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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a case study of how bonding and bridging social capital function in 
community-based coastal resource management (CBCRM) in Fiji. Fiji provides a suitable 
case for the study of the human dimensions of CBCRM as common pool resource (CPR) 
management, because first, the existence of customary marine tenure and second, the 
existence of Fijian community norms that affect on members’ use of resources by 
constituting an area-specific institutional framework. This allows us to compare it to the 
recent CBCRM movement involving different stakeholders, including NGOs and 
government agencies who build bridging social capital with local communities. Using data 
collected from two districts of Viti Levu island in semi-structured interviews and an 
individual survey, I analyse how bonding and bridging social capital affect CBCRM. I am 
especially concerned with its impact on (1) villagers’ understanding of the rules; and (2) 
their compliance with the rules.
My results suggest that strong bonds among village members help disseminate information 
and knowledge in the village. Regularly held village meetings and gatherings, such as for 
church groups, women’s clubs, men’s clubs and mother’s clubs, contribute to information 
sharing and allow for the dissemination of information to all villagers. They are then able to 
make decisions and gain greater understanding of the process through which they are made. 
The kinship based village structure in Fiji contributes to the high degree of accountability to 
other villagers of the nominated fish wardens responsible for the monitoring of marine 
resources. The norms of sharing and exchange allow for the control of emotions, such as 
anger and hatred, toward rule breakers. As a result of these high levels of bonding social 
capital, the cost of rule enforcement in Fijian villages remains relatively low.
Increased cooperation between NGOs and local villages build ‘weak ties’, which then allows 
key actors in villages to gain access to new knowledge and information on coastal resource 
management. Furthermore, joining those NGOs from outside the village affects how 
villagers’ perceive compliance with local resource use rules. If an NGO took an ‘individual 
participation approach’ and considered a village to be a group of individuals with
i
heterogeneous interests, a sense of ownership over the project was facilitated among 
villagers. However, if an NGO took a ‘group approach,’ treating a village as a group whose 
members share common interests and follow traditional decision making arrangements, the 
sense of ownership and responsibility among villagers in resource management became 
lower. My results suggest that this affected how villagers perceive compliance with local 
resource use rules, mainly because the management plan failed to incorporate the knowledge 
of local ecological conditions possessed by resource users.
I conclude that a credible commitment among the villagers is enhanced by connecting 
individuals and fostering collective interests that, in turn, lead to mutually reinforcing 
expectations. These encourage individuals to pursue their long term interests rather than 
only that of the immediate and short-term. In short, whether or not the interactive processes 
among the villagers are taken into account during project implementation can make the 
difference between whether communities build common understanding and mutual trust 
among interdependent individuals, or whether they end up stagnating in their cooperative- 
arrangements.
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GLOSSARY
koro a village
mataqali sub-clan
qoliqoli customary fishing rights areas
roko tui Fijian provincial officer
tabu taboo; implies a religious sanction or sacred. In the context of community-based 
coastal resource management in Fiji, it means a marine protected area where people 
are not allowed to catch any marine creatures.
tikina a district
tokatoka extended family
turaga a chief
turaga ni mataqali sub-clan head
turaga ni yavusa clan head or chief
turaga ni koro appointed village leader
yavusa a clan
yaqona also called kava. It is made from the dried and pulverised root of Piper methysticum 
plant. It has anaesthetic effects. Drinking kava used to be a ceremony limited to 
chief but now developed into a sort of entertainment for Fijians and the benefit of 
visitors.
vakaturaga Fijian ideal behaviour including respect, deference, and humility, as well as 
compliance to the various traditional obligations and responsibilities
vanua land or tribe
vasu the mother’s brothers’ son, who has a right to take whatever he wants from his 
uncle’s property
Sources: Capell (1991) and Ravuvu (1983)
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The past few decades have seen substantial investment directed at reducing pressures on 
coastal resources in the island states o f the Pacific. Large amounts o f money, time and 
effort have gone into a variety o f coastal resource management activities aimed at solving 
problems related to the degradation o f coastal resources. Simultaneously, the practice o f 
coastal resource management has evolved. A large shift in thinking took place from a 
centralised or ‘ top-down’ approach to what is commonly called community-based or 
‘bottom-up’ resource management. The shift to a community-based approach to coastal 
resource management has been especially visible in the Pacific islands, where halting and 
reversing the degradation o f the coastal environment by working with local communities is 
accepted as the norm in both government policy and international donors’ strategies. 
Numerous governments, international donors, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
suggest that the most appropriate approach in responding to the need for the proper 
management o f coastal resources in the region is through community-based coastal 
resource management (CBCRM) (for example, King and Lambeth 2000; LM M A  Network
This thesis analyses how social capital affects CBCRM in small, non-urbanised 
communities dependent on coastal fishing for their food supply and economic activities. 
Currently, little is known about the processes through which social capital in rural 
communities is translated into action regarding CBCRM. Fiji was chosen for this study 
because it offers the opportunity to study a case o f CBCRM in which the central 
government claims jurisdiction over surrounding waters while the law recognises the 
customary fishing rights o f local indigenous Fijians. In recent years, NGOs have 
intervened in rural communities and have affected their resource use.
From the perspective o f theoretical generalisation, a large-N study where I would 
visit a large number o f villages engaging in CBCRM and measure their bonding and 
bridging social capital would have been preferable, but it was impossible given time and 
funding constraints. I chose to take an in-depth look at two particular cases and compare 
them. I conducted a case study o f two particular districts on V iti Levu island in the 
Republic o f Fiji Islands, collecting my data using a mixed method. By analysing how these 
two districts attempt to solve the problem o f collective action, I explore the possibilities for 
improving CBCRM. Although lim iting theoretical generalisation, 1 focus on two cases to 
provide the reader with a close-up view o f how individuals perceive CBCRM. Unless we 
can understand the perception and behaviour o f individuals, we cannot understand why 
some communities follow rules in CBCRM and others do not.
1.2 Significance of the coastal environment
Given the geographic conditions, a large number o f people in the Pacific islands depend 
heavily on coastal resources for their livelihoods. A t the national level, the status o f coastal
2
and marine resources affects the economic revenues of Pacific island countries especially 
through the tourism industry. First, the images of clear blue water and white sandy beaches 
largely contribute to attracting international tourists. In particular, tourism is a major 
industry in Fiji, being the main earner of foreign exchange. Based on statistics from the 
Reserve Bank of Fiji, Narayan and Prasad (Narayan and Prasad 2003: 6) estimated average 
yearly income from tourism between 1980-2001 of approximately US$1.7 million1. This is 
equivalent to 16 per cent of GDP. Approximately 40,000 people, or 13 per cent of the 
economically active population, are directly or indirectly employed in the tourist industry 
(Fiji Government 1997b). The Fijian Government has targeted annual earnings of 
approximately US$570 million from tourism by 2007 (Fiji Government 2005: 22). 
However, the military coup d’etat of December 2006 may have an unforeseen impact on 
this.
Although the contribution to the national economy may be small compared to 
tourism, small-scale fishing, normally conducted in the areas from the coast to the outer 
slope of the reef, is essential for the day-to-day life of large numbers of coastal dwellers in 
the Pacific islands (Gillett and Lightfoot 2001; King and Lambeth 2000; World Bank 1999). 
According to Dalzell (1993: 28), total coastal fisheries production in the region during the 
early 1990s was estimated to be about 105,000 tonnes per year, worth US$244.5 million. 
Approximately 80 per cent of the coastal fisheries production was used for subsistence -  an 
estimated US$161 million. An economic study of fisheries in Fiji in 2001 estimated that 
the catches by subsistence fishing were worth $23,546,700, while coastal commercial 
fishing and locally-based offshore fishing were worth $10,263,557 and $14,421,000
1 In this thesis, all currency is calculated in US dollars (1 Fijian Dollars = 0.57 US Dollars).
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respectively (Gillett and Lightfoot 2001). Furthermore, subsistence fisheries products such 
as fish and other marine resources have been found to provide 39 per cent of the total 
animal protein in the diet of Pacific Islanders, compared to the worldwide average of 16 per 
cent (World Bank 1999: 1). Due to the high nutritional value of local seafood relative to 
available imported food, many Pacific Island governments actively encourage their people 
to eat more fish and other marine products (for example, King and Lambeth 2000). In short, 
subsistence fishery is an important form of livelihood for coastal dwellers.
In Fiji, the subsistence and village level commercial fishery sector is rapidly 
expanding, and statistics show growth in production over the past two decades. In 1980, 
estimated production was 14,000 tonnes, and by 1992, this had expanded to 16,400 tonnes 
with a value of US$34 million (Veitayaki 1995: 13). In 1996, the amount of production 
had increased further to 17,200 tonnes (Fiji Government 1996b: 9), and to 21,600 tonnes in 
1999 (Gillett and Lightfoot 2001). The production reached up to 29,609 tonnes in 2005, 
while it decreased to 24,661 tonnes in 2006 (Fiji Government 2007a: 5).
Data from the 1996 Fiji census2 shows the significance of subsistence living (Table 
LI and Figure LI). The census reported that 297,770 people (38.4 per cent) of the entire 
population are ‘economically active’3, while the rest are either ‘economically inactive' or 
are children under 15-years of age. Of this group, 61,191 people, or 20.5 per cent, are
2 Although the latest national census of Fiji was conducted on 16 September 2007, the result was not available 
by the time this thesis was submitted.
' Economically active is defined as ‘all persons of either sex who furnish the supply of labour for production 
of goods and services defined by the United Nations System of National Accounts and Balances in the one 
week before the census night of 15 August 1996.’ This includes people are in paid employment, engaged in 
subsistence activities, actively looking for a job, or unemployed.
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involved only in subsistence activities4, such as farming and fishing for either their own or 
their household's consumption. Nearly six per cent (17,265 people) are unemployed. 
Although the rest (219,314 people or 73.6 per cent) are in paid employment, a substantial 
number -  29.7 per cent of them (88,562 people) engage in subsistence activities in addition 
to their paid job. For instance, as shown in Figure 1.1, 50.2 per cent of the economically 
active population are engaged in subsistence living either on a full-time or part-time basis.
In particular, this is common among the rural population of Indigenous Fijians 
compared to other ethnic groups in Fiji. Figure 1.2 shows that approximately 80,000 (83.7 
per cent) of 95,683 Fijians living in rural areas produce food for themselves and/or their 
families. The high percentage of the rural population engaged in subsistence living 
suggests that the quality and availability of natural resources have a disproportionate 
impact on the Fijian population than other racial groups.
In the case of the villages of Verata district of Viti Levu, a species of shellfish 
Anadara spp., locally known as kaikoso, contributes up to 37 per cent of total income 
earned (an average of US$70/fortnight) by each household and provides a consistent source 
of protein of 2,635kg, iron of 56kg over 10,505 kcal to a village population of 310 per year. 
(Tawake 2004: 97). These data show that natural resources, including marine products 
contribute substantially to the economy and health of rural villages. Furthermore, the 
geographic fact that Fiji is a nation of islands means that fishing plays a significant role in 
the lives and livelihoods of the people.
4 In the 1996 Census, the word ‘subsistence’ was used to indicate persons whose main activity during the 
reference period (one week before the census night of 15 August 1996) was farming or fishing for own or 
household consumption.
5
In addition to these economic benefits, it is well-known that the coastal environment 
and its resources are of cultural and ecological importance to the local population. In many 
areas of the South Pacific, a division of labour in fishing between men and women has 
evolved. Fishing with boats has primarily been the domain of men while women have 
concentrated on collecting a wide variety of species from the reef and inshore area. Some 
of these activities are communally implemented and a number of customs and traditions 
have developed as a result of the intimate relationship between coastal communities and the 
sea. Although the social value of such activities are difficult to quantify, Pacific Islanders 
claim that fishing plays an important role in the culture and identity of their communities 
(for example, Veitayaki 2000a). The ecological significance of coastal ecosystems, such as 
mangroves and other wetlands, coral reefs and lagoons, cannot be underestimated. They 
provide a key defence against erosion and deflect and absorb much of the energy of storms.
6
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Figure 1.1 Economic activities of people in Fiji
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1.3 Overview of the study
This study investigates the functions o f social capital in CBCRM in Fiji where non-local 
organisations assist local residents in their management activities. It draws on the literature 
on social capital, defined as the norms and social networks that facilitate collective action 
among individuals. It is a set o f values and relationships that exist in a society and that are 
developed through interactions with others. The important point o f the social capital 
argument is that, by developing social capital, a group o f people can build trust that affects 
the degree o f their collaborative actions.
It is widely recognised that theories o f common-pool resources (CPR) are 
particularly important in the study o f the governance o f natural resources and they explain 
why social capital is necessary in CBCRM. To avoid commons problems caused by the 
two key elements o f subtractability and excludability5, long-lasting CPR use requires 
cooperation among users (Ostrom 1990). Users need to share norms and understand rules 
regarding resource use so as to maintain the institutions to some extent.
The literature on new institutionalism has reached a general consensus that building 
institutions that empower local communities is a prerequisite for long-lasting resource 
management. This is because institutions reduce uncertainty by providing structure to 
management (North 1990) and by clarifying those actions that are permitted and those 
actions that are prohibited (Oakerson and Walker 1997). Furthermore, institutions affect 
the way a community evolves over time because they affect people’s choices by: ( l)
5 Subtractability (or rivalry) means that the level o f exploitation by one user adversely affects the ability o f 
another user to exploit the resource.’ Excludability (or control o f access) refers to ‘the physical nature o f the 
resource is such that controlling access by potential users may be costly and, in the extreme, virtually 
impossible’ . Feeny, David, Fikret Berkes, Bonnie J. MaCay, and James M. Acheson. 1990. "The tragedy o f 
the commons: twenty-two years later." Human Ecology 18: 1-19.
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influencing the availability of information and resources; (2) by shaping incentives; and (3) 
by establishing the basic rules of social transactions (Nicholson 1993). As CPR researchers 
have argued, a certain level of trust among resource users is necessary to sustain institutions. 
As a result, it follows that social capital plays a critical role in CPR management.
Despite the fact that existing CPR research has argued that social capital is 
important, little empirical work has focused on how social capital functions in CPR 
management. In particular, this thesis focuses on the two-dimensional nature of social 
capital, expressed by bonding and bridging capitals, to analyse a CBCRM case with 
external interventions. Bonding social capital, defined as ties among somewhat 
homogenous groups, represents social capital within the community, while bridging social 
capital, defined as ties across diverse social groups, corresponds to the concept of social 
capital between the community and external organisations.
The concept of a two-dimensional nature of social capital is helpful in explaining 
the CBCRM situation in Fiji. Fijians themselves characterise village life as a source of 
their identity and a symbol of unity. These strong ties - or strong bonding social capital - 
have been an important factor in enabling Fijians to cooperate in maintaining two 
institutions vital in conserving their resources. These are the system of customary fishing 
grounds or qoliqoli, and the traditional practice of marine management or tabu. However, 
due to some externally driven factors, especially the recent increasing interdependence with 
the world economy, Fijian village life has been changing rapidly. During my fieldwork I 
was told by numerous villagers that people in a village are becoming individualistic 
because of their demand for money. This is especially pronounced in places which are 
more exposed to commercial activities like tourism.
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As a response to the problem of resource degradation caused by unsustainable 
methods of resource use, NGOs have promoted CBCRM projects in Fijian villages. The 
theory underlying these projects is that of CPR, promoting self-governance by the villagers. 
In doing so, the NGOs empower the community members by providing knowledge, skills 
and suggestions in order to revive the traditional resource use practices, specifically tabu 
(Veitayaki et al. 2001: 1). In short, the NGO projects aim to build bridging social capital in 
the context of CBCRM.
In order to improve the effectiveness of coastal resource management in the region, 
it is important to increase the understanding of how different types of social capital affect 
CBCRM. Through an analytical framework based on CPR theories and social capital, I 
analyse how social capital acts as a catalyst in CPR management and influences the 
durability of CBCRM with intervention from external organisations such as NGOs. Since 
the challenge of CPR management is to get people to collaborate to maintain institutions, 
one way to measure ‘long-lasting CBCRM’ is to examine:
(1) if the resource users share a common understanding of the rules; and
(2) if they follow these rules.
To assess how villagers share a common understanding of the rules of marine resource use, 
I conducted interviews of villagers. Although I intended to collect data measuring the 
behaviour of village residents regarding rule compliance, this was impossible because there 
was no actual record on infringements in the villages. As a result, by conducting an 
individual questionnaire survey, I collected data on the perceptions of respondents 
concerning whether or not they complied with the rules.
1 1
It has been pointed out by numerous scholars (for example, Bullen and Onyx 1998; 
Halpern 2005; Woolcock and Narayan 2000) that the measurement of social capital is 
inherently complex. For the purpose of this study, 1 follow previous studies that have 
attempted to measure social capital and socioeconomic outcomes across a number of rural 
villages in different developing countries (Grootaert et al. 2004; Narayan 1997; Narayan 
and Pritchett 1999). Forms of social capital are society-specific, diverse, and change over 
time. Therefore, the instruments for measurement must focus on a range of dimensions of 
social capital rather than the usual measure of just group membership (Narayan and 
Cassidy 1999).
The following measures employed for my study are based on Grootaert et al. (2004) 
who suggest that studies of social capital in developing nations should focus on people’s 
subjective perceptions. The three most important perceptions associated with social capital 
are: first, trustworthiness of other people; second, the institutions that shape their lives; and 
third, the norms of cooperation and reciprocity that surround them. Questions from the 
Integrated Questionnaire for the Measurement of Social Capital (Grootaert et al. 2004) 
were modified to fit the local conditions of my study sites in Fiji. The interview guides and 
survey questionnaire can be found in Appendix A and Appendix B respectively.
Given that the concept is complex and that no consensus exists on a single measure, 
this study employs a combination of three different empirical indicators of bonding social 
capital. The first indicator was the number of social groups in a village. This was based on 
a qualitative assessment of the responses of interviewees in each village to the question 
asking, “What types of organisations or groups exist in this village?”
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The second indicator was a measure of the norm of reciprocity among villagers 
regarding the use of coastal resource using two questions in the survey. First, respondents 
were asked, “Do you use borrowed fishing gear from other people?” Second, only for 
those who replied yes, a follow-up question was asked, “When you borrow, what are your 
obligations?” Those who answered that they had “no obligation” were considered to have a 
low sense of reciprocity while those who said that they would “give part of the fish catch” 
to the owner of the fishing gear were considered to have a high sense of reciprocity. This 
reciprocity was used as a measure for trust.
The third indicator for bonding social capital was the perception of the sense of 
solidarity among villagers. This was measured by the number of respondents who 
answered the question, “If there were a sudden decline in fish catch in village waters who 
do you think would act to deal with the situation?” The number of respondents who 
answered “the village working together” was treated as an indicator of the sense of 
solidarity and, therefore, bonding social capital, among villagers. Each of the three 
indicators was examined separately as an indicator of bonding social capital.
The following three measures were used as indicators for bridging social capital. 
The first indicator for bridging social capital was the number of external assistance 
development projects conducted in the village. A large number of projects were assumed 
to suggest that the villagers have relatively cooperative relations with external groups. This 
was measured using the in-depth interview question, “Is there any other organisation (e.g. 
NGO, donor, university) that has had or is having any project in your village in the past 10 
years (e.g. health, education, infrastructure, conservation)”?
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The second indicator for bridging social capital was the relationship between 
villagers and NGOs regarding marine protected area management. It was important to 
capture the sense among villagers that they felt that they could learn something about MPA 
management from groups outside the village. This was measured by the question in the 
survey asking, “How many times have you attended meeting/workshop/training regarding 
MPA management?” Since attendance at these meetings was voluntary, those respondents 
who attended were assumed to have been villagers who trusted outside organisations to 
improve their skills and knowledge.
The third indicator for bridging social capital was the relationship between villagers 
and government officials. This was measured using the in-depth interviews with villagers 
who were asked, “How does your village contact government agencies” and “what do you 
contact them for?” Responses that villagers frequently contacted government officials were 
assumed to suggest that they had a certain level of trust of outside agencies and were 
willing to work with them to resolve their problems.
The indicators framework is shown in Figure 1.3.
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Figure 1.3 Social capital indicator framework in this study
Social capital
Bridging social capital
Bonding social capital
Sense of solidarity
Number of external assistance 
village received
Relationship with NGOs 
regarding Marine Protected Area
Number of social groups 
in village
Relationship with 
government officials
Norms of reciprocity regarding 
coastal resource use
To analyse how the two types o f social capital affect CBC'RM as CPR management, 
I pose the following research question:
What are the different roles of bonding and bridging social capital in CBCRM?
Through an analysis o f data collected in the field and analysed from the social capital 
perspective, I w ill conclude this thesis with a discussion o f how non-local organisations 
could assist more effectively in the development o f durable CPR institutions.
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1.4 Limitations of the study
This study acknowledges the complexity o f the coastal environment and its management. 
As Orbach (1995: 50) argues, in addition to understanding the non-human components, 
policymaking regarding coastal resource management should involve all interrelated 
components o f ‘cultural ecology’ o f the coastal environment and its resources. These are:
(1) the human constituencies o f the coastal environment itself, including the people 
who live on, use, or otherwise are concerned in their beliefs or behaviours with 
the coastal environment; and
(2) the policy makers, managers and other authority whose decisions and actions 
affect the behaviour o f the coastal constituencies defined in (1).
In other words, coastal management systems can be thought o f as a system o f relationships 
among people. Thus, it is important to take integrated approaches which consider social, 
economic and political concerns among all the actors.
Nevertheless, in this study I pay special attention to the stakeholders who directly 
use the coastal resources and who are directly involved in decision making, focusing on 
institutional aspects o f coastal resource management. Indeed, although many factors may 
influence CBCRM management, this study is concerned specifically with the role and 
influence o f social capital in CBCRM institutions in Fiji. The rationale for directing 
attention toward these two types o f social interactions, bonding social capital and bridging 
social capital, comes from recent developments within institutional choice theory, upon 
which much o f community-based resource management is based. However, few empirical 
studies have been conducted to date emphasising the two-dimensional nature o f social
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capital in the context of community-based resource management. In this study, 1 will use 
these concepts to explain human actions in the context of rural, non-urbanised villages in 
Fiji.
Furthermore, I also acknowledge the complexity of human constituencies in the 
Fijian coastal environment. Fiji is a country of people with diverse racial origins. Different 
ethnic groups are concerned with the uses of local coastal resources. However, my focus is 
on indigenous Fijians living in rural, non-urbanised villages for two primary reasons. The 
first reason is related to existing Fijian institutions. The Fisheries Act officially recognises 
the customary fishing rights of indigenous Fijians who are considered ‘resource owners.’ 
Therefore, as explained earlier, decisions made by indigenous leaders and their community 
have a direct effect on coastal resource management in Fiji. Even the national government 
does not have full control over the resources.
The second reason for focusing on indigenous Fijians in rural areas is the nature of 
existing CBCRM projects in Fiji. Since 1 am interested in how non-local, external 
organisations, particularly NGOs, assist CBCRM, 1 selected only districts where NGOs 
have worked on CBCRM. Until now, no CBCRM project in Fiji has focused on non- 
indigenous Fijians. In addition, the social situation constrained my ability to conduct my 
fieldwork. Generally speaking, indigenous Fijians and other ethnic groups live in separate 
geographic regions, in part due to the race-based policies of the British colonial 
government. The colonial government introduced Indians as labour for sugarcane 
plantations, while indigenous Fijians were encouraged to maintain their cultural practices. 
As experienced by other post-colonial nations, this division has led to a complex political 
and social situation in Fiji even after independence in 1970. This is an unavoidable facet of
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Fijian life and has resulted in mistrust, fear, dislike, and sometimes even hatred between 
different racial and cultural groups (Ewins 1998: 70). This fact is the major reason behind 
a major limitation in my study - I was able to interview' only one Indo-Fijian fisher. Given 
the relations between the ethnic groups, it was impossible for me to extend my data 
collection to the Indo-Fijian population while spending the majority of my time in 
indigenous Fijian villages.
From this point forward, I will use the term ‘Fijians’ only when referring to 
‘indigenous Fijians’, the descendants of Fiji’s original settlers. Other ethnic groups 
referred to are Indo-Fijian or Indian, Chinese, and Europeans. While I understand that 
there is debate on the question of what terminology should be used for Fijian citizens of 
various ethnic backgrounds, I follow the convention of the Fiji Government in its 
publications (for example, Fiji Today 2005-20066). These conventions are also followed 
by most citizens in their day-to-day conversations.
The greatest weakness of my study has to do with the issue of generalisability. 
Despite the growing interest in and awareness of its importance, there are only a few 
datasets that measure social capital. The most well-known is the Social Capital 
Community Benchmark Survey 20007, designed at Harvard University and conducted in 
the United States. However, despite the existence of this dataset and a few others 
conducted throughout Europe no data exists in the context of CBCRM as CPR management. 
What is more, many of the indicators used in developed countries will not be applicable to 
developing countries. As a result, I spent a large amount of time collecting my own data.
6 http://www.fiji.gov.fj/uploads/FijiToday2005-06.pdf
7 http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_acces/data/datasets/social_capital_community_survey.html
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Although it does not have the same level o f generalisability as a large-N study, the case 
study approach does allow for descriptive inference and greater understanding o f the 
processes through which social capital operates at the individual level o f analysis -  albeit in 
only two particular districts. While future researchers may be able to design valid 
indicators for social capital that allow for comparison between many cases, for now, that 
data simply does not exist. However, i f  one o f our primary goals is to increase our 
understanding o f CPR in local communities -  especially in terms o f how these communities 
perceive CPR themselves - then my case study does offer the reader a rich depth o f detail 
regarding individual actions and individual perceptions that would be absent in a large-N 
study.
1.5 Plan of this thesis
The organisation o f this thesis is presented in Figure 1.4. Chapter 2 reviews the existing 
theoretical literature in order to develop an analytical framework. It begins with a set o f 
assumptions and definitions necessary for this study, followed by a discussion o f 
institutions, particularly different types o f property rights regimes. Although several types 
o f property regimes exist, this study draws extensively from the CPR theory (for example, 
Berkes 1989; Ostrom 1990) that explains community-based resource management, 
avoiding overexploitation by promoting collective action among resource users. The 
chapter takes a closer look at the theoretical puzzle involving the relationship between 
social capital and CPR management. In particular, the focus is on the two-dimensional 
nature o f social capital, which is especially relevant to CPR management involving 
multiple stakeholders. The difficulty in operationalising social capital is also discussed.
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Chapter 3 provides the background on CBCRM in Fiji. I describe the physical and 
socioeconomic conditions of the country by reviewing the existing literature in Fijian 
Studies. First, I describe Fiji’s elements of geography and natural environment relevant to 
the study. Although Fiji’s ecosystems vary, this study is limited to its coastal region. 
Second, I explain the general structure of Fijian society so as to understand the norms upon 
which the culture is organised. For the purpose of this study, among numerous existing 
institutions in Fiji, customary marine tenure and the norms of reciprocity are the most 
relevant. Third, the discussion goes into issues related to the coastal environment and its 
management, including concepts and definitions, as well as threats. The emphasis is on 
recent MPAs commonly used as a conservation tool in Fijian CBCRM. Fourth, I describe 
the public policy structure of Fiji specific to jurisdiction over concerns regarding CBCRM. 
Fifth, 1 give an overview of recent trends in coastal resource management in Fiji.
Chapter 4 explains the research methods, citing the criteria for selecting the two 
cases, field methods used for data collection and methods of analysis. My data includes 
both qualitative and quantitative types and 1 employed several different methods of 
collection. A mixed method is appropriate for this study, because both quantitative and 
qualitative aspects of social capital are necessary to produce a comprehensive picture of the 
structure and perceptions of different dimensions of social capital.
20
Figure 1.4 Organisation of thesis
Chap ter 1 Introduction
Has chapter provides a problem statement, an overview of the study including research questions, 
and scope and limitations of study.
Chapter 2 Theoretical Background
This chapter reviews existing literature on social capital and the theories of common-pool resource, 
in order to provide an analytical framework for this study.
Chap ter 3 The Context -  p eop le and the environment
This chapter provide a review of literature on topics related to this study as background 
information. The topics include Fiji’s geography and the coastal environment, Fijian social 
structure and customs, structure of public policy and government of Fiji, and the recent trends in 
coastal resource management in Fiji.
Chap ter 4 Methodology
This chapter explains methodology used in this thesis, including criteria for selecting the two cases, 
field methods used for data/information collection and methods of analysis.
I
Results and Analysis 
Chap ter 5
CB CRM Institutions of Fiji
In this chapter, data show similarity and difference m the 
operations of institutions in the study sites. In particular, the 
study found that the degree of compliance with fishing rules 
and governance structure are different.
Chap ter 6
Norms in Fijian Village Life and S 
haring Information for CBCRM
This chapter shows that there is no critical difference in 
bonding social capital in the study sites and that bonding 
social capital is not the key variable to explain the 
differences in the operation of institutions presented in 
Chapter 5
Chapter 7
NGO Approaches to Information Sharing and 
Rule Compliance in CBCRM
This chapter argues that differences in NGO approaches 
through which they build bridging social capital caused 
the difference in the operations of institutions showed in 
Chapter 5.
This chapter summarise
Chap ter 8 Cone fusion
findings of the research and discuss implications for future CBCRM
projects
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In the two study sites, Cuvu and Wai districts, I conducted semi-structured 
interviews, direct observation, and participant observation to obtain in-depth qualitative 
information. Individual surveys were implemented to collect quantitative data. I also 
collected and reviewed documents to acquire baseline information that is both quantitative 
and qualitative. Triangulation allows the researcher to combine the data and information 
collected through multiple methods and sources. Critical issues regarding methods, such as 
the validity and reliability of the methods, as well as ethical consideration, are also 
discussed.
In Chapters 5, 6 and 7, I discuss my findings and provide an analysis of the data and 
information collected. Chapter 5 explores CBCRM institutions in Fiji that constrain 
villages’ behaviour regarding their resource use and management. The two indicators used 
to measure long-lasting CBCRM are (1) if the resource users share a common 
understanding of the rules; and (2) if they follow these rules. My data show that the 
villagers in both districts have similar levels of understanding of fishing rules, while their 
perceptions of the level of rule compliance in their own districts differ. Following this 
analysis, the chapter also examines existing institutional arrangements related to CBCRM, 
comparing governance structures of the two districts.
The next two chapters explore possible reasons for the differences between the two 
districts regarding rule compliance, by focusing on bonding and bridging social capital 
respectively. Chapter 6 aims to analyse issues related to bonding social capital. Despite 
the suggestion of past literature that trust among resource users is the key in CPR 
management, I argue that current bonding social capital in the two districts cannot explain 
the variations in the operation of institutions presented in Chapter 5. In fact, my data show
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that there is no critical difference in bonding social capital in the two districts. Following 
this analysis, I present how bonding social capital is affecting CBCRM activities in the two 
districts. I argue that bonding social capital is not the key variable to the sustainability of 
CBCRM institutions in Fiji. However, it is important in understanding that ties among 
villagers that have been fostered over generations as part of their social system and how 
they are relevant to CBCRM activities. I also discuss the reasons for the consensus among 
villagers that their ties as a community have weakened.
Chapter 7 analyses the functions of bridging social capital in CBCRM. In this 
chapter, 1 argue that bridging social capital is critical in CBCRM in Fiji and present how 
bridging social capital, particularly the one added by NGOs, caused the differences in the 
operation of institutions presented in Chapter 5. The chapter begins with discussion of 
different types of ties between the villages and external groups. These include access to 
external assistance, their relationship with NGOs regarding CBCRM and their relationship 
with government officials. My field research found that the relationship with NGOs 
differed between the two districts while there was no major difference in other types and 
levels of bridging social capital. In short, I argue that a type of bonding social capital 
developed by the presence of the NGOs explains the difference in the operation of CBCRM 
institutions. I discuss the history of NGO interventions in the two districts to compare the 
procedures they follow in conducting their projects. It is interesting to note that although 
both NGOs similarly emphasise their projects to be community-based, my survey and 
interview data show that their approach and activities were different, especially regarding 
the process of management planning. The difference in the NGO approaches could be the 
reason for the difference in the degree of rule compliance shown in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 8, the concluding chapter, summarises the findings o f this study and their
implications.
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CHAPTER 2
Theoretical Framework
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I discuss the theoretical framework to be used in the analysis that follows. 
The framework is derived from two streams o f theoretical literature - that o f social capital 
and that o f common-pool resource (CPR) regimes.
Social capital is a set o f values and relationships that exist in a society and can be 
developed through repeated interactions with others. These interactions facilitate 
cooperation among individuals because people build trust through common norms and 
social networks. CPR theory has been applied to the management o f natural resources, 
including coastal resources. These resources are commonly used by a defined set o f 
individuals who create institutional arrangements and management regimes that help them 
use the resource over long periods o f time. Examples o f CPR regimes include collectively 
managed forests, irrigation systems, fisheries and land for grazing. Previous research on 
the mechanisms o f collective action has found that shared norms o f reciprocity and 
common values are critical to overcoming the strong temptations to pursue short-term self- 
interest. We assume that social capital is a critical variable in encouraging collective action 
among individuals -  a requirement o f CPR management.
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While the identification of social norms and values as significant for collective 
action is plausible, an important question still remains unanswered. Regardless of the form 
it takes, is long-lasting natural resource management at the community level stimulated by 
more social capital? In order to address this gap in the literature and to contribute to 
building a framework for the analysis of CPR management, this thesis introduces the two- 
dimensional nature of social capital, defined as bonding and bridging social capital, to 
identify and examine social relations within a resource user group, and to identify the 
effects of interactions between the resource user group, external actors and institutions. In 
order to analyse the role of the two dimensions of social capital in CPR management, the 
rest of this thesis intends to answer the research question posed in the previous chapter.
What are the different roles of bonding and bridging social capital in CBCRM?
This chapter provides the theoretical background by outlining a set of assumptions 
and definitions to be used in this study. It then defines the concept of social capital in order 
to explain why some communities are able to overcome collective action problems while 
others are not. Through a review of the literature, I explain my operational definition of 
social capital. The discussion then proceeds to the CPR theory that explains community- 
based resource management. After a detailed explanation of the CPR theory as well as a 
review of existing literature on social capital and CPR management, the discussion 
proceeds to my theoretical question involving how different types of social capital function 
in CBCRM and the relationship between social capital and CPR management. This is 
particularly relevant to CPR management involving multiple stakeholders because different
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interactions among the stakeholders are expressed as different types o f social capital. The
measurement issue is dealt with when I review the debates concerning the difficulty in
operationalising the concept o f social capital
2.2 Assumptions and definitions 
2.2.1 Appropriators as a rational actor
This study is about deliberate human intervention in the coastal environment. A ll human 
actions ultimately have different levels o f consequences on the quality and quantity o f
natural resources, and environmental degradation is one o f the first indications o f
unsustainable social and economic systems. Management o f natural resources is thus at the 
frontline o f the struggle for more sustainable and equitable development o f coastal areas. 
So as to explore and explain how people can manage coastal resources more effectively, it 
is necessary to make a set o f assumptions and definitions about the primary actors, as well 
as the resources that they depend upon.
In this study, it is assumed that individuals are bounded rational actors8. People 
make intentional rational decisions, that is, they are goal-oriented and adaptive. However, 
they do sometimes fail and end up with choices that are not rational in substance because o f 
the limits o f human cognitive and emotional architecture (Jones 1999). In other words, 
even though individuals try their best when making decisions, a group o f people sometimes 
have to face the unintended and unwanted consequences o f their actions.
s Bounded rationality has been a key component since the 1950s in public administration and public policy 
studies and it is defined as ‘a school o f thought about decision making that developed from dissatisfaction 
with the “ comprehensively rational”  economic and decision theory models o f choice.”  Feeny, David, Susan 
Hanna, and Arthur F. McEvoy. 1996. "Questioning the assumption o f the "tragedy o f the commons" model o f 
fisheries." Land Economics 72: 187-205.
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In any particular resource management situation, those individuals who withdraw 
resource units from a resource system, also known as appropriators (Plott and Meyer 1975), 
are assumed to be rational actors. Examples o f appropriators include fishers, herders, and 
irrigators. Given the complexity o f uncertain situations, their decisions and actions are 
dependent on perceived costs and benefits, primarily based on their values and previous 
information (Ostrom 1990: 33).
2.2.2 Resources
Resource systems are considered stock variables that, under favourable conditions, are 
capable o f producing a maximum quantity o f a resource without harming the stock itself 
(for example, fishing ground, groundwater basins, and grazing areas). This assumption 
underlies the concept o f ‘maximum sustainable yield’ which determines the limits o f 
sustainability in resource use. Resource units are what individuals use from resource 
systems, such as the tons o f fish harvested from a fishing ground, the cubic meters o f water 
withdrawn from a groundwater basin or the tons o f fodder consumed by animals from a 
grazing area (Ostrom 1990: 30).
2.2.3 Institutions
In order to understand how appropriators use and manage natural resources, the concept o f 
institution is important. In his classic definition, Douglass North (1990) states that 
institutions are ‘ the rules o f the game in a society or, more informally, are the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interactions’^ . 3). Meanwhile, rules refer to the 
prescriptions that create authorisations and ‘ rights’ are the product o f ‘ rules’ (Schlager and 
Ostrom 1992: 250). While state legislation is a kind o f institution, institutions can also be
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informal: norms are similar to rules but are considered the informal standard among a 
group of specific individuals. It is important to note that institutions are different from 
‘organisations’ which are ‘groups of individuals bound together by some purpose to 
achieve objectives’ (North 1990: 5).
For the purpose of this study, I use the term “norm” to mean expectations about 
what others will do. In other words, norms in this study are shared beliefs and shared 
information that individuals, as rational actors, use to make decisions. This reduces 
uncertainty in a collective action dilemma as it gives a strong basis for anticipating the 
choices likely to be made by others.
Institutional theorists and resource management practitioners agree that building 
institutions that empower local communities is necessary for long-lasting resource 
management. Previous theoretical studies have given two major explanations for the 
importance of institutions in resource management at the community level. First, according 
to North (1990), institutions reduce uncertainty because they provide structure to 
management, which shapes the interactions among participants of resource management by 
specifying who has authority over what so as to eliminate unnecessary negotiations. 
Second, Oakerson and Walker (1997) argue that institutions clarify people’s actions by 
giving information on what is permitted and what is prohibited. Furthermore, Nicholson 
(1993: 4) argues that institutions affect human choice by influencing the availability of 
information and resources, by shaping incentives, and by establishing the basic rules of 
social transactions. In short, institutional innovation contributes to resource management 
by providing more efficient ways of organising management activity.
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2.2.4 Property rights
For scholars who have tried to explain how and why community-level natural resource 
management works, the institution o f property rights is a particularly significant category. 
Property rights are the rules-in-use that define the range o f privileges that individuals hold 
to specified goods or services (Libecap 1989). In economic terms, optimality requires that 
resource use continues until the marginal benefit o f resource use equals the marginal cost. 
Costs and benefits include those that are private and external. One important factor in 
determining this optimal condition is the nature o f the property rights regime for managing 
the resource (Bromley 1991), because property is ‘a secure claim on a future benefit stream 
(Bromley 1992: 11).’ Thus, property rights define who has access, how much they can 
harvest, who manages, and how rights are transferred (Ostrom 1992: 293).
I f  the appropriators do not have secured rights to the resources, they w ill lack 
incentives to invest in long term resource management because they are not assured o f 
receiving the benefits (Ostrom 1992). When new management practices for the sustainable 
use o f resources are introduced, especially when they do not bring immediate benefits, 
appropriators want to be assured o f some kind o f guarantee o f ownership long enough for 
them to reap the benefits o f their investment. A property rights regime contributes to 
sustainable resource use by reducing uncertainty. Owners are guaranteed access to the 
resource they wish to extract, allowing them to calculate whether the costs o f long-term 
management are worth the benefits (Ostrom 1992). However, while important, 
determining property rights alone may not be a sufficient condition to avoid the 
overexploitation o f a resource. Therefore, some scholars argue that social capital plays a 
critical role in CBCRM.
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2.3 Social capital
A large number o f scholars have studied social capital both theoretically and empirically 
(for example, Coleman 1988; Fukuyama 1995; Putnam 2000; Putnam et al. 1993; 
Woolcock 1998). A number o f government and international agencies (for example, the 
World Bank, the British Government and the Australian Government) also use the term 
‘ social capital’ in their projects and documents (for example, Cote and Healy 2001; Halpern 
2005). As the frequency o f usage increases, there is often confusion over just what is 
meant by ‘ social capital’ . Therefore, to provide an operational definition o f the term for the 
purpose o f this study, the following section provides a review o f the literature on social 
capital.
2.3.1 What is social capital?
The term social capital has increasingly gained popularity among academics and 
practitioners because both view it as a useful concept in delivering desirable outcomes in 
social and economic development. A t the same time, as discussed below, numerous 
authors have criticised the concept o f social capital for its ambiguity and debate continues 
regarding its precise definition. However, a limited consensus does exist that, at the 
minimum, it refers to ‘ trust, concern for one’s associates, a willingness to live by the norms 
o f one’s community and to punish those who do not’ (Bowles and Gintis 2002: l). People 
can accumulate social capital when they interact with others in a variety o f occasions, such 
as what occurs within families, neighbourhoods, workplaces, local associations and a range 
o f informal and formal meeting places. To risk simplifying what is an extensive and rich
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literature, fundamentally, social capital is relational and embedded in the structure of 
people’s relationships with others (Narayan 1999: 6).
In the following section, I provide some examples to provide the basis for 
understanding how social capital is understood in this study. Most people belong to a 
series of different social networks and organisations. Starting with a close relationship 
between family and relatives based on kinship, they grow up within a neighbourhood. 
They may belong to a specific religious or ethnic community. When starting kindergarten 
or school, people make friends and learn from different teachers. People go to work and 
socialise with colleagues, bosses and subordinates. They may belong to a club that keeps 
them in touch with people who have similar interests. They may also join a professional 
association that allows them to exchange information with similar professionals outside of 
their own work context. After work, they may play a sport with a particular club or join 
other groups whose members share common interests, such as photography, chess, or music. 
Some people may also join a political party or citizen group working for a specific political 
purpose, such as women’s rights or environmental protection. These day-to-day social 
networks, including many of the social customs, norms and bonds that define them, are 
held together by social capital.
The significance of social capital is that it benefits the individuals who are in these 
social networks as well as those communities that they belong to. The utility of social 
capital for both the individual and the group is explained with the example of the New 
York wholesale diamond market:
‘In the process of negotiating a sale, a merchant will hand over to another 
merchant a bag of stones for the latter to examine in private at his leisure, with no
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formal insurance that the latter w ill not substitute one or more inferior stones or a 
paste replica. The merchandise may be worth thousands, or hundreds of 
thousands, o f dollars. Such free exchange o f stones for inspection is important to 
the functioning o f this market. In its absence, the market would operate in a 
much more cumbersome, much less efficient fashion. ... It is essentially a closed 
community. Observation o f the wholesale diamond market indicates that these 
close ties, through family, community, and religious affiliation, provide the 
insurance that is necessary to facilitate the transactions in the market. I f  any of 
this community defected through substituting other stones or through stealing 
stones in his temporary possession, he would lose family, religious and 
community ties. The strength o f these ties makes possible transactions in which 
trustworthiness is taken for granted and trade can occur with ease’ (Coleman 
1988: S98-9).
Although the practice above may seem risky to outsiders given the high value o f the 
diamonds and the incentive for an individual to take more than their share, Coleman (1988) 
nonetheless concludes that the market is successful and efficient mainly due to the high 
levels o f trust that exist among the merchants.
2.3.2 Comparison of existing definitions
Different definitions o f social capital have emerged from both w ith in  academia and from
national and international organisations (Table 2.1). One way to define social capital is to
conceptualise it as ‘ resources’ , such as information, ideas and support, which individuals
are able to obtain from their relationships w ith other people. James Coleman (1988), who
was responsible for popularising the term ‘ social capital’ , saw it as the component o f
human capital that allows members o f a given society to trust one another and cooperate in
the formation o f  new groups and associations. He offers the fo llow ing  definition:
‘Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a variety o f 
different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist o f some aspect
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of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors -  whether persons 
or corporate actors -  within that structure. Like other forms of capital, social 
capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its 
absence would not be possible’ (Coleman 1988: S96).
Similar to Coleman, Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J.D. Wacquant (1992) and Nan Lin (2001)
argue that social capital consists of resources embedded in social relations and social
structures, which can be accessed and used only through human relationships. Bourdieu
and Wacquant (1992: 119) argue that economic orthodoxy was artificially limiting itself to
the study of a narrow band o f ‘practices’ that were socially recognised as ‘economic’, and
in so doing was missing the fact that ‘capital presents itself under three fundamental species
(each with its own subtypes), namely economic capital, cultural capital, and social capital.’
Therefore, in this way, Bourdieu and Wacquant define social capital as:
‘...the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a 
group by virtue of processing a durable network of more or less institutionalised 
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition. Acknowledging that 
capital can take a variety of forms is indispensable to explain the structure and 
dynamics of differentiated societies’ (1992: 119).
For Nan Lin (2001), social capital is ‘capital captured through social relations’ (p. 19), 
focusing on two different levels: that o f the individual and that of the group. At the 
individual level, one accesses and uses resources embedded in social networks to gain 
returns in his/her particular actions, such as finding a job9 (Lin 2001: 21). While some 
economists question how social capital can be considered ‘capital’ (for example, Arrow 
1999: 4; Solow 1999: 6), Lin (2001: 25) defends social capital stating that, when an
l) Putnam’s view of social capital is broader than that of Lin. According to Lin, social capital is the 
expectation among actors that other actors in the same network will reciprocate in any exchange of goods or 
services. Although Putnam’s definition includes this aspect of social capital, it is also includes the wider, 
unintended positive consequences on the entire society of having such social capital. For Putnam, higher 
levels of social capital in a society tend to be associated with higher levels of economic growth.
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individual is aware of the presence of resources they possess or can access in their social 
ties and networks with others, the individual can capitalise on these resources in order to 
obtain benefits for themselves. This function of social capital reinforces an argument of 
Francis Fukuyama (1999), often regarded as one of the first to give prominence to the 
concept, that social capital is a private good as people cooperate in order to achieve their 
selfish ends. However, Lin (2001) also states that ‘aggregation of individual returns also 
benefits the collective’ (p.21). Contrary to the individual level, certain groups can develop 
and more or less maintain social capital at the group level, as a collective good to enhance 
the life chances of group members (Lin 2001: 22). This function of social capital focuses 
more on the ‘public good nature’ of social capital and this view is shared by Coleman 
(1988; 1990), Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) as well as Putnam (1993; 1995).
Putnam is largely responsible for popularising the concept of social capital over the
last fifteen years. In the book ‘Making Democracy Work’ (Putnam et al. 1993), the authors
linked the differences in performance outcomes of 20 regional governments in Italy to the
number of horizontal civic associations. They concluded that associationism, trust, and
cooperation facilitate successful regional government which then results in economic
prosperity. Social capital in this perspective is used as a conceptual term to characterise the
various ways in which members of a given community relate to one another. The
definition of social capital in Putnam’s work is:
a feature of social organisation, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can 
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action (Putnam et al.
1993: 167).
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Putnam (2000; 1993) argues that a range of social problems, such as crime, health 
and the environment are linked to a community’s endowment of social capital. This is 
explained by people’s cooperation facilitated by a repeated game of Prisoner’s Dilemma, as 
well as networks that convey information of individuals’ intentions and behaviour to others 
within the network. Putnam’s concept is based on two presumptions: first, that social 
networks and norms are empirically associated; and second, that they have important 
economic consequences. As discussed above, the latter is what Lin (2001) emphasises as 
the function of social capital at the group level.
Michael Woolcock also has produced a number of papers on social capital. His 
view supports that of Coleman and Putnam. He offers a general definition of social capital 
as:
‘...the information, trust, and norms of reciprocity inhering in one's social 
networks’ (Woolcock 1998: 153).
Woolcock (1998) makes a point different from others in that he attempts to develop a 
theoretical framework to explain how different societies could be characterised by the 
relative prevalence of different kinds of social capital. He argued that a range of 
development outcomes flows from different types and combinations of social capital 
determined by community capacity and state functioning.
In addition to a large number of academics, many national and international bodies 
have shown their interest in social capital and have made efforts to conceptualise the term. 
Although those organisations consider its potential in achieving their policy goals, a major 
challenge is to set out an operational definition. For example, the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics and the Office for National Statistics of the United Kingdom have adopted a
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definition developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD):
‘networks, together with shared norms, values and understandings which 
facilitate cooperation within or among groups’ (Cote and Healy 2001: 41).
The World Bank suggests a more expansive and broader definition:
‘social capital refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the 
quality and quantity of a society’s social interaction’ (World Bank, Website)10.
The interesting point is that the World Bank and other researchers (for example, Ahn and 
Ostrom 2001) include ‘institutions’ as a form or component of social capital. This seems to 
add further confusion to the debate over what social capital actually is. As discussed in the 
earlier part of this chapter (Section 2.2.3), North (1990) considers institutions as ‘formal’ 
and ‘informal’ rules of the game in a society. This is a broadly accepted definition. 
Although Halpern (2005: 12) states that community norms can be codified into 
neighbourhood codes or contracts, other prominent studies reviewed above have seen social 
capital as a resource that comes from informal human relationships. Therefore, the use of 
the term ‘institution’ in the definition of social capital can result in too broad a meaning, in 
which social capital may end up meaning all things to all people.
10 http://wwwl .worldbank.org/prem/poverty/scapital/whatsc.htm
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Table 2.1 Different definitions of social capital
Author Definition
Coleman 1988 (p.S96) ‘ form o f capital that makes possible the achievement o f  certain ends that 
in its absence would not be possible’
Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992 
(P-119)
‘ the sum o f the resources that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue 
o f processing a durable network o f more or less institutionalised 
relationships o f mutual acquaintance and recognition’
Nan Lin 2001 ‘ capital captured through social relations’ (p. 19)
‘ the resources embedded in social networks accessed and used by actors 
for actions’ (p.24)
Woolcock 1998 (p. 153) ‘ the information, trust, and norms o f reciprocity inhering in one's social 
networks' seemingly obvious opportunities for mutually beneficial 
collective action are squandered’
Putnam 2000 (p. 19) ‘ connections among individuals -  social networks, and the norms o f 
reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them’
OECD: Cote and Healy 2001 
(P-41)
‘ networks, together w ith shared norms, values and understandings which 
facilitate cooperation w ith in or among groups’
World Bank, Website ‘ the institutions, relationships and norms that shape the quality and 
quantity o f  a society’ s social interaction.’
2.3.3 Operational definition of social capital for this study
As shown in the literature review above, different definitions o f social capital have 
emerged in the last two decades. The term reflects a way o f conceptualising how informal 
cultural, structural, and institutional aspects o f groups in a society interact and affect 
economic and political outcomes. People can overcome the strong temptation to only 
pursue their own short-term self-interest because building social capital helps them develop 
trust among themselves. As Rudd states, a social capital framework is useful to 
conceptually explore
‘ ...the effects of institutional structure on sustainability and to articulate the links 
between social interaction, collective action and social vision’ (2000: p. 132).
Thus, the concept o f social capital is useful in the analytical framework for community- 
based resource management because collective efforts o f individuals are critical in
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achieving group conservation goals. For the purpose o f  this study, social capital is defined
as:
a set o f values, such as the norms o f reciprocity, and social relations embedded in 
the social structure o f society that enable people to act collectively and to achieve 
their desired goals.
For the purpose o f  this study, the strength o f  these values and norms are measured 
em pirically using questions in the survey and semi-structured interviews.
2.3.4 The two-dimensions of social capital
For the purpose o f  this study, the two most important types o f  social capital are ‘ bonding’
and ‘ bridging’ (Table 2.2). While attributing the coining o f this distinction to G ittell and
Vidal (1998), Putnam describes these two types thus:
‘Some forms o f capital are, by choice or necessity, inward looking and tend to 
reinforce exclusive identities and homogenous groups. Examples of bonding 
social capital include ethnic fraternal organisations, church-based women’s 
reading groups and fashionable country clubs. Other networks are outward 
looking and encompass people across diverse social cleavages. Examples of 
bridging social capital include the civil rights movement, many youth service 
groups and ecumenical religious organisations’ (2000: 22-3).
Bonding social capital cements somewhat homogenous groups, whereas bridging social 
capital creates bonds o f  connectedness that are formed across diverse social groups.
This d istinction somewhat repeats the earlier sociological research done by Mark 
Granovetter (1973: 1378) regarding the role played by ‘weak’ ties and ‘ strong’ ties. 
Granovetter’ s challenge was, using a labour market study, to present the linkage o f small, 
face-to-face groups w ith  one another and with larger, more amorphous ones. According to
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him, ‘weak ties’ such as those that occur between acquaintances and various contacts are 
extremely useful in obtaining information, opportunities and jobs. On the other hand, 
‘ strong ties’ such as those that occur between family and close friends provide a more 
intense, multi-stranded form o f support, and as such play a greater role in emotional well­
being. In other words, different types o f social networks, characterised by different forms 
o f interpersonal ties, have different roles, and weak ties are indispensable to the 
opportunities o f individuals and to their integration into communities (Granovetter 1973: 
1378).’ To use Putnam’s terminology, we can interpret Granovetter’ s argument to imply 
that bonding and bridging social capital have different roles. Bridging social capital is 
particularly significant for people’s economic activities.
Table 2.2 The two-dimensions of social capital
Definition Functions Examples
Bonding social 
capital
Social ties which 
cement somewhat 
homogenous groups
As 'strong ties,’ it reinforces 
ethnic identities and 
homogenous groups.
It helps rationalisation o f rules 
and norms w ith in a group so as 
to encourage the members to 
conform.
Social relationships 
w ith in fam ily, close 
friends, ethnic 
fraternal group, 
church-based group.
Bridging social 
capital
Social ties which create 
bonds o f connectedness 
across diverse groups
As ‘weak ties,’ it provides a 
group w ith information, 
opportunities, and technology 
from the external world.
It facilitates information flows 
by enhancing transparency so as 
to reduce transaction costs.
Friends o f friends, 
business associates, 
acquaintances, youth 
service groups, 
ecumenical religious 
organisation.
Other scholars have also contributed to the theoretical arguments regarding types o f 
social capital. Michael Woolcock (1998) attempted to develop a theoretical framework in 
order to show how different societies could be characterised by the relative prevalence o f 
different types o f social capital. He argues that these different types o f relations within and
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between social groups at different levels of society shape the prospects for sustainable 
equitable growth and participatory governance by solving collective action problems. 
While recognising his contribution to the development of the theoretical argument for 
social capital, Halpern (2005: 20) criticises Woolcock as his work created some confusion 
over the use of different terms for similar conceptual distinctions. For instance, Woolcock 
called bonding social capital ‘integration’ and bridging social capital a ‘linkage.’ Focusing 
on state-society relationships, Woolcock (1998; 2001; 2000) also highlights the presence of 
power and uses the concept of ‘linking social capital’ to describe the extent to which an 
individual’s or community’s networks are characterised by linkage between those with very 
unequal power and resources. In sum, linking social capital is a kind of bridging social 
capital but vertical bridge across asymmetrical power and resources.
Fedderke et al. (1999: 716) introduced two different functional roles (but not as 
kinds or forms) of social capital: transparency and rationalisation, in order to answer the 
question whether more social capital increases economic growth. Although such 
distinctions, dimensions and rival conceptions or definitions of social capital create 
confusion, their cross-cutting distinction between the two functions of social capital help us 
understand the roles of bonding and bridging social capital.
The definition of transparency in Fedderke et al. (1999: 719) is ‘the 
comprehensibility of the rules, norms and values of an institution or society to its members.’ 
Since this function of social capital facilitates the flow of information and generally reduces 
transaction costs, a society with more bridging social capital would be seen as having more 
transparency, as information would flow more smoothly between groups. This would 
improve the certainty of outcomes for individuals due to the increased predictability in
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others’ actions, and thus possibly increase the likelihood o f  cooperation between the
members o f the group. Rationalisation o f social capital, on the other hand, refers to ‘ the
degree to which it is embodied in form ally codified rule, norms, and values (Fedderke et al.
1999: 722). I f  a community has more rationalised social capital, such rules, norms or
values w ill be procedural rather than substantive. In other words, those communities with
rigid rules are considered as more rationalised than those w ith behaviour that is more
situationally flexib le and driven by outcome-oriented rules.
The two functions o f social capital, transparency and rationalisation, are not 
independent o f one another. The more universal the rules, the more widely 
accessible to interpretation they become. As a result, the performance o f those 
acting under such rules becomes progressively more transparent and the rules and 
practices themselves become more open to understanding by individuals in the 
society (Fedderke et al. 1999: 729). This indicates that indefinite increases in 
social capital in any one dimension may be neither desirable nor feasible 
(Fedderke et al. 1999). In short, bonding and bridging social capital are related to 
each other and are indivisible. Therefore, there is simply limited potential for 
continued development o f social capital in any one dimension, such as bonding or 
bridging.
2.4 Community-based coastal resource management
In spite o f the significance o f coastal resources to Pacific Islanders, no consensus exists 
regarding the long-term sustainability o f  their use. A  number o f previous studies have 
revealed that coastal ecosystems in the Pacific islands are under increasing threat from 
various sources (Huber and McGregor 2002; UNEP 1999; World Bank 1999), including 
both land-based and ocean-based human activities. According to a W orld Bank cross­
national comparison (W orld Bank 1999), communities o f island nations in the Pacific
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islands are pessimistic about the conditions of their coastal resources. At 21 out of 31 sites 
in Fiji and four other island nations, locals perceived that they expected resources to 
continue declining into the future (World Bank 1999: viii). Given the importance of coastal 
resources in the region, efforts for proper management of coastal resources is necessary for 
improving regional sustainability.
In order to address different problems in coastal ecosystems, it is useful to 
categorise the causes, or drivers, of change in coastal resources, according to their types. 
This study employs categories used in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment lead by the 
United Nations. These categories help to explain the role of actors, including social and 
political organisations, at different levels so as to develop strategies in response to a 
specific problem. The Conceptual Framework for the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
defines a driver as ‘any natural or human-induced factor that directly or indirectly causes a 
change in an ecosystem' (MEA 2005: 87). The drivers of ecosystem change are divided 
into two different types: direct or indirect and endogenous or exogenous. According to the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, a direct driver 'unequivocally influences ecosystem 
processes' and is measurable. An indirect driver 'operates more diffusely, often by altering 
one or more direct drivers.' Whether a driver is endogenous or exogenous depends on the 
degree of control at a given level. For instance, although endogenous drivers at the local 
level are under the control of a decision maker in the community, exogenous drivers are not.
Table 2.3 summarises the key drivers that are thought to cause changes in coastal 
ecosystems in Fiji. It shows that strategies to resolve coastal environmental problems in a 
country can be implemented at different levels, depending on the nature of the problem to 
be solved. An interesting point to note is that decisions made by local-level Fijian
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traditional authorities are an exogenous driver to changes in resources at the national-level, 
therefore affecting the government’s resource management policy. Customary marine 
tenure allows the local level authority to have de jure and de facto decision-making power 
over their coastal resources. This unique power relation was noted by the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment group in Papua New Guinea (PNG) in their report on PNG’s coastal 
resources (Filer et al. 2004), as customary marine tenure is found not only in Fiji, but also 
in many Pacific island nations. Although numerous exogenous drivers to change exist in 
ecosystems at the community-level, management efforts at higher levels are still necessary 
to improve the quality of the coastal environment. However, the fact that the local 
authority has independent decision-making power explains Johannes’ (2002: 318) 
observation that CBCRM may be more widespread in Oceania today than in any other 
tropical region of the world. Although colonial administrations changed many of those 
systems, the recent CBCRM initiatives promoted by donors and government agencies in the 
Pacific islands build upon their management activities based on customary marine tenure, 
combining scientific knowledge and modern technologies.
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Apart from the widespread concept of customary marine tenure in the Pacific 
islands, the existing literature also suggests two justifications for recent worldwide 
recognition of community-based resource management. First, the community-based 
approach has emerged largely due to dissatisfaction with the performance of centralised 
management policy in providing appropriate management resources and sufficient 
incentives to local resource users managing resources on a sustainable basis (Adams 1998; 
Crean 1999; Huber and McGregor 2002; Jentoft et al. 1998). In particular, according to 
Adams (1998: 129), attempts by governments to manage resources using ‘Western models’ 
in the wake of the decolonisation of Pacific island nations resulted in de facto  open-access 
situations in which overexploitation easily occurred.
Second, there is increasing recognition that organised civil society plays an 
important role in overcoming economic problems, including the internalisation of 
ecological externalities, the provision of local public goods, and access to credit by the poor. 
Molinas (1998: 413) argues that neither the market nor the state can reliably solve these 
problems. As a result, much work has been done to support community-based resource 
management with a focus on local level economic development and environmental 
conservation. In this context, participatory resource management is often seen as a viable 
solution to the problems of rural poverty and resource degradation.
Other literature also cites the potential benefits for government from a community- 
based resource management approach. Clark (1995: 310) argues that local fishers are the 
real day-to-day managers of fishery resources when they are assigned to organise 
themselves and implement their management activities. Kellerher (1999) sees the 
involvement of the local community as an efficient measure to reduce the costs of
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enforcement in coastal management. For example, King and Fa’asili (1998) observed that 
increased local control over the resources encouraged local people to comply with the rules 
to a higher degree in community-owned village fish reserves in Samoa. According to 
Kellerher (1999: 30), the reduction of resource-use conflicts due to better understanding 
and knowledge among stakeholders is a likely benefit from local community involvement.
Supported by the above positive perspectives, a number of government agencies, 
NGOs, international donors and other organisation have promoted CBCRM initiatives in 
the South Pacific. However, the outcomes of these projects are mixed. Baines et al. (2002: 
1) clearly state that the South Pacific Biodiversity Conservation Programme, managed by 
the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme from 1992 to 2001 with an emphasis 
on the involvement of community into biodiversity conservation, failed to develop a 
process that would lead to the protection of biological resources. In their assessment of a 
number of conservation projects in the South Pacific focusing on marine protected areas, 
Huber and McGregor (2002: 21-2) argue that projects using the community-approach have 
not fully demonstrated long-term sustainability.
As the existing literature does recognise the importance and strong potential of 
promoting resource management at the local level, efforts to better understand socio­
economic issues at this local level is important to improving coastal resource management 
in the Pacific islands. The purpose of this thesis is to empirically analyse CBCRM, using a 
theoretical framework based on the academic literature on common pool resource 
management and social capital.
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2.5 Common-pool resource regime and CBCRM
Coastal resources, particularly fishery resources, possess the characteristics o f a common 
pool resource (CPR) and, therefore, may encounter problems o f management. These 
resources are part o f the natural capital stock that can be added to or depleted by the level 
o f harvesting. To address the question as to how people can most efficiently and equitably 
manage their local coastal resources, the debate centres around whether they can coordinate 
their actions for long-term group benefits. From this perspective, social capital may play a 
significant role in CBCRM, since the resource users develop trust among themselves by 
building social capital. In order to understand how social capital helps deliver better 
CBCRM outcomes, I w ill first review CPR regimes in comparison with other property 
regimes. Then, the discussion w ill proceed to how CPR theories can explain three major 
collective action problems. The solutions are provided by focusing on how the 
appropriators develop their mutual understanding through their social relationships.
2.5.1 CPR and its management
A CPR resource is a system that:
(1) is sufficiently large enough that it is d ifficult to exclude potential beneficiaries; 
and
(2) when there is jo in t use, it involves subtractability (Berkes and Farvar 1989: 7; 
Ostrom 1990: 30).
In other words, more than one individual can jo in tly  use a CPR as a resource system and an 
individual using the CPR can receive the full benefit, while the full costs o f use are shared
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with others. Similarly to that of public goods, CPRs are likely to have certain management 
problems: free-riding, underprovision of the good, and the dissipation of resource rents. On 
the other hand, CPRs share a feature of private goods due to their subtractability, meaning 
that ‘the level of exploitation by one user adversely affects the ability of another user to 
exploit the resource’ (Feeny et al. 1990: 54). For example, multiple persons can fish in the 
same fishing ground at the same time, while the fish harvested by one fisher is not there for 
someone else. Prominent examples of CPR management include grazing land practices and 
investments; forest and agroforestry resource use and management; soil fertility 
management; irrigation systems; watershed management; and fisheries management 
(Meinzen-Dick et al. 2002; Ostrom 1990).
The concept of CPR regimes emerged as an alternative to the pessimism of the 
“tragedy of the commons”. Until two decades ago, there was a belief that the users of a 
commons were caught in an inevitable process leading to the destruction of the very 
resource on which they depended. Berkes et al. (1989: 91) characterise this as an open- 
access situation with an ‘absence of well-defined property rights’ which can lead to people 
free-riding and thus overexploiting a resource because individual users ignore costs 
imposed on others. Where open access prevails with no management implementation, 
resource use tends not to be optimal, since resource exploitation continues until total costs 
equal total benefits. The problem is that appropriators’ individual evaluation of the 
expected benefits does not take into account the decline in the others’ benefits caused by 
their exploitation. In other words, by their action, they impose an externality on the other 
users. This will eventually destroy the resource as stated by Garrett Hardin:
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‘The rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him is to add 
another animal to his herd. And another . . . But this is the conclusion reached by 
each and every herdsman sharing the commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each 
man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit - 
in a world which is limited’ (1968: 1244).
Hardin (1968: 1245) proposed two possible solutions to avoid the seemingly inevitable - 
the transfer of the resource to either private ownership or to government control.
Mancur Olson (1965) made another classic argument that overexploitation was 
inevitable due to the problem of collective action. Outcomes are at least partly determined 
by incentive structures, which may, in part, be determined outside o f the community or 
affected by external actions. In large group situations, free riding is identified as a general 
problem in the use of the commons. Olson (1965: 2) asserts that ‘rational, self-interested 
individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests,’ and he summarises his 
view thus:
‘The idea that groups tend to act in support of their group interests is supposed to 
follow logically from this widely accepted premise of rational, self-interested 
behaviour. In other words, if the members of some group have a common 
interest or object, and if they would all be better off if that objective were 
achieved, it has been thought to follow logically that the individuals in that group 
would, if they were rational and self-interested, act to achieve that objective’ 
(1965: 1).
Based on Olson’s argument, the solution to commons problems, such as the 
sustainable use of coastal resources, is relatively simple and plausible. Individual 
contributions are determined by selective incentives, which include rewards for co- 
operators and punishment for violators/free riders. Therefore, external actors such as 
governments may be needed to create the selective incentives, protect assets, and improve
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missing markets (Olson 1965). Olson’s challenge was to prove that an incentive for a 
group is not a sufficient condition to motivate individuals for their collective action to 
achieve group benefits. This analysis was built on two broad presumptions: that attributes 
of the set of individuals facing a common problem affect their capabilities to solve 
problems themselves; and that two attributes of the phenomena involved in a problem, 
namely exclusion and jointness, would also affect the capabilities of a set of individuals to 
solve a common problem. In other words, the assumption on which Olson based his 
argument is that each appropriator makes an isolated, independent decision about 
participation in conservation activities.
The assumption that all individuals make independent, selfish decisions seeking to 
maximise short-run benefits is reasonable for large markets where the actors do not know 
each other (Feeny et al. 1996: 188-9)11. When a large number of individuals make high 
demands on a single resource and act independently, taking only their own expected return 
into account without communicating with each other, the tragedy of the commons may 
occur. However, CPR theories imply that both Flardin and Olson’s arguments are not 
necessarily valid in community-based natural resource management.
In relatively small scale situations, the maximisation of short-term benefits is not
the only goal of individuals. Non-pecuniary rewards, such as prestige, respect, kinship and
other social and psychological objectives, are also important motivations for resource
11 The pessimistic analyses were based on the assumptions that: (1) individual appropriators are homogenous 
and lack distinguishing characteristics; (2) that no property rights are assigned to resources thus, access to the 
resources is open to all; and (3) that there is no interaction among individual appropriators and they are 
powerless to alter the institutional arrangements to affect the outcome. As a result, each user takes into 
account only his/her own marginal costs and revenues and ignore the fact that increases in his/her catch affect 
the returns to fishing effort o f other users as well as the health o f the resource. Krishna, Anirudh. 2001. 
"Moving from the Stock o f  Social Capital to the Flow o f Benefits: The Role o f  Agency." World Development 
29: 925-943.
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exploitation in addition to profit maximisation (Oliver et al. 1985: 524). Furthermore, 
each individual can benefit from being a member of the community or larger group when 
they develop trust among themselves (Ahn and Ostrom 2001). Therefore, the individual 
has an interest in sustaining the group and its resources. In other words, considerations of 
solidarity or altruism, in addition to simple self-interest, are also relevant and important in 
understanding collective action (Feeny et al. 1996: 190; Marwell and Oliver 1993: 5).
Moreover, the likelihood of people’s behaviour towards cooperation based on trust 
is not the only reason for optimism about community-based resource management. The 
two types of management regimes that Hardin suggested, private property and state 
property, could result in negative management consequences, or in some circumstances, it 
may not be possible to implement these two management regimes. Under the private 
property regime, the rights to exclude others from using the resource and to regulate the use 
of the resource are vested in an individual (or organisation) and normally these rights are 
transferable (Feeny et al. 1990: 3). While private property rights in many cases lead to the 
successful exclusion of other potential users and are effective in avoiding the tragedy of the 
commons, due to the characteristics of natural resources such as coastal natural resources, 
difficulties in the application of a private property regime are common. Problems arise 
because of their unique physical traits: indivisibility and multiple-resource characteristics 
(Adger and Luttrell 2000: 78). Many coastal resources such as fish and marine 
invertebrates are highly mobile, and ecotonal habitats on the coasts, such as tidal flats and 
coral reefs, alter seasonally or sometimes even daily. As a result, it is difficult to physically 
partition these resources. In addition, problems related to the multiple-resource
characteristics include likely conflicts over the resources located on the boundaries between
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several ecosystems, since different types of users tend to have a variety of large demands 
placed on them.
On the other hand, under state property the resource is held exclusively by the 
government. Decisions concerning access to and use of the resources are made by the 
government that has coercive authority over enforcement (Feeny et al. 1990: 3). However, 
due to problems in the political process, failures of law enforcement are not uncommon. In 
many cases of coastal resource management, de facto  open access to users is more likely to 
conform to the predictions of an open access regime rather than one of state property.
The existing literature discusses a range of benefits generated by CPR regimes. In 
their book supporting indigenous property rights arrangements entitled Halting 
Degradation o f  Natural Resources, Baland and Platteau (1996: 175) argue that CPR 
regimes enable resources to be used just as efficiently as in private property regimes. 
Moreover, privatisation and government control are likely to eliminate the implicit 
entitlements and personalised relationships that are characteristic of CPR arrangements. 
Fisher (2005) shows that some natural resources in developing nations such as forests and 
grasslands are dependent on group-based systems of tenure and management and, therefore, 
are essential in reducing poverty and allowing economic benefits to flow to communities.
CPR systems often exist in combination with other property rights regimes. For 
example, large areas of forest are often under state ownership and controlled by 
government authority, while at the same time, the resources are managed de facto by 
nearby communities. The government of Nepal devolved permanent use rights of forests to 
a large number of Forest User Groups, increasing local control over the resources,
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including local arrangements such as limiting collection of certain products and sharing 
them between households (Fisher 2005: 29). Satria et al. (2005) report a case of co­
existing private property and CPR regimes that provide a preferred setting for a successful 
pearl-culture industry in West Lombok, Indonesia. In some Pacific island countries, land 
tenure systems combine aspects of group and individual rights and obligations. Although 
ownership is held at the group level, land use can be exercised at the individual or 
household level for personal benefit. Therefore, it is too simple to refer to CPR settings as 
only ‘communal ownership’ (Fingleton 2005: 4).
In sum, CPR regimes do play a critical role in the management of natural resources 
at the community-level, possibly superseding the more pessimistic models suggested by 
Hardin and Olson. In a relatively small-scale community, people could have close 
interactions for long periods of time, engaging themselves in a trial-and-error effort to learn 
more about the results of their actions so that they can evaluate benefits and costs more 
effectively (Ostrom 1990: 38). Berkes and Farvar (1989: 11) listed various roles that a 
CPR regime can play, such as:
(1) a principle means of livelihood that assures the basic needs of community 
members;
(2) a mechanism for equitable use of resources with minimum internal conflict;
(3) the basis for the system of production in community life; and
(4) a system of resource conservation that supports local self-sufficiency and 
provides ecological sustainability over generations.
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In response to CPR researchers’ criticism against the tragedy o f the commons,
Garret Hardin later admitted that he had misused the term “ commons”  instead o f
"unmanaged commons" in his classic 1968 article. Hardin revised his argument as follows:
‘ ...the way to avoid disaster in our global world is through a frank policy of 
"mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon." Under conditions of scarcity, ego- 
centred impulses naturally impose costs on the group, and hence on all its 
members’ (1998: 682).
His modified argument then is that ‘a “ managed commons”  describes either socialism or 
the privatism o f free enterprise’ (Hardin 1998: 683). However, Ostrom et al. (1999: 278) 
criticise Hardin for his article o f 1998 by comparing Chinese, Russian and Mongolian land 
use policies and their outcomes as examples o f how socialism and privatisation can end up 
with more degradation than the outcomes o f a traditional group property regime 
characterised by self-organised institutions.
2.5.2 Solutions to collective action puzzles
As explained above, the CPR theory has been used to empirically demonstrate the settings 
o f a management regime where actors who are principle appropriators o f the resource are 
involved over time in making and adapting rules within collective-choice arenas. How then 
can CPR theory reasonably resolve or explain the theoretical questions related to collective 
action? Ostrom (1990: 42) raised the following three theoretical questions:
(1) Why do institutions emerge even though creating a new set o f rules attracts free­
riders?
(2) How is the commitment o f appropriators’ in key management practices 
maintained?
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(3) How can the appropriators engage in mutual monitoring of conformance to a set of 
their own rules?
Regarding the emergence of institutions, they may enhance the welfare of rational 
actors, thus building new institutions may cause another collective action problem because 
supplying new rules is the equivalent of providing another public good. A possible solution 
to this problem is proposed by Robert Bates (1988) on the basis of a repeated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game. Bates (1988: 399) argues that rationality on the part of individuals lead to 
coherence at the community level. People reciprocate a series of mutually productive plays 
and could establish trust and a sense of community that work as mechanisms for solving the 
problem of building new institutions (Ostrom 1990: 43).
To maintain the appropriators’ commitment, the key is for them to share common 
knowledge concerning:
(1) what the rules are and how they work; and
(2) the likelihood that others behave in reciprocal ways.
This knowledge of the rules and their operation greatly increases the appropriators’ 
reciprocal behaviour, because there is a ‘you know that I know this’ situation that 
discourages them to act exploitatively. This is particularly true in long-enduring CPR cases 
because the appropriators themselves have established and revised rules.
Lastly, researchers have observed that, in many long-lasting CPR cases, monitoring 
and sanctioning are undertaken by the appropriators by themselves rather than external 
authorities. Ostrom (1990) uses Margaret Levi’s analysis of strategic actors to explain why
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the appropriators can engage in mutual monitoring. Levi (1988: 60) argues that the actors 
comply with a set of rules when:
(1) they perceive that the collective objective is achieved, and
(2) they perceive that others also comply.
In short, cooperation is conditional on information available to the actors. 
Advancing from Levi’s argument which presumed the presence of an external enforcer, 
Ostrom (1990) explains how self-monitoring by the appropriators is feasible and essential. 
The key to understanding self-monitoring is, again, functions of information and 
knowledge given to the actors. In the settings where the appropriators have or acquire 
complete information about past history, such as rate of rule compliance, they know what 
others did in the last round of decisions and how those choices affected outcomes (Ostrom 
1990: 96). Therefore, having a self-monitoring system provides better information and 
knowledge to the whole group at low cost and, if each individual learns that others follow 
the rules, it is safe for them to also comply with the rules.
If CPR theories can offer solutions to all these major theoretical questions, why 
have resource management problems then been reported in different places of the world? 
Why have Pacific island communities experienced degradation of their coastal resources 
(Baines et al. 2002; Huber and McGregor 2002; UNEP 1999; World Bank 1999)? Why 
have we found the mixed outcomes of CBCRM in the South Pacific based on CPR 
theories? This thesis intends to find answers to these general questions by focusing on 
social relationships not only among the actors in the community but also external 
relationships between the community and other actors.
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2.5.3 Social relationships in CPR management
It is important to note that the three collective action puzzles as described by Ostrom (1990) 
o f how appropriators develop institutions; how they credibly commit to follow the 
institutions; and how they monitor others’ compliance, as well as their solutions, are all 
about interactions among appropriators. It is this focus on the appropriators that points to 
the significance o f social capital in CPR management. In CPR settings that have existed 
for an extended period o f time, people have developed internal norms. When these are 
shared by the appropriators o f a CPR, they are able to use complex strategies rather than 
simply independent strategies in relation to other individuals. This can reduce the cost o f 
monitoring and sanctioning activities considered necessary to counter self-interested free­
riding or opportunistic behaviour (Ostrom 1990: 35-6). As a simplified mechanism to 
explain rational behaviour, Ostrom focuses on internal norms and discount rates, as these 
two variables affect individual choices o f actions (Figure 2.1). Depending on the situation, 
appropriators develop and share different types o f the internal norms, while internal 
discount rates are affected by the range o f opportunities that an individual has outside any 
particular situation (Ostrom 1990: 37). In other words, it matters for CPR management 
how people build up the necessary level o f trust for them to function and how they share 
norms and information.
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Figure 2.1 Simplified conception of rational action
*  Expected benefits \
In terna l norm s ^ C ho ice  o f  strategies
D iscoun t rate ^
Expected costs
Adapted from Ostrom (1990)
In order to address this important theoretical issue regarding the relationship 
between people’ s interaction and CPR management, it is necessary to understand how the 
social networks o f communities affect the achievement o f their goals. The term ‘social 
network’ describes people’s interdependence: it refers to the links between individuals and 
the multiple relations that can exist among them (Monge 1985: 130). A ll societies are built 
from social groups consisting o f individuals. These groups affect people’s attitudes, beliefs, 
identities and values, as well as their access to resources and opportunities (Narayan 1999: 
l). Those social relationships may be built on internal links, such as a common gender or 
age, kinship associations, or external links, such as neighbourhood-based groupings, 
employment-based networks and other organisations. The idea o f internal and external 
social links has led to theoretical work seeking to break the notion o f social capital down 
into different sub-types.
2.6 Existing CPR research and social capital
Some scholars argue that social capital relates to long-enduring CPR management (for 
example, Agrawal 2002; Ahn and Ostrom 2001; Ostrom 1994). Others have attempted to 
analyse the functions o f social capital in CPR management (for example, Grafton 2005;
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Plummer and FitzGibbon 2006; Rudd 2000). However, there have been only a few studies 
on the CPR-social capital relationship that have considered bonding and bridging social 
capital. In particular, empirical studies in this topic are rare. This section will provide a 
review of existing major CPR research in order to understand how it has used the idea of 
social capital.
Many academic CPR studies have focused on the investigation of conditions under 
which CPR institutions are viable. In his comprehensive studies, Arun Agrawal (2001; 
2002) compiled a list of conditions for sustainable CPR management (Table 2.4), based on 
the work of Robert Wade (1988), Elinor Ostrom (1990) and Jean-Marie Baland and Jean- 
Philippe Platteau (1996). Agrawal chose these three studies because they have made 
significant academic contributions to CPR theory development based on empirical 
investigation of specific cases. He categorised critical conditions for sustainability of the 
commons into the following four groups (2002: 54-5):
(1) physical attributes of the resource, such as size, boundaries and mobility;
(2) characteristics of the appropriator group, such as size, past experience and 
heterogeneity;
(3) institutional arrangements, such as resource use rules and decision-making 
systems; and
(4) external environment, such as market influence and assistance from government 
agencies.
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Table 2.4 Critical enabling conditions for sustainability on the commons
(1) Resource system characteristics
1. Small size (RW)
2. Well-defined boundaries (RW, EO)
3. Low levels o f mobility
4. Possibilities o f storage o f benefits from the resource
5. Predictability
(2) Group characteristics
1. Small size (RW, B&P)
2. Clearly defined boundaries (RW, EO)
3. Shared norms (B&P)
4. Past successful experiences -  social capital (RW, B&P)
5. Appropriate leadership -  young, familiar with changing external environments, connected to local 
traditional elite (B&P)
6. Interdependence among group members (RW, B&P)
7. Heterogeneity o f endowments, homogeneity o f identities and interests (B&P)
8. Low levels o f poverty
Combination of (1) and (2) Relationship between resource system characteristics and group 
characteristics
1. Overlap between user group residential location and resource location (RW, B&P)
2. High levels o f dependence by group members on resource system (RW)
3. Fairness in allocation o f benefits from common resources (B&P)
4. Low levels o f user demand
(3) Institutional arrangements
1. Rules are simple and easy to understand (B&P)
2. Locally devised access and management rules (RW, EO, B&P)
3. Ease in enforcement o f rules (RW, EO, B&P)
4. Graduated sanctions (RW, EO)
5. Availability o f low-cost adjudication (EO)
6. Accountability o f monitors and other official to users (EO, B&P)
Combination of (1) and (3) Relationship between resource system and institutional arrangements
1. Match restrictions on harvests to regeneration o f resources (RW, EO)
(4) External environment
2. Technology:
i. Low-cost exclusion technology (RW)
ii. Time for adaptation to new technologies related to the commons
3. Low levels o f articulation with external markets
4. Graduated change in articulation with external markets
5. State:
i. Central government should not undermine local authority (RW, EO)
ii. Supportive external sanctioning institutions (B&P)
iii. Appropriate levels o f external aid to compensate local users for conservation activities (B&P)
iv. Nested levels o f appropriation, provision, enforcement, governance (EO)___________________
Adapted from Agrawal (2002: 62-3)
RW, Wade (1990); EO, Ostrom (1996); B&P, Baland and Platteau (1996).
While the list o f these variables does not provide a blueprint to be imposed on resource 
management regimes, it can provide a framework to understand the factors that enhance or
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reduce the capabilities of individuals collaborating in group management so as to organise
long-enduring institutions. As Ostrom states, listing CPR conditions is important because:
‘...they can affect incentives in such a way that appropriators will be willing to 
commit themselves to conform to operational rules devised in such systems, to 
monitor each other’s conformance, and to replicate the CPR institutions across 
generational boundaries’ (1990: 91).
As Table 2.4 shows, the list of CPR conditions suggests social capital as one of the 
variables that affects sustainability of CPRs. However, in this list, social capital seems to 
suggest a narrow meaning. Following Wade (1988) and Baland and Platteau (1996), 
Agrawal (2002: 54) uses the term ‘social capital’ to refer only to ‘a community’s past 
successful experiences in collective action.’ He does not discuss social capital regarding 
its definition or function. As explained above, in accordance with other major social 
capital studies, social capital in this study is defined as a set of values such as the norms of 
reciprocity and social relations, embedded in the social structure of society that enables 
people to act collectively and achieve desired goals. Although past experience of 
successful collective action can be part of the common knowledge that encourages people 
to take further collective action, shared norms are also relevant to social capital or 
considered an even more important form of social capital. In short, Agrawal’s definition of 
social capital does not include the key feature of shared norms that is so important in 
collective action due to their function in reducing the cost of monitoring and sanctions 
(Ostrom 1990; Ostrom 1998a; Ostrom 2000).
Other research has attempted to analyse how social capital works to solve collective 
action problems and how it relates to CPR management. Using the concept of bargaining 
found in game theory, Ostrom (1994) theoretically explores social capital. She finds that
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appropriators engage in collective action by investing their time, effort and resources to 
build physical capital such as an irrigation system. The social capital she is concerned with 
only refers to institutions as rules of resource use. Although she notes the presence of other 
forms of social capital, such as networks, norms and social beliefs, social capital in that 
study seems to be quite unusually defined. We have discussed this point whether social 
capital should include ‘institution’ or not in section 2.3.2 of this chapter. In fact, in her 
later work with Ahn (2001) she identifies trustworthiness, networks and institutions as three 
basic forms of social capital. What is more, she states that ‘whether or not to include 
institutions as a form of social capital is a matter under debate (Ostrom 1994).’ While it is 
necessary to point out that her definition of the term ‘social capital’ is not comprehensive, 
Ostrom (1994) theoretically demonstrates how trust among the appropriators, the core idea 
of social capital, can be developed both among homogenous and heterogeneous 
appropriators in their process of rule making. Since locally crafted institutions that make 
collective action possible are one of the keys in long-term CPR management (Agrawal 
2001; Agrawal 2002; Baland and Platteau 1996; Ostrom 1990; Wade 1988), Ostrom’s work 
(1994) is important in understanding the mechanisms of local rule-making. She emphasises 
the importance of common understandings among the appropriators regarding rules in 
resource use and lists seven assumptions that they need to share.
Ostrom’s theory (1998a) of behavioural rational choice is based on the idea that 
trust, reputation and norms of reciprocity interact with each other and thus can lead to 
higher levels of cooperation and outcomes that are ‘better than rational.’ According to her, 
although individuals are boundedly rational, meaning that they are not given complete 
information regarding all potential actions and strategies available to them, they can use
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experience they have learnt from their interactions with others and also learn to adopt and 
use norms and rules as they communicate with others. Although Ostrom (1998a) did not 
explicitly use the term ‘social capital,’ her experimental method is useful because it helps 
explain the role o f trust in leading to greater cooperation necessary for resolving social 
dilemmas. Although the generalisability to the real world o f any controlled experimental 
study must be treated with caution, she does demonstrate the basis o f how social capital can 
function in creating new structural arrangements that may be used to solve CPR problems. 
The study theoretically supports the significance o f social capital in empirical CPR settings.
Rudd (2000: 132) used a social capital framework ‘ to develop theories o f the effects 
o f institutional structure on sustainability and to articulate the links between social 
interaction, collective action and social vision.’ He sees social capital as ‘an input factor in 
the production o f environmental quality’ because it facilitates norms o f reciprocity, trust 
and those which matter to produce and maintain public goods, such as natural resources 
(Rudd 2000). In order to connect structural variables in the creation o f social capital (for 
example, group size, sim ilarity o f interests, and info availability) with collective action, he 
combines a framework for conceptualising social capital based on social indicators 
proposed by Collier (1998) with a theory o f rational choice behaviour developed by Ostrom 
(1998a). However, while he demonstrated the utility o f a social capital theory, his 
framework still lacks strong evidence and, therefore, needs to be empirically tested.
2.7 A theoretical puzzle in CBCRM
As I have discussed, social capital plays an important role in cases o f CPR management 
that require collective action. Social capital refers to a set o f values, such as the norms o f
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reciprocity, and social relations embedded in the social structure of society that enable 
people to act collectively and to achieve desired goals. This is possible because social trust 
facilitated by building social capital enhances coordination, communication, and thus 
resolves social dilemmas surrounding collective action, reducing the incentives for free­
riding. This view is summarised by Michael Woolcock as:
‘Ceteris paribus, one would expect communities blessed with high stocks of 
social capital to be sager, cleaner, wealthier, more literate, better governed, and 
generally “happier” than those with low stocks, because their members are able to 
find and keep good jobs, initiate projects serving public interests, costlessly 
monitor one another’s behaviour, enforce contractual agreements, use existing 
resources more efficiently, resolve disputes more amicably, and respond to 
citizens’ concerns more promptly’ (2005: 7).
From his argument, we hypothesise that in a situation of CPR management, higher 
levels of social capital should facilitate greater collective action for long-lasting natural 
resource management. Still, numerous questions remain unanswered. Through what 
process does social capital built by external relationships affect CPR institutions? Is long- 
lasting coastal resource management at the community level stimulated by more social 
capital, regardless of the form it takes? Does building social networks with external 
organisations really benefit CBCRM, as Woolcock's argument would seem to 
suggest? While the hypothesis that higher levels of social capital leads to improved 
collective action is plausible, it still needs to be empirically investigated in a complex CPR 
setting.
The two dimensions of social capital are relevant to the effectiveness of rules in 
CBCRM. First, the greater the amount of bonding social capital that exists in a community, 
the more rigid are rules due to its rationalisation function. Rationalisation is the degree to
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which norms and values are formally codified (Fedderke et al. 1999: 719), meaning that 
there is greater awareness within the community of rules, and fewer chances of 
misunderstandings. Second, bridging social has the transparency function, which increases 
the comprehensibility of the rules, norms and values of an institution (Fedderke et al. 1999: 
719). The greater the amount of bridging social capital the community holds, the better 
information flows with external groups, therefore, reducing transaction costs. For the 
purpose of this thesis, I have classified the impact of bonding and bridging social capital on 
CBCRM into two categories:
(1) Promotion of shared understanding on rules in use; and
(2) Enforcement of rules and better compliance (Table 2.5).
1. Shared understanding on rules in use
a. Provision of knowledge: Knowledge diffusion, transmission and exchange
Bridging social capital based on weak ties with external groups can provide new 
knowledge, ideas and technologies to the community. Once the information is 
introduced into the community, bonding social capital helps in its dissemination. 
For the external groups, such as government agencies and supportive NGOs, local 
knowledge and regulations, helpful for management, can be obtained through 
bridging social capital. The exchange of knowledge is important for them to 
develop sound co-management policies or assistance strategies that meet local 
needs. Transparency enhanced by social capital facilitates the flow of information 
and increases trust between the groups (Fedderke et al. 1999).
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b. Conflict resolution mechanisms: Availability of low cost adjudication mechanism
Both types of social capital are also important for conflict resolution depending on 
the level at which the conflict takes place (Grafton 2005: 7). At the community 
level, internal mechanisms are necessary for resolving what is or is not a rule 
infraction because different individuals could interpret even a simple rule in 
different ways (Ostrom 1990: 100). On the other hand, a community may have 
conflicts with neighbouring communities or outsiders, such as commercial fishers 
coming from long distances. In such cases, links across the community or 
supportive external sanctioning institutions may be necessary to mitigate the 
conflict.
c. Nested enterprises: consistency of rules at multi-levels
By facilitating better communication among different levels, bridging social 
capital can help rules to be consistent in a large system. Rules and norms on a 
day-by-day basis are not isolated structures but parts of a wider and complex set of 
institutions. The pattern of interrelation of these institutions at the lower levels 
provides a higher level institution in society. When rules at one level take rules at 
the other levels into account, the governance activities can be organised in 
multiple layers of nested enterprises that range in size from small to large. This 
can solve diverse problems involving different issues of scale (Ostrom 1990: 102; 
Ostrom 1998b: 8; Ostrom 2000: 152).
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2. Enforcement of rules and better compliance
Bonding social capital based on strong ties within a community is important for 
ensuring that its members comply with rules. The norms of reciprocity they 
develop over the long term motivate them to follow the rules because they assume 
that others will also conform. Rational individuals cooperate with one another 
rather than cheat because of the mutual trust they build through their ties. The 
system of monitoring and sanctioning further reinforce rule compliance.
a. Monitoring: Accountability of monitors to users
As Gibson et al. (2005) argue, rule enforcement is necessary for long term CPR 
management. Resource monitors have to be accountable to the users and keep a 
watchful eye on resource conditions and user behaviour. Monitors can be selected 
from among the resource users themselves or provided by reliable officials 
(Ostrom 1990). Those CPR user groups that enforce their own de facto  sets of 
rules, monitored by locally selected individuals, could potentially be a low cost but 
effective means of enforcement. However, if rule breaking by outsiders is 
common, enforcement of de jure rules by official agents might be necessary. In 
either case, the important point here is that monitors are trusted. This is necessary 
so that they can continue cooperating without constant fear that they are being 
taken advantage of (Ostrom 2000: 151).
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b. Sanctioning: Graduated sanctions
Ostrom (2000: 151) also argues that the initial sanction can be relatively low. In 
fact, it does not even have to be considered a ‘punishment’. It could be simple 
information provided to the person who broke the rule and the rest of the 
community. When the members of the community have higher levels of trust 
among themselves, they are more forgiving of mistakes. However, if an outsider 
is guilty of repeated infringements, then, the community has no effective means to 
exclude them. The result is a possible real threat to community-based resource 
management. In this case, the provision of supportive external sanctions could be 
necessary for the continuance of the CPR institutions (Baland and Platteau 1996: 
345).
Although the two-dimensional nature of social capital plays an important role in 
understanding CPR management, little empirical work has been done analysing how 
different types of social capital function in CPR management. For example, Jain and Jain 
(2002) analysed the functions of social capital in forest resource management in India. 
Although they acknowledge the presence of vertical relations of the community as part of 
social capital, their focus remains on the horizontal relations within the community. My 
research thus intends to incorporate the two-dimensional nature of social capital in CPR 
management because it explains how external organisations relate to the community in 
building long-lasting CPR institutions. Although different distinctions of social capital 
types have been suggested by various scholars (for example, Fedderke et al. 1999; 
Woolcock 1998), this research employs the most widely used (Halpern 2005: 22) bonding-
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bridging distinction to express the links between the community and non-local 
organisations regarding CPR management.
Table 2.5 Theoretical functions of social capital in CBCRM12
Bonding social capital Bridging social capital
1. Shared understanding on rules in use
a. Knowledge
Diffusion X
Transmission and exchange X
b. Conflict resolution mechanism
Availability o f low-cost adjudication X X
c. Nested institutions
Consistency o f rules at multi-levels X
2. Enforcement o f rules and better compliance
a. Monitoring
Accountability o f monitors X
b. Sanctioning
Graduated sanctions X ~ 1 (TT~
2.8 Measuring social capital
Despite the fact that the concept o f social capital has witnessed a remarkable rise to 
prominence in the theoretical literature in social science, economic development, health, 
and resource management, perhaps the greatest sticking point remains the problem o f 
measurement. Studies o f economic rationality require rigid indicators o f social capital 
because ‘ i f  we cannot measure it, you cannot manage it ’ (Bullen and Onyx 1998: 8). 
However, as we have discussed, social capital is a complex construct - simple proxies are 
not suitable. Woolcock and Narayan (2000: 239) state that obtaining a single, true measure 
o f social capital is probably not possible. The reasons are:
12 The style o f this chart follows Grafton’s (2005: 759).
13 Effects o f bridging social capital in monitoring and sanctioning depend on the presence o f outsiders and its 
seriousness.
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(1) social capital has a multi-dimensional nature incorporating different levels and 
units o f analysis;
(2) the nature and forms o f social capital change over time as the balance between 
informal organisations and formal institutions shift; and
(3) the absence o f a long-standing cross-national survey measuring social capital.
In spite o f the difficulties in measurement, a number o f researchers have developed 
indicators to measure social capital. This section critically reviews the approaches to 
measuring social capital and introduces the methods to be used in this thesis.
2.8.1 Measures used in key studies
A general pattern o f social capital measurement in large scale studies tends to use only one 
or a few measures o f social capital, including trust and membership o f groups, and civic 
engagement. For example, the General Social Surveys conducted by the National Opinion 
Research Centre in the United States asked for ‘membership in a variety o f voluntary 
associations’ and then aggregated responses up to the state level to create an indicator o f 
per capita membership in voluntary groups. The result was used by Putnam (1993) as an 
indicator o f social capital in his groundbreaking study. However, Halpern (2005: 32-33) 
identifies three serious weaknesses in operationalising social capital as the number and 
density o f organisations for the following reasons:
(1) it takes account o f only a narrow definition o f social capital, which is network- 
based definition o f social capital;
(2) the composition and nature o f groups can be ambiguous and change over time; and
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(3) studies after Putnam have sometimes failed to replicate his results (for example, 
Knack and Keefer 1997).
Knack and Keefer (1997) used indicators of trust and civic norms from a sample of 
29 market economies. Their conclusion was that memberships in formal groups was not 
associated with greater levels of trust or with improved economic performance, although 
they argue that social capital matters for measurable economic performance. Though not 
directly concerned with norms or levels of trust, Krishna (2001: 930) also criticises Putnam 
(1993) for using the number and density of organisations as mere proxy measure of social 
capital. More importantly for my purposes, Putnam’s method of measurement may not be 
applicable in other cultures beyond Western Europe due to the differences in social 
structure and way of life. As a result, it is necessary to develop a locally-relevant scale for 
measuring social capital.
To develop an index of social capital in villages of a developing country, Krishna 
and Uphoff (1999; 2002) devised a locally relevant scale for measuring social capital in 
villages in Rajasthan, India, in the context of watershed management. Their factor analysis 
found that six specific types of activities which people were commonly engaged in are 
valid for investigating aspects of cooperation and coordination. These six items are 
aggregated into the development of a social capital index (Table 2.6). The index was 
further tested in study (Krishna 2001) on rural development that focused on agricultural 
activities in the same geographic area. The study found strong correlations among these six 
components, which suggest validity of the index. In short, Krishna (2001) observed high 
degrees of cooperation and reciprocity in villages with high scores on the social capital 
index, while people in villages where social capital was low were suspicious of each other.
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These studies (Krishna 2001; Krishna and Uphoff 1999; Krishna and Uphoff 2002) 
suggested a useful method to measure social capital in rural areas of a developing country, 
incorporating not only membership in voluntary groups but also different aspects of social 
capital. However, a problem remains in the survey questions -  specifically the question 
measuring solidarity. Krishna asked, Ts it possible to conceive of a village leader who puts 
aside his own welfare and that of his family to concern himself mainly with the welfare of 
village society?’ A question worded like this may threaten respondents who feel sensitive 
about discussing an issue like power in a small, rural village where authority clearly lays 
with their leader. As a result, their response may not reveal an accurate measure of their 
attitudes.
Following Krishna (2001), Grootaert et al. (2004) suggest focusing on people’s 
subjective perceptions regarding the following items:
(1) trustworthiness of other people;
(2) the institutions that shape their lives; and
(3) the norms of cooperation and reciprocity that surround them.
In order to generate quantitative data on the various dimensions of social capital, they 
developed the Integrated Questionnaire for the Measurement of Social Capital based on 
five previous empirical works conducted in developing countries. Although the 
questionnaire they developed is expensive, time-consuming, and long (it consists of 95 
questions in six sections), its comprehensive nature does provide a prototype instrument. 
The questionnaire has been pilot-tested in Albania and Nigeria. Grootaert et al. (2004: 2) 
suggest that the questionnaire needs to be revised to fit local conditions when used in
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different part o f the world, because not all the questions and not all the phrasings are 
relevant or appropriate in every context.
Table 2.6 Components of social capital index in the context of village-based agricultural development 
in Rajasthan
Components Questions Mode o f response
(1) Membership in labour­
sharing groups
Are you a member o f a labour group in the 
village?
Yes or No
(2) Dealing w ith crop 
disease
I f  a crop disease were to affect the entire 
standing crop o f this village, then who do 
you think would come forward to deal w ith 
this situation?
5 point Likert-scale, from 
‘ Everyone individually deals 
w ith ,’ scored 1, to ‘The entire 
village act together,’ scored 5.
(3) Dealing w ith natural 
disasters
Suppose there was some calamity in this 
village requiring immediate help from the 
government, who in this village do you 
think would approach government for help?
5 point Likert-scale, from ‘ no 
one,’ scored 1, to ‘the entire 
village collectively,’ scored 5.
(4) Trust Suppose a friend o f yours in this village 
faced the fo llow ing alternatives:
To own and farm 10 bighas'4 o f  land 
entirely by themselves 
To own and farm 25 bighas o f  land jo in tly  
w ith  one other person
Answers were scored as 
follows: (1) scored 1 point, and 
(2) scored 2 point.
(5) Solidarity Is it possible to conceive o f a village leader 
who puts aside his own welfare and that o f 
his fam ily to concern him self mainly w ith 
the welfare o f village society?
3 point Likert-scale, from ‘ such 
a thing is not possible,’ scored 
1, to ‘ such a thing happens 
quite frequently in this village,’ 
scored 3.
(6) Reciprocity Suppose some children o f the village tend 
to stray from the correct path, for example, 
they are disrespectful to elders, they 
disobey their parents, are mischievous, etc. 
Who in this village feels it right to correct 
other people’s children?
4 point Likert-scale, from ‘No 
one,’ scored 1, to ‘Anyone 
from the village,’ scored 4.
Source: Krishna (2001: 931-2)
2.8.2 Qualitative or quantitative?
While emphasising the importance o f gathering quantitative data, to use social capital as a 
development tool and to make policy recommendations, the qualitative aspects o f social
14 A bigha is a local unit for measuring land in Rajashan. One bigha is roughly equal to quarter o f a hectare.
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capital should not be ignored. It is a contradiction in terms to argue that universal measures 
are the most valid and reliable means to understand local conditions. Depending on the 
setting, the survey instruments used to measure social capital require intensive periods in 
the field to ascertain the most appropriate methods to ask the necessary questions.
A number of researchers have supported the use of qualitative methods, in addition 
to quantitative methods, to study social capital. While their study focuses on quantitative 
measures of social capital in a health survey, Harpham et al. (2002: 1) explicitly recognise 
the significance of qualitative methods for exploring social capital. Grootaert et al. (2004: 
4) state that the combination of both quantitative and qualitative methods can produce a 
more comprehensive picture of the structures and perceptions for measuring the different 
dimensions of social capital. Harpham and his colleagues (2002) agree with this in their 
study and use a quantitative measure of social capital, recognising that ‘the importance of 
developing qualitative methods for exploring social capital that will be important in setting 
the issue within local context [sic]’(p. 106). Thus, my study employs both quantitative and 
qualitative elements to examine the role of social capital in community-based coastal 
resource management as CPR management that involves external organisations.
2.9 Summary
To summarise my argument to this point, the purpose of this research is to investigate the 
role of social capital in CBCRM. Through the analysis, I intend to explore the appropriate 
institutional arrangements for effective CBCRM. This thesis draws on the literature of 
social capital, a term for norms and social networks that facilitate collective action among 
individuals. It is a set of values and relationships developed by people through repeated
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interactions in a society. The theories of CPRs, an important category of institutions for the 
study of governance of natural resources, support the significance of social capital in 
CBCRM because users of a CPR need to cooperate to avoid problems associated with the 
‘tragedy of the commons.’ Social capital shapes levels of trust and co-operation among the 
resource users and between resource user groups and external organisations so as to affect 
management outcomes. The focus of this thesis is on two major relationships between 
actors regarding CPR management, the two conceptual categories of bonding and bridging 
social capital. Due to the different roles of these two types of social capital in CPR 
management (Table 2.5), it is important to understand the role of social capital.
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CHAPTER 3
The Context -  People and the Environment
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, I explained the theories o f common-pool resources (CPR) and social capital. 
The purpose was to offer a theoretical background for exploring people’ s relationships in 
community-based coastal resource management (C'BCRM) first, within the community and, 
second, between the community and external organisations. Although this study 
investigates the role o f social capital in the management o f CPRs in which external 
organisation have intervened, the main policy implication is the possible development o f an 
improved system for managing coastal natural resources in Fiji. As Scura et al. (1992) 
describe, the management o f resources o f coastal areas encompasses ‘ the interactions 
among the biophysical, terrestrial and marine environments and human activities, including 
the governing institutional and organisational arrangements.’ Therefore, it is essential to 
understand the particular physical and socioeconomic conditions o f the area under study as 
a background. The description o f these conditions below includes the characteristics o f 
F iji’ s coastal natural environment, the livelihood activities o f Fijian people on the coast, 
and their resource management activities. The purpose o f this chapter is to describe the 
conditions particular to Fiji necessary for understanding the problems and issues related to 
CBCRM.
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The chapter is divided into five sections. First, I explain the relevance of the 
geography and natural environment of Fiji to the study. Although Fiji’s ecosystems vary, 
this study is limited to its coastal region. The coastal environment is significant for both 
the people and the state because half of the economically active population are engaged in 
subsistence living either on a full-time or part-time basis, and a substantial portion of these 
citizens depend on fishing. Although its activities are largely done offshore, fishery is a 
large export industry and provides large numbers of people with a stable income. What is 
more, since visitors who go to Fiji for the beaches bring much needed foreign exchange, 
natural resources and sceneries of coastal areas are a key attraction in the tourist industry.
Second, I explain the key concepts relevant to Fijian society. Knowledge of the 
social structure is important to understand the norms upon which the culture is organised. 
Norms relay the information as to how individuals, based on their standing in society, are 
expected to act in their interactions with others. They shape the patterns of people’s 
behaviour and constrain their choices. From existing anthropological studies, it seems that 
some specific concepts form the basis of particular rules that affect Fijians’ behaviour, 
including kinship, the chiefly system, and consideration based on age and seniority.
The discussion then proceeds to key social issues relevant to this study, customary 
marine tenure and the norms of reciprocity. The institutions of the customary marine 
tenure system give indigenous Fijians authority over management of marine resources to 
some extent, providing an important incentive for CBCRM (Johannes 2002: 328). As 
discussed in Chapter 1, its presence justifies the validity of a community-based approach in 
Fiji. On the other hand, the norms of reciprocity are forms of social capital and their 
presence implies trust among the people. As a result, they are able to make those credible
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commitments that are key to solving the problem o f collective action. In the review o f the 
relevant literature below, these are explained as necessary background knowledge for 
understanding the role o f social capital in CPR management.
Third, 1 explore the public policy structure o f Fiji relevant to CBCRM by discussing 
national-level public policy, including a review o f relevant legislation and government 
agencies. Understanding public policy is necessary in an analysis o f institutional 
arrangements o f CBCRM. The presence o f a supportive national legislative framework and 
management capacities o f government are critical in the implementation o f natural resource 
management at the community level (Ruddle 1998: 122).
Lastly, this chapter explains the general concept o f coastal management and 
outlines recent trends in Fijian coastal resource management. The emphasis is on recent 
marine protected areas (MPAs), commonly used as a conservation tool in Fijian CBCRM, 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that have been actively involved in MPAs.
3.2 The environment 
3.2.1 Geography of Fiji
Fiji is an archipelagic state that lies midway between Wallis and Futuna and Samoa to the 
northwest, Tonga to the east, New Caledonia to the southwest, Vanuatu to the west, and 
Tuvalu to the north (Figure 3.1). The country consists o f 332 islands, and the total land 
area is 18,333 square kilometres (Fiji Government 2004). In 2007, approximately one-third 
o f these islands were inhabited by a total population o f 827,900. This was divided into 57.3 
per cent Fijians, 37.6 per cent Indians and 5.1 per cent others. While the two largest islands,
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V iti Levu and Vanua Levu, constitute 87 per cent o f the total area, small and scattered 
islands make up the rest o f the country.
Figure 3.1 Map of Fiji
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Fiji enjoys a south sea maritime climate that supports various rich ecosystems and a 
wide variety o f habitats. As terrestrial ecosystems, the islands include lowlands and 
montane rainforests, inland swamps and grasslands. The coastal and marine areas o f Fiji
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also vary with different types o f ecosystems, such as mangroves, sandy beaches, tidal flats 
and coral reefs. These different ecosystems provide humans with a variety o f services, as 
explained in the next section. Although in the bigger islands the mountains and other 
inland natural environments are important as sources o f water and agricultural land, a 
significant portion o f people, particularly those living in coastal areas and small islands, are 
dependent on the coastal and marine environment and their natural resources. According to 
the Fisheries Division Annual Report (F iji Government 1996b), approximately 50% o f all 
rural households in Fiji depend on fishing to satisfy their protein needs. The subsistence 
production is estimated to be 21,600 tonnes including finfish and non finfish, or slightly 
more than half o f all domestic production (FAO 2002).
3.2.2 The Coastal Environment
Definitions of a coastal zone
The boundary between the land and ocean generally occurs through a gradual transitional
region, called a ‘coastal zone.’ As suggested by Carter, a very broad definition is:
‘The coastal zone is that space in which terrestrial environments influence marine 
(or lacustrine) environments and vice versa’ (1988: 1).
Since the natural processes that shape the coast are highly dynamic, varying in both space
and time, this line where land and ocean meet constantly moves. Accordingly, there is no
single definition for such zones, and different boundaries are delineated for particular
management purposes, as Hildebrand and Narrena state:
‘ In practice, the [coastal] zone may include a narrowly defined area about the 
land-sea interface on the order of hundreds of metres to a few kilometres, or 
extend from the inland reaches of coastal watersheds to the limits of national
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jurisdiction in the offshore. Its definition will depend on the particular set of 
issues and geographical factors which are most relevant to each stretch of coast’ 
(1992: 94).
In particular, small island countries like Fiji should have a specific definition o f
coasts, because the general definition could cover the entire land o f the state. Filer et al.
proposed a narrow definition for Papua New Guinea’s coastal zone as:
‘the space which extends 10 kilometres inland from a shoreline up to a maximum 
height of 600 metres above sea level, or 10 metres below mean sea level but 
within 10 kilometres of a shoreline’ (2004: 9).
I argue that this definition can be applied to Fiji, particularly for some o f its bigger islands 
because its geographical characteristics as an island are similar to those o f Papua New 
Guinea.
In this thesis, my attention is on the marine component o f coastal zones, although I 
realise the importance and impact o f the management o f terrestrial components, such as 
agriculture, forestry and construction o f human settlements on the coastal zone. However, 
Fijian CBCRM has evolved focusing on marine resources and customary marine tenure 
explained in this chapter. Thus, management activities o f the marine components provide 
an appropriate case for an analysis o f the role o f social capital in CBCRM in Fiji.
Coastal ecosystems and their services
As discussed in Chapter 1, a great number o f Fijians directly use coastal resources as a 
source o f food and commercial products, as well as a cultural good. In addition to these 
economic and social benefits, different types o f ecosystems, such as mangroves, tidal flats, 
seagrass beds and coral reefs, provide different ecological services.
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Mangroves are a formation of coastal trees or shrubs that are adapted to estuarine or 
even saline environments. It is known that mangroves provide significant value in the 
coastal zone as a buffer against erosion, storm surge and waves along many low-lying 
tropical coasts. Serving as a bulwark, they protect human settlements, agriculture and other 
infrastructure from storms. Mangroves are also one of the most important habitats for 
wildlife, including a number of bird species and commercially important species of fish and 
crustaceans. The mangrove ecosystem is highly productive and the abundance of 
decomposing detritus from the trees and other plants in the forests provides a rich source of 
food. Furthermore, the structure of mangrove roots that normally exist in shallow water 
prevents access by predators and provides a relatively secure nursery ground for the 
juveniles of different species of prawns, crabs and fishes.
The richest mangroves in Fiji occur at the mouths of major river deltas around mud- 
covered stream banks in the tidal zone. Fiji’s mangroves are mainly found on the two 
largest islands, Viti Levu and Vanua Levu. As a result, mangroves are often close to 
human inhabited areas thus making them vulnerable to major damage from various types of 
development. According to time series data compiled by the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations (Wilkie and Fortun 2003), the estimated area of 
mangroves of Fiji declined from 51,700 square kilometres in 1969 to 49,777 square 
kilometres in 1975, and then to 42,464 square kilometres in 1991. The decrease has 
continued mainly due to developments for farming (especially in Ba and Labasa areas), 
tourism (Nadi Bay) and urban development (especially in Suva area) (Fiji Government 
1997a: 11). The state has developed mangrove management plans (Phase I in 1985 and
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Phase II in 1986) to promote sustainable uses of the mangroves but these need to be 
implemented and enforced.
Intertidal areas of the coastal edge sometimes have wide areas of open tidal flats, 
often found in estuaries and lagoons. Such intertidal areas support seagrass and marine 
algae that provide essential feeding areas for fish at high tide or birds at low tide. The tidal 
flats also serve to catch nutrients and hold them, thus they act as important energy 
processing and storage elements of the lagoon, estuary, and delta ecosystems.
Coral reefs are often regarded as one of the most important ecosystems for tropical 
maritime nations. Like mangroves, coral reefs are known to provide a defence against 
storm waves that would otherwise inundate coastal lands. Although endemism tends to be 
low, coral reefs generally have a high diversity of species. Based on the concept of 
‘hotspots15’ coral reefs also receive high levels of attention as targets for environmental 
protection.
With an estimated number of reefs at over 1,000, Fiji has one of the largest and best 
developed coral reef systems in the Pacific (Zann 1994: 55). These include a variety of 
types, including fringing reefs, barrier reefs, platform reefs, oceanic ribbon reefs, drowned 
reefs, atolls and near atolls. The major coral reefs are the Great Sea Reef in Macuata in 
Vanua Levu, the Coral Coast reef of Viti Levu and the Great Astrolabe Lagoon situated 
north-east of Kadavu or 70 kilometres south of Suva.
15 Hotspot is a term for areas rich in total number o f species or number o f  a particular kind or category of 
species. Norse, Elliott A. 1993. Global marine biological diversity: a strategy for building conservation into 
decision making. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, p.51.
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Although Morrison and Naqasima (1999) found the Great Astrolabe Lagoon to be 
in a healthy state due to its remoteness, destructive fishing practices remain a serious 
problem throughout Fiji. Dynamiting is prevalent in some areas o f western V iti Levu and 
western Vanua Levu, and the use o f traditional fish poisons, domestic pesticides and bleach 
is relatively common in most areas (Zann 1992). Thaman and his colleagues (2001) 
reported that the community near Yanuca Island o f the Coral Coast area attributed 
increasing sedimentation to the construction o f a large-scale resort. Furthermore, numbers 
o f 19 o f 26 finfish species declined over the past 25 years due to an increase in fishing 
efforts and the use o f more destructive fishing methods.
3.3 Fijian people and their life 
3.3.1 Key concepts in Fijian villages 
Kinship based social structure
Fijian society is based on a hierarchical structure. The primary unit o f local organisation in 
Fijian society is the village, o f which there are approximately 1,080. A village can be 
further divided into social unit groups that are ranked relative to each other (Figure 3.2). 
According to Ravuvu (1983: 76), the largest and broadest division is yavusa or clan, o f 
which the members trace their descent back to a common male ancestor or ancestor god. A 
clan consists o f mataqali or sub-clans, the second subdivision in the village. A child is 
normally registered at birth as a member o f the father’s sub-clan, which entitles the child to 
all rights and privileges, including customary land rights (Ravuvu 1983: 1). The sub-clan is
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a group of extended families called tokatoka. The unit of extended families is usually 
composed of a group of adult brothers and their sons' families.
Although Fijians generally claim the hierarchical structure as their tradition, 
anthropological researchers have argued that this ‘customary’ organisational framework is 
actually a relatively recent creation. Walter (1978: 352) states that, in order to administer 
efficiently land tenure which varied locally, colonial governments demanded uniformity in 
the officially recorded native system of land tenure. In this process, the colonial 
government applied the common social unit, mataqali, to the entire country as the official 
corporate land-owning group, despite the fact that it was used only on the politically 
dominant island of Bau in southwest Viti Levu (Walter 1978: 352).
Figure 3.2 Fijian Social Structure
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However, in spite of its recent introduction, it appears that the organised specific 
model of social structure has become an accepted feature of Fijian national identity. 
Although people may have different alternatives in their life, such as moving to city or 
town or even migrating overseas, it is rational for many individuals to remain within 
villages because they are secure places in a carefully ordered society that encourage a sense 
of mutual obligation (Frazer 1973: 85). This is especially true for people who do not have 
much financial capital to invest in migration and/or did not receive higher levels of 
education or training to find jobs.
In order to enable a village to maintain a sense of consistency among the divergent 
interests of its members, Nayacakalou (1975:15) states that three hierarchical levels of 
decision making seem to be the optimal structure. As the head of a village, the Turaga ni 
Koro is elected or appointed by the villagers for implementing local administrative work. 
This is such an ingrained element of Fijian society that the tiered system of administration 
which begins with the Turaga ni Koro, extends from the appointed provincial heads, Roko 
Tui, to the Secretary for the Ministry of Fijian Affairs. In short, the administrative structure 
at the three levels is set on top of the Fijian social structure that is kin-based.
A number of clans, or yavusa, are grouped together to form vanua, or a tribe. This 
is a socio-political association, cemented by social and economic ties, with common 
allegiance to a chief (Lasaqa 1984: 18). In the modern administrative system, the term 
tikim  or district is used almost as an equivalent to that of tribe. A number of districts 
collectively make up a province and each of the 14 provinces is governed by a council with 
an executive head, or Roko Tui, appointed by the Fijian Affairs Board. The Fijian Affairs
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Board16 is regarded as the guardian of the Fijian administrative system and many other 
aspects of Fijian customs. This system of local government is operated exclusively by 
indigenous Fijians (Fiji Government2004: 15).
Chiefs
Like many other nations in the Pacific, the social significance of the chiefly system is well 
known in the social context of Fiji. The chiefly system exists exclusively among 
indigenous Fijians. It divides the Fijians into two mutually exclusive groups - that of chief 
and that of commoner. Chiefs are those for whose status is attained by birth and passed on 
to descendants in a system of patrilineage. Commoners are the rest of the villagers. The 
chief, or turaga, is selected from the highest-ranking sub-clan, or mataqali, of the village. 
Other sub-clans are allotted different social roles, such as chiefs spokesman, warrior, 
carpenter, fisher and priest.
In the chiefly system, the chiefs and the people cannot exist independently. The 
bond between the two groups has evolved over time due to their interdependence for 
survival (Bole 1992: 73). The chief is given certain privileges and responsibilities and 
generally maintains authority over all members of the village. His/her position and 
presence is important in village life, expressed by a term denoting ideal behaviour, 
vakaturaga^1 The idea of vakaturaga includes respect, deference, and humility, as well as 
compliance to the various traditional obligations and responsibilities. A chief must show 
these qualities in his/her actions in relation to all people as if they held positions of
16 The Fijian Affairs Board was established under the Fijian Affairs Act of 1978. It governs all matters 
concerned with the administration relating the development of indigenous interests.
17 ‘ Turaga’ means a chief and one of the uses of prefix ‘vaka’ is to indicate possession of the followed noun;
‘vakaturaga’ literally means belonging to a chief.
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authority and importance or occupied the seat of the chief (Ravuvu 1983: 103; Ravuvu 
1987: 18).
At the national level, the Great Council of Chiefs, or Bose Levu Vakaturaga, is the 
highest assembly of the traditional chiefs of Fiji which consists of 55 members nominated 
from all the provinces. The Council enjoys extensive power as it appoints the President 
and Vice-President, and, according to a publication of the Fiji Government (2005: 5), its 
advice is esteemed by all communities in Fiji. However, in spite of the common perception, 
it was created by the British colonial government and many argue that it is a politically 
‘invented tradition’ (Ewins 1998).
Seniority
While chiefs are highly respected, relative age is also important in determining social 
behaviour and relationships among Fijians. The younger person in any relationship is 
expected to respect and obey the elder while the elder is obliged to behave in a mature and 
responsible way in all social and economic activities (Ravuvu 1983: 7). In addition, they 
are to give instructions to younger members of the village. For the selection of leaders, 
although the principle of patrilineal descent determines actual seniority in the villages, 
seniority in terms of age is also of considerable importance (Nayacakalou 1975: 33).
In addition, while observers of social relations among Fijians often consider that 
men have a social and political status vastly superior to women, Toren (1990: 41) argues 
that the seniority and gender relationship is more complex. Some older women are ranked 
higher than young men and thus treated with greater respect.
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3.3.2 Key social issues in Fijian villages
Customary tenure
The term vanua, which literally means land, represents both the social units and the social 
and cultural aspects of the physical environment identified with a particular social group. 
The concept has interrelated physical, social and cultural dimensions related to the land, 
including vegetation, animal life, and other objects. Furthermore, it represents an all 
pervading aspect of the Fijian way of life, referring to the people and their social structure, 
values, beliefs and common ways of doing things (Narayan 1984: 12; Ravuvu 1983: 76). 
As the concept of vanua shows, not only does Fijian society have a bond with the land in
I o
general, but Fijians also identify themselves with a particular piece of land (Lasaqa 1984: 
22). As mentioned earlier, Fijians are registered as landowners at birth by the government 
to assure their indigenous land rights. Eighty-three per cent of the country's area is made 
up of land under customary tenure, while nine per cent is state land and eight per cent is 
freehold land, which can be put on the market for trade (Fiji Government 2004).
Like the land, authority over the fishing grounds or qoliqoli, is to some degree given 
to the community under customary marine tenure. This includes all rivers, creeks, lakes 
and stretches of coast. Customary fishing rights in qoliqoli are generally claimed by the 
tribe or clan or a group of clans (Waqairatu 1994: 82). Although some residents such as 
warriors and carpenters who do not usually go fishing due to their customary social duties, 
they have the same fishing rights as the other members of the vanua. These rights are 
secured so that the qoliqoli is open to all residents wishing to exploit marine and freshwater
ls Although the term vanua represents the Fijian -  land interactions, the most common landowning unit is 
normally the mataqali [sub-clan] rather than the vanua [tribe].
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resources as their source of food (Ravuvu 1983: 75; Waqairatu 1994: 82). The central 
government has clearly demonstrated the boundaries of all qoliqoli (385 marine and 25 
freshwater qoliqoli) throughout the country and the boundaries appear on maps which have 
been registered. Despite this, disputes over ownership and resource use still occur even 
among local residents19.
Reciprocal relationships
One of the most important principles in Fijian village life is that related to reciprocity 
(Ravuvu 1983: 11). The norm of reciprocity is important for this thesis because it can be 
considered one form of social capital. Reciprocity is an on-going exchange over time that 
makes collective action possible among multiple numbers of persons (Oakerson 1993: 143- 
4). In reciprocal relationships, people have developed trust among themselves for a long 
period of time. As a result, they cooperate rather than free ride because they expect others 
to do the same. The economic benefits they receive from reciprocal relationships are an 
incentive for them to stay in the village (Frazer 1973: 85).
Some examples of local customs show how reciprocity works in the villages. First 
of all, it is quite normal for Fijians to reciprocate on visits between friends and relatives, 
giving yaqona, food and other items in order to show their hospitality, honour, respect and 
acceptance. The value and amount of the gifts are symbolic of the social status of the giver 
and the recipient. The person who gives the best and the most tends to feel better and is 
treated with greater respect (Ravuvu 1983: 11). While the norm of giving gifts is not
19 For example, Fiji Times on 11 July, 2005 reported that a man, living in Vutia village on Viti Levu, who 
claimed to have the traditional rights found men from neighbouring villages in ‘his’ fishing ground. He 
demanded the fish catch and threatened to kill them, but the men ignored him. The incident allegedly turned 
violent on the water with two people admitted in hospital.
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limited to these visits, the sharing of commodities among neighbours is a custom found in 
the day-to-day life of Fijian villages. Watters (1969: 134-5) observed that some Fijian 
villages households with low income tended to depend on other households to obtain their 
food. Although at first glance this may seem to be an asymmetrical relationship, the fact 
that most village relationships are expected to be long-term investments may produce 
equivalent or higher levels of return in the future.
A second example of reciprocity can be found in the village labour force consisting 
of the entire village population of working age. Rather than being determined by 
legislation or considerations of productivity in relation to wages, the allocation of jobs is 
determined by the people’s physical ability to work (Nayacakalou 1978: 107). Labour is 
generalised due to the comparative absence of rigid categories of economic specialisation. 
As a result, a high degree of mobility exists between occupations and households, between 
household use and communal use and even between gender and age groups (Nayacakalou 
1978: 107-109). Mobilisation of village labour depends on the principles of seniority based 
on age and social position based on the chiefly system.
A third example of reciprocal relationships among Fijian customs can be found in 
the vasu relationship, which is based on a child and its mother’s natal lineage. Fijian 
women generally marry into other villages. When giving birth to a child, the vasu 
relationship allows the child to receive care from the sub-clan of his/her maternal uncles 
and to take anything without asking, including use of the sub-clan’s land for planting. 
Although the colonial government did not permit the right of appropriation to continue, the 
practice continues to exist (Geddes 2000: 69). This traditional system of reciprocity
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ensures the long-term wellbeing of children and the consolidation of relations between 
different groups.
As it can be seen from these three examples, the basic needs of the people are 
provided for by kin-based networks and the sharing system based on reciprocity. This is 
the basis for my claim that Fijian villages have high levels of bonding social capital. 
Hoarding is traditionally neither necessary nor practical (Narayan 1984: 12). A Fijian term, 
kerekere, meaning to ‘organise things by begging for them from a member of one’s own 
group’ (Capell 1991: 95), is frequently used among Fijians, and this reciprocative system 
ensures that surpluses are shared. In reciprocal relationships, especially in small 
communities, it is quite rational for people to offer help for others rather than accumulating 
wealth for themselves because of the knowledge that they may one day require assistance 
themselves (Oakerson 1993: 143). In other words, the incentive to reciprocate in the 
villages is not one of direct, immediate economic reward but one of long-term security 
(Nayacakalou 1978: 119). As a result, Fiji has historically achieved ‘subsistence affluence’ 
(Fisk 1970: 2; Knapman 1987: 2), and the village economy has been maintained by the 
sharing system with minimal amounts of money used in day-to-day life (Ravuvu 1983: 43).
Although even today sharing and exchange are the basis of the economic, political 
and social systems of Fijian villages (Kaplan 1990: 137), modernisation has resulted in a 
fundamental transformation of village life (Frazer 1973). Semi-commercial activities have 
replaced subsistence living and self-sufficiency while paid labour and individually owned 
venues have provided substitutes for communal labour and ownership (Ward and Kingdon 
1995: 222-5). A money income is keenly desired by most Fijians to ensure a better 
education for their children, purchase of manufactured food, or for investing in a vehicle or
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business (Fisk 1970: 45). As a result, most Fijian villages have a dual economy with an 
intricate mixture o f traditional reciprocity and the contemporary money-based systems 
(Veitayaki 2000b: 60).
3.3.3 Village social systems and their implications for CBCRM
The kinship based social structure is a highly cohesive entity bound together with a 
decision making, monitoring and enforcing system that would seem to be conducive to 
collective action. Less heterogeneity in identities and interest helps the villagers share 
common norms so as to increase the likelihood o f success in collective action (Baland and 
Platteau 1996: 302). While the centralised decision making system gave limited 
opportunities for villagers to participate in the decision-making process, the norm o f 
hierarchical power relations limited the exercise o f private interests among individuals.
However, in recent decades, the Fijian village has become far less cohesive, with 
individuals more w illing  to pursue various goals. Social change has been observed 
continuously since cession to Britain in 1874 (Frazer 1973). In particular, Sofer (1987: 2) 
argues that the change in style o f agriculture made the mobility o f individuals possible 
since the 1930s, when villagers started conducting a form o f individual farming, locally 
known as galala. These galala farmers normally lived in a settlement outside o f their 
village and, in 1958, Regulation 6 o f the Fijian Regulations outlined the legislation that 
enabled individuals to become galala farmers.
The rate o f change further increased rapidly after independence in 1970 when the 
state began encouraging rural development with an emphasis on economic activities. For 
example, Development Plan V II (1976-1980) aimed to decentralise economic activities so
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as to enhance the material living standards and the social amenities of rural areas. In the 
process of rural development, some customs based on the existing communal system were 
regarded as impediments to development and this offered justification for new socio­
economic activities based on individual economic needs (Ravuvu 1988: 83). Sofer (1987: 
4) argues that fundamental to the promotion of independent commercial farming was a 
weakening of communal relations and a strengthening of individualism.
While the development policy largely affected the attitudes of village residents and 
altered their way of life, the socio-economic change has also affected the status of marine 
resources. Individual needs brought to the fore the economic and monetary values of the 
various natural resources under their control (Ravuvu 1988: 83). The changes from a 
subsistence economy to a monetary one have resulted in more fishing efforts and the use of 
advanced fishing gear, contributing to the degradation of near shore resources (Veitayaki 
1995: 1). Since such intensive fishing efforts pose a danger of overexploitation and 
threaten the lives of people, this has led to a growing awareness of the need for 
conservation efforts. There is a growing recognition that the costs of not being able to 
properly manage resources will be high for both people in the villages and the government.
However, although the entire country has more or less experienced the socio­
economic change toward modernisation, it is important to note that the extent of 
commercialisation and social disintegration vary between different parts of the country. 
Sofar (1988; 1990; 1993) argues that a polarised economic pattern was established due to 
the colonial government’s policy and the basic structure maintained over time has resulted 
in uneven patterns of economic development because two different modes of production
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exist throughout the country - the capitalist mode in the core and the village-based mode in 
the periphery.
Figure 3.3 shows the pattern o f differentiation in economic opportunities in rural 
and urban areas. While 74.6 per cent o f the urban Fijian population are engaged in wage 
employment and only 15.6 per cent lives on subsistence in urban areas, 57.1 per cent o f the 
rural Fijian population are given employment opportunities and another 38.8 per cent work 
only on subsistence activities. It is apparent that people living in rural areas are still largely 
dependent on natural resources under the customary tenure.
Figure 3.3 Economic activities among Fijians over 15 years old of age in rural and urban areas
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3.4 Public policy structure related to CBCRM
For the purpose o f this thesis, knowledge o f the socio-economic conditions o f local 
communities in Fiji is significant because they largely control coastal resources. Flowever, 
it is also important to understand national level public policy because the state shares rights 
and responsibilities in the management o f coastal resources throughout the country. Below,
1 w ill discuss the public policy structure o f Fiji specific to jurisdiction over concerns 
regarding CBCRM. I first review legislation relevant to CBCRM. The important 
government agencies, namely the Department o f Fisheries and Ministry o f Fijian Affairs, 
are then discussed, including their responsibilities and management priorities, 
organisational structure and management programs, with a particular emphasis on their 
relationship to coastal management.
A review o f public policy is important in an analysis o f institutional arrangements 
o f CBCRM, because a supporting legislative framework is critical for the management o f 
natural resources at the community level. In addition, management capacities at the 
national level can determine what policy options should be taken (Ruddle 1998: 122). 
Therefore, how government agencies are constituted and how they function needs to be 
understood.
3.4.1 Legislative framework
The Fisheries Ordinance o f 1942, which is now referred to as the Fisheries Act, is the most 
relevant legislation regarding the management o f coastal resources at the community level. 
The main features o f the Act important to the current discussion are that it:
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recognises Fijian use rights in customary fishing areas or qoliqoli and their exclusive 
use to members of the customary owners;
establishes the Native Fisheries Commission charged with the duty of ascertaining 
customary fishing rights (this will be explained below in the section on Ministry of 
Fijian Affairs and related organisations);
prohibits the taking of fish in Fijian fisheries waters by way of trade or business 
without a licence; and
gives authority to the Minister:
■ to empower any licensing officer, police officer, customs officer, honorary fish 
warden and any other officer to enforce the Act; and
■ to make regulations on:
fishing practices or methods which are likely to damage the maintenance and 
development of a stock of fish;
prescribing areas and seasons when fishing is banned or restricted, either 
entirely or with reference to a listed species;
prescribing limits to the size and weight of fish of listed species which may 
be taken;
prescribing limits to the size of nets or the mesh of nets which may be used 
for fishing; and
regulating any other matter relating to the conservation, protection and
maintenance of the stock of fish.
While the Fisheries Act recognises Fijians’ exclusive use rights in customary 
fishing areas or qoliqoli, the State Lands Act of 1946 gives the state control over the littoral 
zone, foreshore and submerged sea floor. Confusion over property rights have been 
observed because of this dual ownership system. The ruling party, the United Fiji Party, or 
Soqosoqo ni Duavata ni Leweni Vanua, of Laisenia Qarase intended to transfer the 
ownership rights to Fijians . However, it was opposed by the military and was one of the 
major reasons for the coup of December 2006.
Concerning fisheries, the Marine Spaces Act is the most recent legislation. It 
defines the 200 mile Fiji Exclusive Economic Zone and takes over from the Fisheries Act 
all regulation of foreign fishing vessels. The Act requires any vessel that is not a Fijian 
fishing vessel to obtain a licence to operate in local fishing waters, which include areas 
outside of the customary fishing grounds. It is generally much stricter in its provisions than 
the Fisheries Act, and mandates much higher penalties for illegal fishing. Since I am 
focusing on activities conducted by the local residents in nearshore water adjacent to their 
residence, I consider the provisions included in the Marine Spaces to be beyond the scope 
of this thesis.
3.4.2 Government Structure
Department of Fisheries
The main government agency which is potentially responsible for CBCRM in Fiji is the
Department of Fisheries under the Ministry of Fisheries and Forests. The mandate of the
20 The ‘Qoliqoli Bill’ was enacted by the Parliament o f Fiji in November 2006 for an Act to provide for the 
transfer o f  the proprietary ownership o f qoliqoli areas from the state to the qoliqoli owners, for the 
establishment o f the qoliqoli commission with its powers and functions and for the regulation and 
management o f  fisheries resources within qoliqoli areas and for related matters.
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Ministry is to ensure, in the best possible sustainable way, development and management of 
the fisheries and forest resources in order to maximise the benefit of all stakeholders. The 
roles and responsibilities of the Department of Fisheries include research and development, 
provision of services and training, law enforcement, monitoring and surveillance, and 
provision of support infrastructure where economically viable.
The policy and strategy for the fisheries sector of 2002-2004 include:
(1) to promote and expand sustainable competitive exports of living marine products 
by providing suitable, technological appropriate, safe and cost effective fishing 
vessels, particularly for industrial fisheries segment;
(2) to manage marine resources in a way that maximises resource owner and
community benefit, whilst taking biodiversity and conservation issues into
account;
(3) to improve food security in the context of availability, accessibility and
affordability;
(4) to liaise with the traditional customary fishing right owners on the use,
conservation and sustainability of bait-fish and other lagoon fish species;
(5) to provide assurance of adequate air freight for export;
(6) to encourage local value-adding and down-stream processing with the aim of 
maximising the value of marine products;
(7) to develop and provide infrastructure to island communities; and
(8) to explore new areas such as the black pearl industry.
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CHAPTER 4
Methods
4.1 Introduction
The purpose o f this chapter is to explain my methods. I use a mixed method approach that
includes both qualitative and quantitative data. Furthermore, I employ several different
modes o f collection. Creswell summarises the advantage o f an approach that:
‘ ...employs strategies of inquiry that involve collecting data either 
simultaneously or sequentially to best understand research problems. The data 
collection also involves gathering both numeric information as well as text 
information so that the final database represents both quantitative and qualitative 
information’ (2003: 18).
This thesis seeks convergence among the research results by combining these two 
types o f data. In this study, qualitative methods guide the research and quantitative 
methods are embedded or nested within so as to enrich the description o f the sample 
participants, described by Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998). The combination allows the 
researcher to gain broader perspectives as a result o f using different methods 
simultaneously as opposed to using a single method (Creswell 2003: 218). A mixed 
method is appropriate for this study, because only through both quantitative and qualitative 
analyses can I produce a comprehensive picture o f the structure and perceptions o f the 
different dimensions o f social capital (Grootaert et al. 2004: 4).
I l l
The purpose o f my fieldwork was to obtain the necessary data to analyse the role 
o f social and institutional arrangements o f community-based coastal resource management 
(CBCRM) in Fiji. In order to obtain in-depth qualitative information, I conducted semi- 
structured interviews and direct and participant observation. So as to acquire quantitative 
data, I distributed individual surveys. In addition, 1 also collected and reviewed Fijian 
government documents in order to obtain the necessary background information. 
Triangulation (Maxwell 1996; Patton 2002; Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998) allows the 
researcher to combine the data and information collected through these multiple methods 
and to then confirm whether they are accurate.
This chapter is divided into four parts. First, I explain the selection criteria for the 
study sites. Second, I present each field method in greater detail. Third, I discuss the 
validity and reliability o f the methods, as well as ethical considerations. Fourth, 1 discuss 
criteria used for study sites selection and, finally, I describe the study sites in order to 
provide the reader with general background knowledge necessary for the proceeding 
analytical chapters.
4.2 Field data and methods
The fieldwork in Fiji was divided into three phases. As mentioned above, I conducted the 
first phase as a preliminary field visit from the 15th o f October 2003 to the 19th o f 
November. 1 stayed in Suva, the capital, and visited several government agencies, NGOs 
and academic institutions relevant to natural resources and environmental management so 
as to obtain general knowledge and build personal contacts. Relevant documents that
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supply baseline information were also collected. The information and experience gained 
through this phase helped me develop my research design.
I conducted the second phase of my fieldwork from the 11th of April to the 22nd of 
June 2004. I had a meeting with the representative from Fiji LMMA Network and reached 
an agreement regarding my fieldwork conditions in their project sites. 1 agreed to provide 
the Fiji LMMA Network with my data collected from their project sites after the 
completion of my thesis, while they offered necessary assistance in my fieldwork. 
Interviews of government officials and NGO staff were conducted in Suva. I also spent 
two to three hours every weekday for one month to learn the basics of Fijian language with 
a language tutor. In addition, through visits to two villages24 that worked on CBCRM 
activities, I gained general knowledge on CBCRM in Fiji and became familiar with 
customs and daily life in Fijian villages.
The third phase of fieldwork was implemented from the 20th of August to the 13th 
of December 2004. I conducted data and information collection in the villages. In each of 
my study sites, I stayed with a host family and visited all the villages in the districts. I also 
interviewed local government officers and some NGO staff. The field methods that I used 
for data and information collection are summarised in Table 4.1, and each of them is 
explained below.
24 These villages are different from my study sites.
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Table 4.1 Field methods
Method Purpose Type o f Data Source
Semi-structured
interview
To obtain detailed information 
regarding resource management 
activities and social arrangements 
from interviewees’ perspective
Qualitative Individuals villagers 
Government officials 
NGO staff 
Dive operator 
Commercial fisher
Individual
questionnaire
survey25
To obtain data on resource user 
characteristics, resource use 
pattern, resource and perceptions 
on resource management 
activities
Quantitative Individual villagers
Direct and 
participant 
observation
To gain first hand knowledge o f 
activities and events
Qualitative Resource use activities in 
village
Documents To obtain baseline information on 
coastal resource management and 
social arrangements o f the study 
sites
Qualitative
and
quantitative
Legislation 
O ffic ia l maps 
Government reports 
NGO documents 
Academic reports 
V illage records
4.2.1 Interviews
Semi-structured, open-ended interviews were the principal means o f fieldwork to obtain 
detailed information on the topics relevant to this study. I conducted a total o f 53 
interviews. Interviews with villagers were conducted in all villages o f the two districts and 
the total number was 37, including 17 in Cuvu and 20 in Wai. In Suva, I interviewed eight 
people at three NGOs. I also conducted interviews with four government officials in Suva 
and two in Nadroga Province. In addition, I interviewed one diving manager at a local 
resort, and one commercial fisher. The types o f interviewees are summarised in Table 4.2.
In each village, I interviewed the village leader (Turaga ni Koro) as the key source 
o f information. Other village interviewees were selected for different reasons. When I 
asked the village leader o f each village to introduce me to the key persons in local coastal 
25 Respondents o f the survey are different from the semi-structured interview.
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management activities, he suggested that I interview persons in different roles in the village, 
such as traditional chiefs, elders, women, fish wardens, youth group members, and boat 
owners.
I used interview guides that were prepared for different subgroups (for example, 
villagers, NGO staff, and government officials). A sample interview guide is shown in 
Appendix A. Since most questions were open-ended and interviews remained flexible, the 
format allowed the interviews to be tailored to the knowledge and concerns of each 
interviewee (Patton 2002: 333). By using the common format for the same type of 
subgroups, the researcher is able to obtain reliable and comparable qualitative data while 
the interviewees are allowed to freely discuss issues that they consider to be important 
(Bernard 1988: 205). The interviews were conducted in the interviewee’s home, village hall 
or office, and ranged in duration from 15 minutes to two hours. On average, most 
interviews took 30 to 40 minutes. Although many of my interviewees speak English, my 
native Fijian field assistants translated when necessary.
1 15
Table 4.2 Summary of interview
T ype o f  in terv iew ee L ocation D escrip tion
N u m b er
o f
in terv iew
V il la g e  r e s id e n t
C u v u
V il la g e  le a d e r  ( T u r a g a  n i  K o r o ) 8
T r a d i t io n a l  c h ie f S u b -c la n  h e a d  ( T u r a g a  n i  M a t a q a l i ) 2
O th e r  r e s id e n t
E ld e r 2
C h a irp e r s o n  o f  v i l la g e 1
C h a irp e r s o n  o f  e n v iro n m e n t  c o m m it te e 1
F ish  w a rd e n 1
W o m a n 1
C h u rc h  p r ie s t 1
W ai
V i l la g e  le a d e r  ( T u r a g a  n i  K o r o ) 5
T r a d i t io n a l  c h ie f
C la n  h e a d  ( T u r a g a  n i  Y a v u s a ) 1
S u b -c la n  h e a d  ( T u r a g a  n i  M a t a q a l i ) 2
O th e r  r e s id e n ts
E ld e r 2
N G O  lia is o n  o f f ic e r 1
F ish  w a rd e n 1
W o m a n 2
Y o u th 2
O th e r 4
N G O  s t a f f
C u v u P C D F 2
W ai W W F 2
O th e r O th e r  N G O s 4
G o v e rn m e n t  o f f ic ia l
N a t io n a l
g o v e r n m e n t
F is h e r ie s  D e p a r tm e n t  o f f ic e r 1
E n v iro n m e n t  D e p a r tm e n t  o f f ic e r 1
M in is t ry  o f  F i j ia n  A f fa ir s  o f f ic e r 2
P ro v in c ia l
g o v e rn m e n t
P ro v in c ia l  o f f ic e r  ( R o k o  T u i) 1
F is h e r ie s  e x te n s io n  o f f ic e r 1
D iv in g  m a n a g e r C u v u 1
C o m m e rc ia l  f is h e r C u v u 1
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All formal interviews were recorded and transcribed. The transcription was coded 
on the software package ‘Atlas.ti’ for content analysis. This software enabled me to 
organise, store and retrieve narrative data so as to facilitate systematic exploration. 
Furthermore, it is compatible with various kinds of theoretical orientation (Kelle 1997: 1.4). 
In this research, the software was used mainly in the process of coding interview data and 
searching the database to identify major themes and issues. The coding process started 
with a list of provisional codes from the theoretical framework and the research questions. 
As I categorised information in the transcripts with the a priori codes, other categories were
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subsequently added to the code list that emerged from the data. The latest list o f codes is 
structured as a ‘conceptual web' (Miles and Huberman 1994: 63) and a summary o f codes 
with operational definitions are presented in Appendix B. Interview answers in this thesis 
were selected from the transcripts and edited for general readability, including the removal 
o f irrelevant material (for example, ‘well’ , ‘ you know’ ). The reporting style followed the 
Guidelines for Reporting Interview Quotes’ suggested by Kvale (1996: 266-7).
In addition to the semi-structured interviews, when given the opportunity, I 
conducted informal, unstructured interviews such as during meals in village residences and 
during fishing activities with the villagers. I took notes during or immediately after the 
informal interviews.
My over dependence on interviews as the main source o f my data is the weakest 
part o f my research design, especially in terms o f validity. In deciding whom to interview, 
1 faced the serious problem o f selection bias. I did my best to ensure that I spoke to a wide 
cross-section o f individuals in the villages I visited but I was still limited to talking to only 
those respondents who had been approved by the local chief. In terms o f data analysis, I 
also realise that my over reliance on open-ended answers to my questions leads to the 
problem o f how to interpret the responses. I attempt to get around this problem by 
explaining the context o f all responses.
4.2.2 Individual questionnaire survey
The purpose o f a questionnaire survey is to provide a quantitative description o f trends, 
attitudes or opinions o f a population by studying a sample o f that population (Creswell 
2003: 153). In this research, I conducted a questionnaire survey in order to obtain
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quantitative data on resource user characteristics, their marine resource use patterns, and 
their perceptions on coastal resource management. A questionnaire was drafted with 26 
structured, close-ended questions guided by the literature on theories of CPRs, social 
capital and coastal resource management. The questions regarding resource user 
characteristics and their resource patterns are based on sample questions suggested by 
Bunce et al. (2000). The questions regarding social capital were adapted and modified 
from the ‘Integrated Questionnaire for the Measurement of Social Capital’ (Grootaert et al. 
2004) as well as other existing studies (Narayan 1997; Narayan and Pritchett 1999). The 
draft was translated into the Fijian language by a language tutor, and I conducted a pilot 
study and pre-test in a village on Laucala Island with 10 participants. The translator then 
assisted me in making the necessary corrections based on the comments of the pre-test 
respondents.
A sample questionnaire is shown in Appendix C. The questionnaire was divided 
into four sections. Section 1 has a question regarding their sources of food. This question 
intended to measure the villagers’ dependence on marine resources in their day-to-day life. 
In Section 2, ten questions were related to resource use patterns and asked the villagers how 
they conduct their fishing activities. These included years in fishing activities, frequency of 
fishing, gear types they use, places to fish, obligations in case they borrowed fishing gear 
and other activities at sea other than fishing. While these questions ask how the residents 
use the marine resources, they also aimed to measure reciprocity among the residents in 
relation to their resource use. This was important since reciprocity is one of the key ideas 
in the social capital concept. Seven questions in Section 3 measured respondents’ 
perceptions regarding fishing rules, including who makes decisions, how they know the
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changes in the rules, their compliance to the rules and needed changes in rules, their 
participation in rule making and their sense of solidarity in problem solving. The final 
section asks for background information on the respondents, such as sex, age, employment 
and education, and social groups they belong to. The question about social groups was 
necessary since, along with reciprocity, it is another key idea embedded in the concept of 
social capital. All questions, except for those regarding names of social groups, 
employment category, and the amount of income, are multiple choice. Question statements 
were slightly modified before being applied to the two study sites, as specific conditions 
differ between the districts.
Prior to the survey, I explained to the participants about the purpose of my visit to 
their village, objectives of my study, as well as how I would implement the survey. On the 
cover page of the questionnaire, these explanations were also given to the participants in 
written form.
I conducted the survey with 60 individuals in Cuvu and 62 individuals in Wai. 
Prior to my visit to a village, I asked my field assistant to make contact with the village 
leader to organise a villagers’ gathering for my survey. The village leader announced my 
visit in their regular village meeting and told the villagers to attend my survey. Although 1 
looked for a sample of participants in each village balanced in gender and age, attendance 
remained voluntary. The survey gathering was normally held in the village hall. However, 
in some cases, I conducted the survey in a personal residence. Although the survey was 
conducted in a group during the gatherings, the participants answered the questionnaire 
individually. It normally took 15 to 30 minutes for the participants to complete the
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questionnaire. While all o f the participants were literate, there were some elder participants 
who needed the help of my field assistants in reading due to their weak eyesight.
I coded and analysed the answers using ‘SPSS’ to obtain descriptive statistics. 
Table 4.3 provides the demographic information o f all respondents. Since the participants 
o f the interviews and questionnaire survey did not overlap, the total number of people who 
participated in the study was 158.
Table 4.3 Demographic breakdown of survey respondents
a. Gender
Cuvu Wai
Male 26 29
Female 34 33
Total 60 62
b. Age
N =119, M inimum=16, Maximum =76, Mean=46.38, Standard deviation =15.12
Cuvu Wai
Male Female Total Male Female Total
Under 20 0 3 3 (5%) 3 3 6 (10%)
20-29 5 3 8 (14%) 2 6 8 (13%)
30-39 5 6 11 (19%) 2 10 12 (20%)
40-49 7 8 15 (25%) 7 8 15 (25%)
50-59 2 6 8 (14%) 6 5 11 (18%)
60-69 4 6 10 (17%) 5 1 6 (10%)
Over 70 2 2 4 (7%) 2 0 2 (3%)
c. Education
N = 1 16
Cuvu Wai
Male Female Total Male Female Total
Primary School 10 8 18 (33%) 13 17 30 (49%)
High School 9 19 28 (51%) 15 14 29 (48%)
Vocational School 2 4 6 (11%) 0 1 1 (2%)
University 1 1 2 (4%) 0 1 1 (2%)
Other 0 1 1 (2%) 0 0 0 (0%)
d. Employment
N = 121
Cuvu Wai
Male Female Total Male Female Total
Currently employed 7 11 18 (31%) 5 2 7 (11%)
Currently unemployed 18 23 41 (69%) 24 31 55 (89%)
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4.2.3 Observation
During my stay in the villages, I conducted direct and participant observations. As the 
methodological literature notes (for example, Bernard 1988; Patton 2002), participant 
observation allows the researcher to gain direct insight into the activity under study. These 
experiences provided me with first hand knowledge o f activities and events described by 
respondents and cited in documents.
I participated in the following CBCRM relevant activities: net fishing, spear fishing, 
gleaning, boating, and participatory river survey organised by an NGO. I also observed 
village meetings and a district meeting. I maintained notes on the events throughout these 
experiences and also kept a journal during my stay in the field. During my observation in 
the village and district meetings, I was assisted by a field assistant who translated people’s 
conversation. Although I did not have a translator during my participation in the CBCRM 
activities, all the villagers I was with spoke English and I was able to communicate with 
them.
4.2.4 Documents
1 collected relevant documents throughout the period o f fieldwork. These include 
legislation, official maps o f customary fishing rights areas, government reports, NGO 
documents, academic reports and theses, as well as newspaper and magazine articles. 1 also 
collected fish trading records from the village in order to obtain a general idea about what 
kinds and how much fish was caught in village waters and the commercial value o f the fish. 
These documents provided baseline descriptive and quantitative information and helped to 
elicit and document the perspectives o f villagers revealed throughout the interviews.
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4.3 Reliability, Validity and Ethical Issues
4.3.1 Reliability and validity
Regardless o f the nature, type or scale o f measurement, two basic requirements need to be 
fulfilled pertaining to the collected data. These are the problems o f reliability and validity. 
As a scientific study, this thesis has to deal with the ‘quality control o f data’ based on these 
two criteria.
4.3.2 Reliability
The concept o f reliability is related to the consistency o f the data and error. Random error 
is defined as those chance factors that confound the measurement o f any phenomenon and 
is endemic to social research (Carmines and Zeller 1979: 14). However, it is affected 
primarily by ambiguous instructions given to respondents and differential emphasis on 
particular words during an interview.
In order to reduce the chances o f random error, this research took two approaches. 
First, I informed the survey respondents about the purpose o f the research, about 
confidentiality and anonymity, and how the information they provided would be used and 
by whom. It is expected that this procedure encouraged the respondents to cooperate with 
the survey and to improve the overall data quality (Punch 1998: 104). Second, I made 
every effort to stay in control o f the data collection procedure. For example, I was 
physically present during the survey and administered the questionnaire face-to-face in a 
small group o f 3 to 15 people. My field assistant assisted in translation when the 
participants asked questions regarding the questionnaire.
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4.3.3 Validity
While reliability focuses on a particular property of empirical indicators, validity, the 
second criterion in the quality control of data, concerns the crucial relationship between 
concept and indicator (Carmines and Zeller 1979: 12). Given that we can only observe 
measures rather than concepts, it is difficult to completely avoid the problem of non- 
random measurement error. To increase the validity of the measurement instrument, 
researchers need to use an indicator that is valid to the extent that it empirically represents 
the concept it purports is supposed to be measuring (Punch 1998: 100).
As explained previously, the questionnaire for the survey was adapted and modified 
from Grootaert et al. (2004), Narayan (1997), Narayan and Pitchett (1999) and Bunce et al. 
(2000). Therefore, many questions had been previously field-tested. In addition, the 
pretest of the draft questionnaire helped me answer four questions regarding the 
appropriateness of the questionnaire identified by Converse and Presser (1986: 54): level of 
variation, meaning, task difficulty, and respondent interest and attention. The qualitative 
parts of this research also had the potential to be compromised by threats to the validity of 
the interviews and observations. Following Maxwell (1996: 89-91), I recognised four types 
of threats:
(1) Most of my interviews were analysed through recordings and transcriptions 
meaning that the truthfulness of my argument depended on the accuracy and 
completeness of interviews and field notes;
(2) In the interviews which involve language interpretation, I may have imposed my 
meaning on to the interviewees by discussing possible misunderstanding of
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concepts and terminology with my field assistants prior to, and following, the 
interviews;
(3) Discrepant or contrary data was analysed more carefully by considering alternative 
explanations or understanding of the phenomenon in question; and
(4) Making inferences beyond the cases was a problem because of first, the relatively 
small number of individual informants and districts included in this study, and 
second, the reliance on purposive, rather than random sampling.
Although these threats were identified throughout the fieldwork, the validity of the 
findings were enhanced by triangulation, meaning I collected data from a diverse range of 
subgroups and settings using a variety of methods for gaining multiple data types (Maxwell 
1996: 75-76 ; Patton 2002: 247; Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998:41-42). This approach 
lowers the risk of conclusions reflecting only systematic biases or methodological 
limitations and offers a stronger assessment for developing more generalised explanations 
(Maxwell 1996: 93). Furthermore, the accuracy of the findings can be checked and it is 
possible to build a coherent justification for themes by triangulating different sources of 
information by examining evidence from the sources.
1 also recognise that, in the process of selecting the respondents, a non-coverage 
error and a bias may have occurred due to the selection of villagers who were physically 
available during the period of my visit to the village. In both districts, I stayed overnight 
with a family in one village while visiting other villages in the district during the day. This 
was the recommended arrangement by both the NGOs working on CBCRM and the 
villagers. As a result, 1 visited 10 of 14 villages only during daytime hours. Although I
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chose a day o f village meetings or a day o f community work when all adults were required 
to attend, villagers with full-time paid jobs might not have been able to participate in the 
survey.
This non-random method o f selecting survey respondents likely resulted in some 
selection bias as I may have selected only ‘high profile’ villagers present on the day o f the 
meeting. Since I had only limited time to conduct fieldwork in the villages, 1 had no choice 
but to select a limited number o f residents as participants, affecting on the 
representativeness o f the sample. Following village custom, I was required to ask the 
village leader for his help in organising the survey and, as a foreign researcher, was 
dependent on his decision. It is possible that these villagers might have greater concerns 
about MPA or tabu management and conservation than the general population o f residents. 
However, given the cultural and time constraints, it was not possible to follow a random 
sampling method for the entire population. Since purposive sampling techniques have low 
external validity, any generalisation beyond the sample is o f limited predictive utility. 
However, while unable to fu lly compensate for this, my study also employs qualitative 
methods o f in-depth and detailed data collection so as to increase the depth o f the study, 
while acknowledging limits to its breadth.
4.3.4 Research ethics
Before beginning my fieldwork, the Human Research Ethics Committee o f the Australian 
National University approved the proposal for this research. The research design followed 
the National Health and Medical Research Council’ s National Statement on Ethical 
Conduct in Research Involving Humans o f 1999 and particular ethical consideration was
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given to the informed consent o f the survey participants and interviewees, confidentiality, 
cultural and social appropriateness and handling o f data and information. In accordance 
with consultations with the Committee about ethical considerations, all quotations 
throughout this thesis are anonymous.
4.4 Selection of study sites
Due to the costs and difficulties associated with conducting a large-N study in a region that 
spans numerous countries and thousands o f islands, I used a case study approach for my 
project. Although it is d ifficu lt to generalise results from small N research, a case study 
approach is still an appropriate research design for making descriptive inferences. My case 
study offers a rich depth o f detail that allows for greater understanding o f CPR in Fiji. 
However, I acknowledge the limitations o f my approach, most notably the question o f to 
what extent my inference can extend beyond my cases.
Schwandt (1997: 12) defines a case as ‘a unit o f analysis, representing a specific 
instance o f a phenomenon bounded in time and space.’ The selected cases can be in one 
country or a comparison o f a few countries. In a case study, a researcher explores in depth 
a particular program, event or activity, or the attitudes and ideologies o f one or more 
individuals. Detailed data are collected using a variety o f data collection procedures over a 
sustained period o f time.
Robert Yin suggests that a case study is suitable when:
the investigators has little control over events, and when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within some real life context (Yin 2003: 13)
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These conditions apply to my study because it examines the human interactions around 
CBCRM in Fiji in order to gain an understanding of how social capital functions in a 
particular CPR situation, as well as the implications for the institutional arrangements. As 
argued by Shively (2004: 103), the researcher can intelligently choose the cases, rather than 
select them randomly, so as to identify the relationship of interest.
The study sites for this research are two of the 21 districts found in Nadroga/Navosa 
province on the southwest coast of Viti Levu Island in Fiji - the District of Cuvu and the 
District of Wai (Figure 4.1). As the purpose is to examine the functions of different types 
of social capital in CBCRM from an institutional perspective, I used the following criteria 
for selecting the study sites:
(1) They possess attributes of a CPR case under the Fijian customary marine tenure 
system;
(2) The residents have received support on their coastal management activities from 
external organisations, such as NGOs for MPA or tabu establishment;
(3) The coastal management activities supported by external organisations, such as 
management planning, involve community participation;
(4) The areas are expected to possess different characteristics that could be 
conceptualised as bonding and bridging social capital; and
(5) The residents and concerned parties including NGOs agreed to my visits to collect 
data and information.
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Figure 4.1 Study sites
Rakiraki
Lautoka
Sigatoka
Wai District
Nanam-i»Ra
I■■I
Pacific
Harbour» M H I
15km
Four hundred and ten customary fishing grounds or qoliqoli are registered in Fiji. 
Thus, all the communities that have access to these areas were potential study sites. In 
order to find areas where the residents have received support on their coastal management 
activities from external organisations, I reviewed existing studies of MPAs. Although there 
are no national marine parks in Fiji, Huber and McGregor (2002) listed local-level MPAs in 
22 areas. Among these MPAs, the oldest started in 1970 while some are still in the process 
of being established. At that time of site selection in May 2004, there were also some 
newly started and proposed MPAs under the framework of the Fiji Locally-Managed 
Marine Areas (LMMA) Network, not included in the list of Huber and McGregor. During 
my preliminary visit to Suva, the capital city of Fiji, in October 2003, I conducted an initial
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inquiry about potential study sites. CBCRM professionals working at NGOs and local 
academics said that attempts to establish a CBCRM had been made in 20 districts 
throughout Fiji under the framework of the Fiji LMMA Network. As NGOs have 
increasingly intervened in their management by encouraging participatory approaches, the 
Fiji LMMA sites are appropriate as a study subject that involves community participation.
Regarding the criterion of social capital, the geographical location of villages, 
particularly proximity and logistical ease to city/town or tourism areas, was an appropriate 
indicator of availability of alternative sources of income. Sociological research has shown 
differences between the rural and urban environment, emphasising the fact that rural or 
‘traditional’ communities have more cohesion and lamenting the lack of shared values in 
modern communities (Gilbert and Gugler 1982; Sandel 1984). In other words, it is 
expected that a community which is closer to a market economy possesses less bonding 
social capital and more bridging social capital, while a community which is more remote 
shows more bonding social capital and less bridging social capital. Therefore, in order to 
compare the different functions of social capital in CBCRM, 1 needed to choose two study 
areas that have different proximity and logistical ease to a market economy. In short, I 
chose one site that had easy access to a market economy and one site that had more difficult 
access.
For the purposes of this study, I considered the two districts, Cuvu and Wai, as 
appropriate study sites. Having secured permission from the concerned parties to fulfil the 
sixth criterion, namely the Institute of Applied Science of the University of the South 
Pacific, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) Fiji Programme, and Partners in Community 
Development in Fiji (PCDF), I finalised selection of the study sites. A summary of these
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are shown in Table 4.4. Both districts are part of Nadroga/Navosa province where the same 
paramount chief, Turaga na Kalevu, enjoys his authority.
The first study site is the District of Cuvu, which comprises seven coastal villages. 
These villages traditionally share a customary fishing ground with the neighbouring village 
of the District of Tuva. Due to this historical relationship among the villages, an NGO, 
PCDF, has worked with all of the eight villages in a coastal management project since 
1999“ . Therefore, for the purpose of my research, the study site of Cuvu refers to the area 
that includes these eight villages. Cuvu District is located by the main highway and close 
to Sigatoka town. The tourism industry in and near the district provides employment 
opportunities for the residents. Due to these conditions, and consistent with those 
sociologists sociological research (Gilbert and Gugler 1982; Sandel 1984) who argue that a 
modernised community lacks shared values, I expected that the communities of Cuvu 
district would possess a relatively low level of bonding social capital and a high level of 
bridging social capital.
The second study site is the District of Wai, which has six villages of the western 
part of Nadroga/Navosa Province. Four of these villages, including the main village of 
Lomawai, are located along the coast approximately five kilometres away from the main 
highway while the other two are inland. Since 1999, the WWF Fiji Programme has worked 
on a community project for coastal resource management with the residents of the villages 
of Wai. Compared to Cuvu district, Wai district is remote, and it was expected that the 
villagers of Wai have a higher level of bonding social capital and lower level of bridging 
social capital.
26 PCDF is formerly known as the Foundation for the Peoples of the South Pacific (FSP).
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Table 4.4 A summary of study sites
n c ü v ü W ai C om m ents
C h a r a c te r i s t ic s  o f  c o a s ta l  m a n a g e m e n t
A t t r ib u te s  a s  a  C P R  c a s e Y e s Y e s B o th  d is t r ic t s  a re  u n d e r  F ijia n  
c u s to m a r y  m a r in e  t e n u re  sy s te m
C o a s ta l  M a n a g e m e n t  
A c t iv i t ie s
Y e s ,  s in c e  1999 Y e s , s in c e  1 9 9 9 B o th  d is t r ic t s  h a v e  e s ta b l i s h e d  m a r in e  
p r o te c te d  a re a s  o r  t a b u
E x te rn a l  s u p p o r t  in  c o a s ta l  
m a n a g e m e n t
Y e s Y e s C B C R M  a c t iv i t ie s  in  b o th  d is t r ic ts  
a re  u n d e r  th e  f r a m e w o rk  o f  L M M  A
C o m m u n i ty  p a r t i c ip a t io n Y e s Y e s
E x p e c te d  f e a tu r e s  o f  s o c ia l  c a p ita l
B o n d in g  s o c ia l  c a p i ta l R e la t iv e ly  lo w R e la t iv e ly  h ig h T h e  v a r ia t io n  in s o c ia l  c a p ita l  w e re  
e x p e c te d  d u e  to  th e  d if f e r e n t  d e g re e s  
o f  e c o n o m ic  d e v e lo p m e n t  in  th e  tw o  
d is t r ic t s :  C u v u  h a s  b e t te r  a c c e s s  to  th e
B r id g in g  s o c ia l  c a p ita l R e la t iv e ly  h ig h R e la t iv e ly  lo w m a r k e t  e c o n o m y  w i th  p ro x im ity  to  
to w n  a n d  a  la rg e - s c a le  r e so r t ,  w h ile  
th e  m a jo r i ty  o f  th e  W ai v i l la g e r s  a re  
s u b s is te n c e .
O th e r  v a r ia b le s  th a t  m a y  a f f e c t  th e  e f fe c tiv e n e s s  o f  c o a s ta l  m a n a g e m e n t
D e m o g ra p h y  a n d  s o c ia l  
s t r u c tu r e
2 ,1 7 2  re s id e n ts  
in 8 v i l la g e s
1 ,7 4 5  re s id e n ts  
in  6  v i l la g e s
E d u c a tio n G o o d  a c c e s s  to  
p r im a ry  a n d  
m id d le  sc h o o ls
G o o d  a c c e s s  to  
p r im a ry  a n d  
m id d le  s c h o o ls
R e lig io n C h r is t ia n i ty C h r is t ia n i ty
L iv in g  s ta n d a rd B e tte r  j o b  
o p p o r tu n it ie s ;  
b ig g e r  h o u se s  
m a d e  o f  
c o n c re te  o r  
w o o d
W e a k e r  s o u rc e  
o f  in c o m e ;  
s m a l le r  h o u s e s  
b u i l t  u s in g  le s s  
e x p e n s iv e  
m a te r ia ls
P o l i tic a l  p o w e r P a ra m o u n t  
c h ie f ,  T u r a g a  
n a  K a l e v u ,  
e n jo y s  h is  
a u th o r i ty
P a ra m o u n t  
c h ie f ,  T u r a g a  
n a  K a l e v u ,  
e n jo y s  h is  
a u th o r i ty
B o th  d is t r ic t s  a re  p a r t  o f  
N a d r o g a /N a v o s a  p ro v in c e  a n d  h a v e  
th e  s a m e  p a ra m o u n t  c h ie f
The characteristics of my study sites also match a set of research design criteria set 
by Ostrom (1990: 26) for self-governing resource management of small-scale CPRs, where 
she explicitly mentions inshore fisheries. She states:
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‘Serious study is more likely to penetrate the surface complexity to identify 
underlying similarities and processes’ (Ostrom 1990: 26).
In other words, a closer look at small CBCRM cases provides clear information about the 
processes involved in governing a long-lasting CPR and their effects. My cases meet the 
criteria for CPR research suggested by Ostrom (1990: 26) as follows:
(1) The CPR cases are entirely located within one country;
(2) The CPRs affect 50 to 15,000 appropriators;
(3) The CPRs are heavily relied upon for economic returns by the affected individuals;
(4) The CPRs are a renewable resource; and
(5) The CPRs are subject to substantial scarcity.
Ostrom’s criteria seem vague because the criterion related to the range o f appropriators’ 
number is large. In my study, the range is smaller as the Fijian population o f Cuvu is 2,172 
while that o f Wai is 1,745.
4.5 Description of study sites
The last section o f this chapter describes the two study sites, Cuvu and Wai Districts. My 
purpose here is to provide the reader with background information necessary to understand 
those other important variables that may be affecting CBCRM management. The 
descriptions below include, for each o f the districts, demographic information, social 
structure, religion, education, living standards o f villages and resource use 
patterns. General explanations o f the NGOs involved in CBCRM are also provided. Since 
such little information is available on these districts, I depend mainly on data and
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information collected by myself during fieldwork. The little data that does exist has been 
collected mainly by local NGOs. Although I compare the similarities and differences 
between the two districts in the following section, due to the fact that the different NGOs 
employed different methodologies in their data collection, the following section may 
appear uneven due to the variation in quantity and quality of information available between 
the two districts.
To repeat, I selected these two particular districts for my study because they were 
expected to contain variations in the different types of bonding and bridging social capital 
that affect CBCRM institutions in Fiji. In order to compare districts that have different 
types of social capital, I used the concept ‘remoteness of the district’ which determines 
‘availability of alternative sources of income’ as a possible indicator for predicting the 
levels of bonding and bridging social capital. Cuvu district has relatively easy access to a 
town, Sigatoka, and is close to large-scale resorts that give residents better job opportunities, 
such as Shangri-La’s Fijian Resort (referred to as Fijian Resort), while Wai district is 
relatively remote from any other market. Thus, I expect to find that Cuvu possess a 
relatively low level of bonding social capital and high level of bridging social capital. On 
the other hand, I expect Wai has a higher level of bonding, and lower level of bridging, 
social capital.
In the following discussion, I present variables that may account for differences in 
the effectiveness of CBCRM. Although both districts have worked on CBCRM projects 
with NGOs within the framework of Fiji LMMA, by holding constant those variables 
including demography, social structure, the level of education and types of religion, I 
intend to show that the difference in the level of remoteness of the districts is a major
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causal factor in the varying levels o f the economic status o f the two villages. The 
difference in ease o f access to a market economy has also led to differences in coastal 
resource use patterns that are known to affect people’ s willingness to cooperate (Gibson 
2001; Ostrom 1998b). However, in the two study sites, when I asked my interviewees if  
they are satisfied with their MPAs and w illing to continue to keep them, all o f them stated 
that they were.
4.5.1 Demography and social structure
The villages o f Cuvu District are located along the country’ s main road, Queens Road, 
which links the west coast sugar town o f Lautoka, and the capital Suva on the south eastern 
side o f the island. The area is in the heart o f the Coral Coast, the belt along where the 
infrastructure o f the tourist industry is concentrated. A frequent public bus service 
connects the villages to Nadi town and Sigatoka town.
The district includes seven villages, namely Cuvu, Naevuevu, Rukurukulevu, Sila, 
Tore, Yadua and Hanahana. This study also includes Voua village o f Tuva District, 
because the CBCRM project in Cuvu District includes that village. Table 4.5 shows 
population distribution.
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Table 4.5 Population distribution and number of households of Cuvu27
Village Population Number of 
household
Cuvu 350 52
Naevuevu 233 60
Rukurukulevu 412 45
Sila 93 20
Tore 135 26
Yadua 428 89
Hanahana 200 26
Voua 321 54
The Fijian villages in the district are facing a rapid population increase: 1,747 in 
2001 (PCDF 2003: 12) to 2,172 in 2004 (data from fieldwork). Job opportunities created 
by the tourism industry in Cuvu have resulted in a higher rate o f migration than in other 
parts o f the country. In particular, the newest village, Hanahana, was recently separated 
from Rukurukulevu village, as a residence o f those who had migrated to this area.
The Cuvu District holds regional historical significance to the province because the 
paramount chief o f the province, Turaga na Kalevu, resides in the district. Generally 
speaking, the paramount chief holds decision-making power over all matters in the district. 
According to one villager, a power relation also exists among the villages:
We have our Paramount Chief, and we have some sub-chiefs around. Yadua village is one o f the 
major villages. The main villages are Yadua, Cuvu, and Navuevu. Others are sort o f extension 
villages o f the main villages. Most o f the things are organised in these main villages. Here in 
Yadua, we have a yavusa [clan] chief, he is actually one o f the high chiefs o f the district. In 
Cuvu [village], we have our paramount chief and he looks after the whole district and the 
province. (Villager3 o f Cuvu)
21 The data used in this table were gathered in the villages during my fieldwork from September to December 
2004.
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These customary roles and power relations in villages are socially important for 
Fijians living in the districts. Thus, it reflects the design of the CBCRM project. An 
example is the involvement of Voua village in the CBCRM activities. As mentioned, 
although the village is not jurisdictionally a part of Cuvu, the project includes people living 
in Voua. A resident of Voua village told the history of their village:
Our ancestors came from Cuvu. We are brothers of Cuvu. This started when the missionary 
came. When the missionary came, they took this good news about Jesus to the western side of 
Fiji. So Kalevu chose one of his brothers from the family living in this village [Voua] and they 
brought the good news to Malolo. Kalevu died there. The title of Kalevu was then given to his 
brother, our ancestor. He is our great great grandfather. The title of Kalevu was kept here in this 
village for eight years. When they came to decide the qoliqoli and land, our village took half of 
• them, because of the old days when Kalevu died. (Villager 12 of Cuvu)
This story implies that historical events and customary borders have an important meaning 
in resource management in the district.
The national census in 1996 reported that the District of Wai held a total of 2,026 
residents and 372 households (Fiji Government 1996a). The CBCRM activities involve 
only Fijians, who comprise 56.8 per cent of the population. Indo-Fijians comprise 43 per 
cent of the population and are widely scattered into individual cane farms and farming 
settlements. Most of these Fijians live in one of the six villages while others live in 
farming settlements. Table 4.6 shows the distribution of population in Fijian villages of 
Wai district in 2004. Although the total Fijian population of Wai (1,745) is slightly smaller 
than that of Cuvu (2,172), both fall into the category of ‘small-scale CPR’ as defined by 
Ostrom (1990: 26). In these CPRs, the number of individuals affected is between 50 and
136
15,000. The difference in population o f 427 individuals is minimal and should not affect 
the process and outcomes of CBCRM in the two districts.
Table 4.6 Population distribution and number of households of Wai
Village Population
Number o f 
households
Lomawai 280 72
Kubuna 106 24
Korokula 316 54
Tau 240 45
Navutu 243 32
Bavu 560 43
Like Cuvu, Wai is part o f Nadroga/Navosa province. Therefore, the same 
paramount chief, Turaga net Kalevu, enjoys his authority in the District o f Wai. Lomawai 
village is considered the main village where the yavusa (clan) chief resides and district 
meetings are normally held in this village.
4.5.2 Education
The level o f education individuals completed could affect the degree o f their understanding 
of rules in CBCRM. Overall, the levels o f education in the two districts are relatively high 
and children in both districts seem to have similar educational opportunities. Although 
education is not compulsory in Fiji, almost all children in both districts between ages o f six 
and fourteen attend schools. Most children go to local primary school and middle school, 
while some parents send their children to boarding schools in larger cities, such as Suva 
and Lautoka. Depending on their academic performance and preference, as well as 
finances, students decide whether to go on to higher education, such as university or 
vocational schools, to obtain a job, or to stay with their family. In addition, children
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between the ages of four and five in Cuvu have easy access to a kindergarten that was 
constructed with support from the Fijian Resort located in the district and which also pays 
the salaries of the kindergarten teachers.
Although the District of Wai does not have external support in early childhood 
education like Cuvu, children in the villages of Wai have good access to primary level 
education. According to a socio-economic assessment of the villages in 2002 (Areki 2002), 
all persons who are above the age of 15 surveyed in the Wai District have received some 
formal education. Approximately 43 per cent of them finished at a Class 8 or Form 2 (final 
year of primary school) or lower level of education, while seven per cent went on to the 
tertiary level. It is interesting to note that women received longer and higher education 
than men: the average number of years in school for females is 9.4 years (SD=2.4) while 
for males it is 7.9 years (SD=2.9) (Areki 2002: 11).
Figure 4.2 presents a comparison of education levels in Wai with the national Fijian 
population. Although the percentage of the population going on to a higher level of 
education is slightly lower than the national population, residents have received a better 
education than that of the Fijian population as a whole, up until Form 4.
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Figure 4.2 Levels of education for age of 15 or older in Wai District
Class 1-3 Class 4-6 Forms 1-2 Forms 3-4 Forms 5-6 Post Secondary
Level of education
4.5.3 Religion
Like every other Fijian village, Christianity is the main religion in all the villages of Cuvu 
and Wai, with the dominant denomination being Methodism. A ll villages in both districts 
have a Methodist church building in the centre of village. In the case o f Wai, 87 per cent o f 
the villagers are Methodist (Areki 2002: 12). Other villagers belong to denominations 
including A ll Nation, Assembly o f God, Christian Outreach Centre, Church of Christ, 
Seventh Day Adventist, Pentecostal Church, Every Home for Christ, the Evangelist, and 
Christian Outreach Centre.
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A Methodist Church is in the centre o f each village and services are held on 
Sundays four times from 6:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Since there are only Methodist churches in 
the villages, some o f those who belong to other denominations in the Wai District regularly 
go to church outside o f the district. In general, these denominations have been recently 
introduced to the villages.
4.5.4 Living standards
An important selection criterion for my study sites was proximity to a market economy. 
Access to a market economy is expected to affect the level o f the two types o f social capital 
within the two districts. In this section, I explain how the living standards o f the two 
districts differ and how their access to a market economy affects this.
Job opportunities and income
The villages o f Cuvu District have a solid economic base both at the community and 
individual level. The residents o f Cuvu District have better job opportunities in comparison 
with some other parts o f Fiji due to the presence o f tourism and proximity to Sigatoka town. 
In particular, the Fijian Resort provides the main source o f income by employing villagers 
both on a part-time and full-time basis. Income is also generated by employees o f the 
Outrigger Reef Fiji Resort, Pacific Green, and other work places in and near Sigatoka town. 
It seems that women have relatively better opportunities in finding a job position at the 
Resort, as they can work as a housekeeper or baby sitter without having specific vocational 
education or training. Thus, women are often the primary income earner in the family.
The participants in my survey in Cuvu indicated that their monthly income from a 
paid job ranged from US$ 68.40 to $352.26 (N = ll ,  Mean=153.9, SD=89.51). In addition,
140
many villagers also received remittances from family members working in other parts of 
Fiji and overseas. However, it was not possible for me to obtain data on this during the 
fieldwork because the villagers sometimes were unwilling to state their exact income. At 
the individual household level, income is spent on: basic food commodities; monthly bills 
for electricity and water; children’s education; weekly church donations; and traditional 
obligations to clan and village (PCDF 2003: 19).
Compared to Cuvu, Wai residents have fewer job opportunities. Sugar plantations 
provide employment for male residents of Wai, mainly from March to December. 
Physically, the south western coastal area of Viti Levu is characterised by a relatively 
humid climate and moderate dry season favourable for growing sugar cane. Approximately 
85 per cent of land in the Wai district has been put to use cultivating sugar cane or pine 
trees. The remaining 15 per cent include mangroves, grassland and scattered remnants of 
dry forests (Areki 2002: 1). According to the villagers, a weekly wage for cane cutting is 
US$28 (8 hours per day for 6 days a week).
Given the fewer job opportunities, Wai residents have lower monthly incomes, 
ranging from US$17.10 to $262.20 (N=7, Mean= 102.6, SD= 151.53). However, this
statistic may be biased because the size of my sample was small. Only seven of 62 survey 
respondents answered that they were employed at the time of survey. More comprehensive 
data can be found in the socio-economic survey done by the WWF (Areki 2002). This 
survey covered monthly household income as can be seen in Figure 4.4 presents monthly 
income at the household level. Families who depend on local natural resources as their 
major source of income make up approximately 77 per cent (33 per cent depends on fishing 
while 44 per cent depends on farming). More than half (54 per cent) of families living in
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the village earn less than US$57 (equivalent to 100 Fijian dollars) per month, and 56.3 per 
cent of these low income families depend on the sale of agricultural products. Another 31 
per cent of them depend on the sale of marine products. The remaining 46 per cent of the 
families have over US$57 per month, 40.6 per cent of them earn cash from the sale of 
marine products while the numbers of families dependent on farming products is only 29.7 
per cent.
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4.5.5 Housing
In Fiji, the type o f house is often used as an indirect indicator o f household wealth (for 
example, National Census). The types generally fall into four categories o f building 
materials: concrete, wood, tin and thatch (Areki 2002: 14). More financially able 
households tend to have concrete houses, while tin houses are more common among lower 
income households. Although the distinction is not a direct indicator o f wealth and some 
well o ff households are known to build wooden or thatch houses, in general, low income 
families use tin and thatch for their houses.
In Cuvu, approximately 95 per cent o f the houses are made o f either concrete or 
wood and properly partitioned to separate the bedrooms, living room, kitchen, bathroom 
and toilet (PCDF 2003: 15). The houses have a shower either inside or outside, although I 
did not observe any houses with hot water. Many houses have a flush toilet (70.7 per cent) 
(PCDF 2003: 17), and it is very rare to see pitfall toilets in the villages. Although the water 
supply is usually fine, it does sometimes stop. While some families use firewood for 
cooking, use o f gas is also common. Most families possess radio and TV, and some have a 
CD player, video recorder or DVD player. Although possession o f a vehicle is not 
common, a few families in every village do have a car. For example, during my stay in 
Yadua village, I observed only two families who owned vehicles.
Compared to those in Cuvu, houses in Wai are generally smaller. Low income 
families most commonly have houses with corrugated iron or tin built over a wooden 
framework. Forty-one per cent o f the houses are built using tin, while nearly 36 per cent 
are cement (Areki 2002: 15). The rest falls into either the category o f wood (16.2 per cent)
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or thatch (6.8 per cent). The floors of those houses are either wooden or raised mud 
covered by layers of locally weaved mats. These houses normally have one room that 
serves the purpose of living room, bedroom and, in certain instances, the kitchen as well. 
However, in many cases, kitchens are also separate from the main house. These kitchens 
are usually built from tin, wood or both and the members of the family, most often women, 
use firewood for cooking.
In villages of both districts, well-built traditional thatch houses, or bure, are usually 
reserved for the chief and members of his family. These houses are constructed purely 
from local materials, such as native timber, bamboo, reeds and coconut fronds. They 
contain one very large single room where the floor is covered with thick layers of mats and, 
in most cases, are completely devoid of furniture. Although this traditional style of house 
remains in the villages as a symbol of authority, it is considered less favourable among 
villagers as a residence. One reason is that the time and effort necessary to build and 
maintain such houses requires community assistance (Areki 2002: 15). Moreover, cement 
houses are preferred because they are considered to be a symbol of wealth.
Overall, the villagers of Cuvu are considered ‘rich’ due to the relatively high 
standard of living. Cuvu district is considered to be an example of modernised village life, 
clearly reflected in the overall standard of housing. A resident described the economic 
influence of the Resort thus:
The Fijian is the first hotel since around late 1960s, and the hotel started helping the local 
people in the district by offering job opportunities, so you don’t see normal Fijian bures here, 
but people live in concrete houses. I see the change in standard of living, which is getting better.
We have land, other sources of income and people work for their families. (Villager3 of Cuvu)
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On the other hand, houses in Wai reflect the lack o f a solid economic basis for residents.
4.5.6 Resource dependence
For the purpose o f my thesis, the important reason for understanding resource use patterns 
is because it affects on people’s cooperative behaviour. A concern about the ‘ rough 
proportionality’ o f management costs and benefits (Ostrom 1998b: 7) means that villagers 
generally perceive it to be fair that those who contribute more to maintaining the 
management system should be the ones who receive the most benefits from the system. 
Gibson (2001) argues that more resource dependent individuals find greater value in the 
long-term sustainability o f resources. I f  this is correct, then I expect to find that, with the 
higher level o f dependence on coastal resources and the same set o f rules restricting fishing 
activities, the people o f Wai should be more w illing to pay higher costs. In contrast, Cuvu 
residents should be less cooperative with regard to MPA or tabu management. Let me first 
explain how the resource use patterns in the two districts differ.
As explained above, the residents o f Cuvu have better opportunities to find a paid 
job due to the geographic location o f the district. While Wai residents sell fish and other 
marine products for their income, Cuvu residents only catch them for own food28. This 
difference reflects the frequency o f fishing, as shown in Table 4.7. Both men and women 
o f Cuvu go fishing less frequently than the residents o f Wai. Box 4.1 presents a typical 
week fora  woman living in Lomawai village o f Wai district.
s Although it does not happen often at all, a buyer from Suva visits the Cuvu villages upon request and buys 
dried sea cucumbers from the villagers.
146
Table 4.7 Frequency of fishing
Cuvu Wai
Male Female Total Male Female Total
1-2 days 
per week
17 (70.8%) 21 (61.8%) 38 (65.5%) 13 (50.0%) 14 (46.7%) 27 (48.2%)
3-4 days 
per week
5 (20.8%) 9 (26.5%) 14 (24.1%) 10 (38.5%) 15 (50.0%) 25 (44.6%)
5-6 days 
per week
2 (8.3%) 4 (11.8%) 6 (10.3%) 1 (3.8%) 1 (3.3%) 2 (3.6%)
Everyday 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (7.7%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (3.6%)
Total 24 34 58 26 30 56
Box 4.1 A typical week of a village woman
This is a typical week schedule o f a woman who lives in Lomawai village. She has a husband who does 
not have a regular paid job and five children whose ages range from 6 to 22.
Monday
Tuesday
Wednesday
Thursday
Friday
Saturday
Sunday
Attend community regular meeting and work for common benefits 
Attend women’s group meeting 
Go fishing 
Go fishing 
Go fishing
Go to town market in Nadi and sell her catch 
Attend church service
She normally takes another villager’s boat when she goes fishing and spends five hours at sea. She pays 
US$0.57 per trip to the boat owner for the ride. The owner can accommodate five women in his boat. The 
main fishing equipment she uses is a spare, and she does not own a net. When the tide is low, she also 
collects shellfish and sea cucumbers. On Saturdays, she takes a public bus at 6 a.m. to go to Nadi and sells 
her catch o f the week at the town market. On one Saturday in November 2004, she did not sell finfish and 
only sold shellfish, sea cucumbers and sea weeds in the market. She earned US$49.42, which was the 
total income for the family for the week. The family spent the income on the following items:
Some food items and necessities obtained in Nadi market (flour, garlic, onion, toilet paper and washing 
powder) 17.10
Community fee 5.70
Bus fare to Nadi 3.42
Boat fare________________________ l .71
Total US$27.93
The family kept the remaining US$21.49 for further needs, such as school fees, church donation and food.
In addition, Wai residents are more dependent on marine resources, not only as their
income source but also for their food, compared to Cuvu residents. Table 4.8 presents the
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sources o f food in the two districts. Both in Cuvu and Wai, the respondents identified 
gardening as the major source o f food. Many families grow food crops, such as cassava, 
taro, yam, vegetables, banana and pawpaw in a private family garden and harvest when 
they eat. Fishing is also important in both districts, as a similar percentage o f survey 
respondents stated fishing to be the major source o f their food, 65.5 per cent in Cuvu and 
65.6 per cent in Wai. Despite the fact that fishing is not a major income generating activity 
in Cuvu, the residents consider marine resources to be important for their life. A resident 
described the importance o f coastal resources:
Even people in the village who work, they go fishing for their food. It is not only for people in 
this village [on the coast], but even for some people liv ing inland, fish is important. 1 mean, 
something from the sea or river. (V illagerö o f Cuvu)
Table 4.8 Sources of food
Most important food source Number o f respondents (Multiple responses permitted)
Cuvu (N=58) Wai (N=61)
Fishing 38 (65.5%) 40 (65.6%)
Gardening 54 (93.1%) 50 (82.0%)
Food from shops 40 (69.0%) 14 (23.0%)
Livestock 2 (3.4%) 3 (4.9%)
Supply from relatives 4 (6.9%) 5 (8.2%)
Other 0 (0.0%) 1 (1.6%)
A difference is found in the percentage o f people who answered that food from 
shops is important. Sixty-nine per cent o f Cuvu villagers answered that food from shops is 
the major source o f their food, while only 23 per cent o f respondents in Wai consider this to 
be so. Since Sigatoka town is close to Cuvu villages, it is logistically easier for the 
residents to obtain food. Furthermore, with a small cash income, many o f the residents o f 
Cuvu are able to purchase food from shops. Also in the Wai District, there are some small
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shops, mainly owned by Indians. These are close to the villages and the villagers buy food 
items, such as milk, tea and flour. Some Fijian families residing in villages also run small 
businesses, selling other residents limited food items, such as tinned tuna and sugar. 
However, although it is possible to buy the food items from these local shops as well as 
markets in Sigatoka and Nadi towns, for the majority of the residents who do not have a 
regular income, farming and fishing remain the major sources of food for their day-to-day 
life. Thus, even though the percentage of the respondents who consider fishing to be their 
main source of food is almost the same in both districts, people’s dependency on fish for 
their own food is higher in Wai than Cuvu because Cuvu residents buy more food from 
shops.
Although it was difficult to measure, all my interviewees in both districts indicated 
that they were satisfied with MPA, or tabu, and showed their willingness to continue in the 
future. The common reason for residents’ satisfaction in both districts is the perceived 
increase in their fish catch. Due to the benefits, both Cuvu and Wai residents think that it is 
worth having tabu in part of their customary fishing ground or qoliqoli to maintain their 
marine resources:
We’ve seen a lot o f changes in tabu, like the abundance o f  fish. So, our future should be alright 
with our tabu. (Villager 13 o f Cuvu)
If all places are well protected and properly managed, the resources will come back. (Villagerl7 
o f Cuvu)
It [the condition o f  marine resources] is going to be better. In our village, our life is from the sea.
Cost o f living is very high. We plant our cassava, we eat fish, we catch fish and sell fish. I think 
the marine resources will be better because o f the tabu area and we need tabu. (Villager2 of 
Wai)
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Marine life there is depleting. Now we have tabu...we stopped fishing [inside the tabu area].
By the time we w ill open, we w ill have plenty fish then. That’s the main purpose o f tabu, to 
increase the fish population. It is important. (Villager3 o f Wai)
This overall satisfaction may indicate that perceived costs and benefits o f tabu are 
roughly balanced. In other words, although the level o f resource dependence differs 
between the two districts, the residents show the same levels o f willingness to cooperate in 
their conservation actions.
4.5.7 NGOs involved in CBCRM
An NGO called the Partners in Community Development in Fiji (PCDF) has been actively 
involved in CBCRM in Cuvu. PCDF is under the Foundation o f the Peoples o f the South 
Pacific International (FSPI), the largest civil society organisation in the Pacific region and 
working at the grassroots level in nine nations: Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Solomon 
Islands, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and East Timor. The FSPI Secretariat is based in 
Suva, serving as the regional nexus for the FSPI network. The organisations belonging to 
FSPI are engaged in various types o f awareness programs and advocacy work, aiming at 
increasing stability and reducing poverty throughout the region.
PCDF focuses on development at the local community level, although targets o f 
their projects are not limited to environmental issues. In fact, when it was founded in 1978, 
the primary concern was with nutrition. Its projects currently encompass health and 
community awareness, the sustainable management o f marine and forest resources, small- 
business development, disaster relief, human rights and good governance. According to the 
description provided by PCDF, they provide technical support to the local communities 
through a participatory approach that encourages community members to take
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responsibility for their own development. This involves assisting them to identify self- 
determined priorities and goals and to assert their right to influence and access public 
services and decision-making processes. PCDF has assisted Cuvu communities under the 
framework of the Fiji LMMA Network_9on their coastal management activities.
In Wai, on the other hand, the WWF Fiji Country Programme has been involved in 
the CBCRM activities since 1999. Their activities are also based on the framework of the 
Fiji LMMA Network, like PCDF. As part of WWF International, the WWF South Pacific 
Programme was established in 1990 in Suva and organises a series of conservation projects, 
policy reviews and campaigns in Pacific Island nations. Having over 100 staff in various 
regions throughout the South Pacific, it covers conservation issues in the South Pacific 
region, while country programme offices are in other countries, such as the Cook Islands, 
Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. The Secretariat in Suva guides support to 
conservation activities in the field and maintains financial accountability, communications 
and administrative procedures. The programmes based in the Suva Secretariat include 
Finance, Human Resources, Administration, Communications, Capacity building and 
Sustainable livelihoods, Regional policy, Climate change and the Regional marine 
programme. PCDF employs international staff while staff members who visit Cuvu for 
project implementation are mainly from Fiji.
As one of the country offices of the WWF South Pacific Programme, the Fiji 
Country Programme Office is also in Suva. It employs nine staff members either in Suva 
or in field offices in Vanua Levu. The employees are both internationally and nationally 
recruited and those who work are Wai district’s project are all Fijians. While the Fiji
29 District of Cuvu and PCDF withdrew from the Fiji LMMA Network in 2004.
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Country Programme Office has been involved in a number of environmental issues, such as 
climate change, a strategic environment assessment of tourism development and wildlife 
species conservation, one of their major activities remains marine conservation through a 
community-based approach. The officer of the Fiji Country Programme states:
We recognise livelihoods, customs and traditions in the communities are closely connected to 
natural resources. Capacity building in the communities is important for them to manage natural 
resources in a sustainable way and we believe that it will lead to well-being of the people.
4.6 Conclusion
To summarise, this chapter described the methods to be used in the thesis. I use a mixed 
research method involving both qualitative and quantitative techniques of data collection 
and analysis. The information and data were collected through semi-structured interviews, 
observations, individual surveys and relevant documents. The interview guides and 
questionnaires used in the field operationalised the concepts discussed in the theoretical 
framework presented in Chapter 2. I made every effort to maximise the reliability and 
validity of my data.
This chapter also described the two study sites, Cuvu and Wai in Nadroga/Navosa 
province, providing socio-economic information on local life. While there is no significant 
difference between the districts regarding general demographic features, such as population, 
village structure, education and religion, differences in geographical proximity to an 
external market economy are one possible reason for their different standards of living. 
Resource use patterns also differ between the two districts as people in Cuvu use coastal 
resources only for their own food while Wai depends on coastal resources for their income
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generation. However, I observed similar levels of satisfaction with the management 
activities in both districts. The NGOs involved in the CBCRM projects both work within 
the framework of Fiji LMMA30.
In sum, although I recognise how my research design limited data collection during 
my fieldwork, I conclude that my two study sites possess similar characteristics, except for 
variations in the level of economic development and marine resource dependence. It is 
hypothesised that this economic difference is the causal factor explaining the difference in 
the levels of social capital. In short, Cuvu district is expected to show a relatively low level 
of bonding social capital and a high level of bridging social capital. In contrast, Wai is 
expected to show a higher level of bonding social and lower level of bridging social capital. 
While the theoretical literature argues that resource dependence affects users’ cooperation 
behaviour, my field data suggest that the levels of satisfaction in both districts with the 
presence of MPA or tabu are similar.
In the following three chapters, I present the results and analyses of this study in 
answering the research questions posed in the Introduction. In Chapter 5, I discuss those 
CBCRM institutions in Fiji that constrain villages’ behaviour regarding the use and 
management of their resources. I found that villagers in the two study sites have similar 
levels of understanding on fishing rules while they perceive different levels of rule 
compliance in their own districts. Chapters 6 and 7 then explore possible reasons for the 
differences between the two districts regarding rule compliance by focusing on bonding 
and bridging social capital respectively.
30 Although Cuvu is no longer part o f LMMA, the earlier stages o f the tabu establishment followed LMMA 
Framework .
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CHAPTER 5
CBCRM institutions of Cuvu and Wai
5.1 Introduction
The purpose o f this chapter is to examine the variable that we seek to explain. Through an 
analysis o f resource use rules in the study sites, I explore the operation o f CBCRM 
institutions that constrain villages’ behaviour regarding their use and management o f 
resources. Let me recall how I measure long-lasting CBCRM as a CPR in this study. Since 
the challenge o f CPR management is to get people to collaborate to maintain their 
institutions, this study examines:
(1) whether the resource users share a common understanding o f the rules; and
(2) whether they then follow these rules.
These were derived from the theoretical discussions presented in Table 2.5. In the semi- 
structured interviews I asked the villagers their understanding o f the rules used in CBCRM, 
and the questionnaire survey asked the villagers their perceptions on rule compliance in 
their villages. I recognise that the use o f villagers’ perceptions rather than actual rule 
infringements is an imperfect measure o f our variable o f interest. However, due to the 
absence o f long-term data on actual MPA or tabu operation I do believe that asking 
interviewees directly about their behaviour is the most valid measure available.
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This chapter consists o f three parts. First, I discuss the rules currently used in 
CBCRM o f Fiji and related issues. These rules include resource boundaries for
management and rules o f appropriation. I also discuss how the local rules are made and 
how conflicts are resolved so as to gain a greater understanding o f how the rules operate 
day-to-day. The first section w ill end with a discussion o f how the residents understand the 
rules — the first indicator o f long-lasting CBCRM. I found that the residents o f both study 
sites have a general understanding o f the rules in use.
Second, I present how these institutions are operationalised in day-to-day resource 
management through an analysis o f rule enforcement. The aspects o f rule enforcement 
covered in this section are monitoring and sanctions. Then, the discussion w ill proceed to 
the second indicator o f long-lasting CBCRM. My data show that the villagers’ perceptions 
on the level o f rule compliance in their own districts differ. Finally, I conclude the chapter 
with a summary o f my findings.
5.2 Rules related to CBCRM and villagers’ understanding 
5.2.1 Resource boundaries for management
The type o f rules that this thesis is most concerned with is that o f resource boundaries. 
Understanding boundaries is important to clarify what is being managed and for whom. In 
short, defining the boundaries o f CPRs is the first step in any kind o f collective action 
(Ostrom 1990). By reducing uncertainty as to who w ill benefit from management practices 
and who w ill pay the costs, clearly defined boundaries increase the chances o f success.
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In CBCRM cases in Fiji, two types o f CPR boundaries exist. These are the 
boundaries o f Customary Fishing Rights Areas or qoliqoli and the boundaries o f MPA or 
tabu, used as the main tool in the conservation o f resources in coastal areas. Figure 5.1 
shows how these boundaries are defined on maps based on an official map o f qoliqoli.
Figure 5.1 Map of qoliqoli and tabu in Cuvu31
*  Vo tu a
X\Rukurnkulevu
K /  -IW f uvu ft
levuevu
\ \ Y a d u a•  Village
Customary Fishing 
Rights Area (Qoliqoli)
Marine Protected Area (Tabu)
31 The original qoliqoli maps produced by the Ministry o f Fijian Affairs were modified by the Author.
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Figure 5.2 Map of qoliqoli and tabu in Wai
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Before proceeding, some historical background is necessary. The starting point for 
any discussion on the boundaries o f qoliqoli must refer to the cession o f F iji to Britain 
signed in 1874. The Deed o f Cession (1874: Clause l)  gave the Queen possession of, as 
well as full sovereignty and dominion over, all Fijian islands. This included possession o f 
the adjacent waters such as all ports, harbours, rivers, estuaries, and reefs. It also 
recognised the rights and interests o f the High Chiefs, the ceding parties, so far as they 
were consistent with British Sovereignty, and the colonial form o f government (The Deed 
o f Cession 1874: Clause 7). The result o f these two clauses was a dispute in interpretation.
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Does ownership over coastal water and underwater resources belong to the Chiefs or do 
they only maintain the right to use the resources?
An official view intended to clarify this confusion was addressed in the Rivers and
Streams Ordinance (1880), which is now revised as Chapter 136 of the Laws of Fiji:
‘All waters in Fiji which the natives have been accustomed to traverse ... shall, 
with the soil under the same, belong to the Crown and be perpetually open to the 
public for the enjoyment of all rights ...’
The Birds, Game and Fish Protection Ordinance also confirmed the position that the Chiefs 
and their sub-clan or lineage groups should enjoy user rights only in their qoliqoli. 
Furthermore, according to the State Land Act of 1946, the State holds control over the 
littoral zone, foreshore and submerged sea floor.
When Fiji became independent in 1970, the Fisheries Act Section 13 confirmed that 
Crown ownership over coastal waters and resources was passed over to the State while the 
traditional owners retained their exclusive fishing rights in each qoliqoli. The boundaries 
of each CFRA claimed by a particular clan, or yavusa, as their qoliqoli, is clearly shown on 
maps and defined by the Native Fisheries Commission of the national government. In other 
words, qoliqoli is managed at the district level. The Commission has determined and 
registered 410 qoliqoli in total and, according to Cooke et al. (2000), it makes Fiji the only 
country with legal recognition of Customary Fishing Rights Areas marked on accurate 
maps.
While qoliqoli is officially recognised, MPA or tabu is voluntarily set at the village 
or district level for resource management purposes as part of the CBCRM projects. As 
explained in Chapter 3, the idea of tabu originated from Fijian custom. Usually for 100
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days after a chief dies, a portion o f qoliqoli is set aside as a no-take zone as a token o f 
respect (Ravuvu 1983:75). When a memorial feast is held on the 100th day after the death, 
the tabu is revoked and people harvest from the reopened area. The on-going conservation 
projects that use tabu as the main conservation measure borrowed this traditional practice 
and then extended it for one or more years. Kunatuba (1994: 92) argues that such 
traditional practices are not necessarily evidence o f a culture o f conservation. Johannes 
(1994) states that uncritical appreciation o f traditional ecological knowledge should be 
avoided without examining their validity. While ecological research to assess the 
conservation effectiveness o f tabu is necessary, the evidence collected for this research 
shows that existing local practices could be tailored to make them efficient in relation to 
current social conditions. The Fijian people whom 1 spoke with generally showed their 
respect for, and willingness to keep, their traditional way o f life. Here is one example o f a 
villager that 1 talked to:
We would rather keep our tradition. We wouldn’t like to be like Hawaii going with the new 
trend forgetting tradition and custom, then we would lose our identity. That is what some o f us 
are looking at now. (Villager 3 o f Cuvu)
Since tradition plays a strong role in the politics o f Fiji, the effects o f conservation efforts 
should be strengthened when resource use rules are in line with social customs. I f  
culturally acceptable practices are regarded as important, then resource management 
projects are likely to avoid disruptive side effects (Klee 1980: 274).
5.2.2 Appropriation rules
In addition to definitions o f boundaries, rules o f appropriation are also important in 
CBCRM. These rules constrain the resource users in many aspects o f their fishing
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activities, including limiting the species, sizes and amounts of fish they can catch, as well 
as the types of fishing gear. At the national level, the Fisheries Act, Section 9 allows the 
Minister of Fisheries and Forests to make the following regulations related to 
appropriation:
• prohibiting any practices or methods, or use of equipment or devices or materials, 
which are likely to be injurious to the maintenance and development of the stock of 
fish;
• prescribing areas and seasons within which the taking of fish is prohibited or restricted, 
either entirely or with reference to a named species;
• prescribing limits to the size and weight of fish of a named species which may be taken; 
and
• prescribing limits to the size of nets or the mesh of nets which may be employed in 
taking fish either in Fiji fisheries waters or in any specified part.
Table 5.1 shows a list of fish species whose harvest is restricted with size limits by 
the Fisheries Act. In addition to these fish species, the Act prohibits harvests of the 
following animals:
• swimming crab, Scylla serrata or Qari Dina, of less than 125 mm measured across the 
widest part of the carapace:
• turtle eggs and turtles less than 455mm measured in length, any turtles seen in the 
months from November to February:
• some species of shell fish: and
• porpoises and dolphins.
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The Fisheries Act also restricts fishing equipment. For example, the mesh of cast 
nets and nets for catching sardines and whitebait cannot be less than 30mm. All other kinds 
of nets must not be less than 50mm, wet and stretched. Destructive fishing methods, such 
as the use of chemical compounds, poisonous plants and dynamite are prohibited for the 
purpose of taking, stupefying or killing any fish.
Apart from the national legislation, village authorities have set informal rules to 
restrict fishing activities in their waters. In the tabu areas of Cuvu and Wai, the common 
appropriation rule is that no one is allowed to fish for a period the villagers agreed among 
themselves. This is a community’s voluntary rule, as the Fisheries Act and other national 
legislation do not require a total ban of fishing in any parts of customary fishing grounds. 
It is also known that totemic and other taboos, such as those that restrict particular clans, 
families, age groups or a specific gender from eating certain types of fish, are practiced in 
Fiji. As an example, Veitayaki (1995: 79) states that marine fish, except for trevally (saqa), 
are for the warrior clans while freshwater fish are for the chiefly clans in Gau island and 
many other areas of Fiji. Although this custom may contribute towards marine stock 
maintenance by limiting demands for a certain species, I did not observe any such totemic 
taboos in Cuvu and Wai.
162
Table 5.1 Minimum size limits for fish
C o m m o n  N a m e Fijian N am e Fam ily Genus
M inim um  
Length  (m m)
B a r r a c u d a O g o S p h y r a e n id a e S p h y r a e n a 3 0 0
C r e v a l l y ,  T r e v a l l y ,  
P o m p a n o
S a q a  ("excluding 
v i l u / S a q a )
C a r a n g i d a e C a r a n x 3 0 0
G r e y  M u l l e t K a n a c e M u g i l id a e M u g i l 2 0 0
G l a s s p e r c h ,
A h o l e h o l e
I k a  D r o k a D u c l id a e D u l e s 150
K e t a n g ,  S p i n e f o o t  
R a b b i t f i s h
N u q a S i g a n id a e S i g a n u s 2 0 0
L o n g - j a w e d
M a c k e r e l
S a l a l a S c o m b r i d a e R a s t r e l l i g e r 2 0 0
L o n g t o m ,  G a r f i s h ,  
G r e e n g a r
S a k u  B u s a B e lo n i d a e B e l o n e 3 0 0
M i l k  F i s h Y a w  a C h a n id a e C h a o s 3 0 0
M o j a r r a M a tu . G e r r id a e G e r r e s 100
P a r r o t f i s h . U l a v i C a l l y o d o n t i d a e S c a r i c h t h y s 2 5 0
P o u te r ,  S l im y ,  
S o a p y ,  P e p e r e k
K a i k a i L e i o g n a t h i d a e G a z z a 100
R o c k  C o d ,  G r o u p e r ,  
S a l m o n  C o d
D o n u ,  K a w a k a w a ,  K a v a  
( e x c l u d i n g  s m a l l  red  
s p o t t e d  c o d )
S e r r a n i d a e S e r r a n u s 2 5 0
S e a  B r e a m ,  P i g - f a c e d  
B r e a m
K a w a g o ,
D o k o n i v u d i ,  M u s u b i
L e th r in id a e L e t h r i n u s 2 5 0
S m a l l  S e a  B r e a m K a b a t ia ,  K a k e L e t h r i n id a e L e t h r i n u s 150
S m a l l  S e a  B r e a m S a b u t u L e t h r i n id a e L e t h r i n u s 2 0 0
S u r g e o n  F i sh B a la g i H e p a t i d a e H e p a t u s 2 0 0
S u r m u l l e t ,  G o a t f i s h ,  
W h i s k e r c o d
K i, O s e M u l l id a e M u l l o i d i c h t h y s
P s e u d u p e n e u s
U p e n e u s
150
S n a p p e r D a  m u L u t j a n id a e L u t j a n u s 3 0 0
U n i c o r n - F i s h ,  
L e a t h e r  j a c k e t
T a H e p a t i d a e N a s o 3 0 0
Source: Fisheries Act, Sixth Schedule, Regulation 18
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5.3 Arrangements for rule making
5.3.1 CBCRM governance at the local level
CPR cases have greater chances o f success when appropriators use locally devised 
management rules which allow for a discussion o f common problems so as to enhance their 
cooperation (Baland and Platteau 1996: 344; Ostrom 1990: 93; Wade 1988: 216). Ostrom 
(1990: 93) states that participation in revision o f rules is particularly important because 
appropriators are able to maintain a fair set o f rules as conditions change. From this, she 
derives her third principle o f long-enduring CPR management (Ostrom 1990: 90): ‘most 
individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational 
rules’ .
In both Cuvu and Wai, although the traditional chief o f the district always has the 
final say in decision making, the process o f decision making differs between the two 
districts. One o f the major foci o f Cuvu’s coastal management project is structuring local 
governance regarding environmental issues and so a new decision making system has been 
introduced (Figure 5.3). The key elements o f this new process are:
(1) Clarification regarding who makes decisions and how; and
(2) Existence o f Environment Committee to allow villagers as well as other 
stakeholders to participate in decision making.
A ll environmental concerns are discussed in the committee following village 
meetings, which all mature residents must attend. The decision making system requires the 
Paramount Chief hold a District Council meeting when he makes decisions on fishing and
164
tabu rules. Supported by NGO involvement, the participatory decision-making process in 
Cuvu is in keeping with collective choice arrangements in the model of CPR management 
as suggested by Ostrom and other researchers (Baland and Platteau 1996; Wade 1988). In 
fact, 45 per cent of survey participants in Cuvu answered that they make decisions 
concerning fishing rules in village meetings (Figure 5.4). This answer implies that 
residents have a sense of participating in decision making. The following Cuvu villager 
understands the importance of the Committee and perceives it to be a ‘bottom-up’ decision­
making process:
We now respect the bottom-up approach. People voice out their opinions, rather than someone 
decides. We leave the decision making to the people, their voice and opinion, whatever they 
want. (Villager 13 of Cuvu)
Figure 5.3 Decision-making process for environmental issues in Cuvu District
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Figure 5.4 Decision maker
Who makes decisions about changes to the fishing rules?
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Village elders. 
7%
^government
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Having this well organised decision-making system should make tabu management more 
transparent for the Cuvu residents. It seems, however, that in practice this is sometimes not 
the case. The Paramount Chief o f Nadroga Province resides in Cuvu Village o f Cuvu 
District, and his power is recognised among all community members. Even with the 
‘ bottom-up’ decision-making process, the Cuvu villagers respect the Paramount Chief as an 
authority figure and i f  they want to harvest in tabu, they directly approach him and ask him 
for permission by presenting a bundle o f yaqona. In fact, 38 per cent o f the respondents in 
the survey stated that the chief makes the decision regarding fishing rules (Figure 5.4). 
Even when the Paramount Chief makes decisions without holding a meeting with the 
Environment Committee and District Council, residents consider this to be the traditional 
Fijian way and culturally acceptable:
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People could go to him [Paramount Chief] and ask if they could go fishing in the area and he 
could open without consultancy, the [Environment] Committee's consultancy, he is able to open 
up a certain area. (Villager 3 in Cuvu)
On the other hand, the dual decision-making system seems to have caused discontent, as 
some residents stated:
.... they come from other villages and ask the Paramount Chief to open [the tabu].....we were
the ones who sacrificed for two years, since they started tabu. But when those people [from 
other villages] saw the abundance of fish in our tabu, they wanted to open it. Sometimes we 
feel frustrated, but we cannot do anything. (Villager 8 of Cuvu)
Whether open the tabu or not should be discussed in the Environment Committee. But people 
go to the Paramount Chief and ask him to open it. This is not good. (Villager 15 of Cuvu)
As in Cuvu, the villages of Wai District also hold regular village meetings on 
Mondays to discuss issues and concerns. As shown in Figure 5.4, however, 50 per cent of 
the respondents answered that decisions are made by the chief, while 22.6 per cent of them 
answered that decisions are made during village meetings. The interview results are 
consistent with the survey results:
The rule is that we cannot touch anything in the tabu area, except if the chief says and then we 
go and have a look. (Villager 1 of Wai)
I cannot say my opinion here, because all decisions are made by theyavusa chief. We won’t say 
anything. My own opinion, I can’t say anything. (Villager 3 of Wai)
The interviewees unanimously stated that the chief had decided on the 
establishment of tabu and makes decisions about any changes in tabu rules. These results 
imply that Wai District maintains a stronger hierarchical decision-making system, where 
their chief of clan is at the top. Although the same Paramount Chief enjoys his authority
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over Wai District as the head of Nadroga/Navosa province, it seems that people in Wai do 
not acknowledge his presence in their everyday life, since none of the interviewees named 
him as a decision maker in the interviews and conversation with me. In Wai District at 
least, it seems that the chief of the clan has more substantial power than the Paramount 
Chief regarding tabu management. The decision making process in Wai is presented in 
Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5 Decision-making process for environmental issues in Wai District
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Although it is not a decision-making body, the Salt-making Committee was created 
in Wai District in 2000 as part of the WWF-led CBCRM governance structure. Lomawai 
village used to be known for its quality salt. Saltwater was collected from a pond dug in
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the tidal flat area o f the village and the villagers boiled the water for a 24 hour period to 
extract salt. According to Lomawai villagers, the salt production technique is used only in 
Lomawai and neighbouring Kubuna villagers. They also believe the saltwater in the 
Lomawai area and the type o f wood used in the production process as key to its high 
quality. In addition to producing salt for barter with other villages, it used to be an 
important wedding gift for when one villager married someone from another part o f the 
country. However, salt production was discontinued about 50 years ago when 
commercially produced salt became available and the village was gradually integrated into 
the market economy. In Lomawai village, only a 70 year old elderly woman remembers 
the salt making process. The CBCRM project saw the potential to use salt-making as a 
tourist attraction, and the Salt-making Committee was created with the purpose of reviving 
the salt-making skills o f the village. The Committee is made up o f three villagers from 
Lomawai village and, with the support of Vv'WF, has built salt-making facilities, including 
two ponds and a hut. The Committee holds a regular meeting on Sundays and is 
responsible for the maintenance o f the facility. Although the committee is a distinctive 
feature o f the Wai CBCRM project, it does not possess actual authority. Decision making 
remains the prerogative o f the traditional clan chief.
5.3.2 Government recognition
In order to sustain community-based CPR management, Wade (1988) and Ostrom (1990) 
argue that the rights o f appropriators to devise their own institutions should not be 
challenged by external governmental authorities. According to Becker and Ostrom (1995: 
119), under this condition, participation empowers individuals to take the necessary steps to
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protect their resources. Furthermore, it prevents others who want to evade local systems 
from undermining these efforts by appealing to the state because legitimacy is lacking.
The presence of appropriator institutions, together with government inattention or 
support, suggests the presence of rights of self-governance. These rights can be both at the 
constitutional and collective choice level. Indicators include:
(1) the existence of appropriator generated institutions acknowledged by the 
government;
(2) legal and/or material support from the state for the development of appropriator 
organisations and institutions; and
(3) formal mechanisms for translating appropriator decisions into binding rules.
As previously discussed, customary marine tenure is recognised in the Fisheries Act. 
Villagers have participated in coastal management activities setting the rules-in-use within 
their qoliqoli. Government officials, such as those from the Ministry of Fijian Affairs and 
Fisheries Department, have been involved in the management of coastal resources in the 
villages. Both agencies recognise the role of villagers in management:
Without their participation, I don’t think that the projects can go ahead...We believe, with their 
participation, at the same time they can improve their life, improving resources they have in the 
area. It will help their survival in the future. (Government Officer 1)
Because in Fiji, the fishing grounds belong to the State but there is an agreement between 
fishing ground owners and the government. We have to work together. We listen to the qoliqoli 
owners. (Government Officer 2)
Moreover, the former ruling party, Soqosoqo ni Duavata ni Lewenivanua, led by ex­
prime minister Laisenia Qarase drafted the Customary Fisheries Bill (Qoliqoli Bill) seeking
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to return foreshore resources to indigenous Fijians in order to protect their proprietary and 
usage rights. This was expected to strengthen recognition o f the legitimacy o f local rules. 
Flowever, after the military coup d’etat the 5th o f December 2006, the interim government 
withdrew the b ill.
5.3.3 Mechanisms for conflict resolution
Since applying rules involves some discretion, conflict is bound to occur. In many CPR 
situations, local resource use rules are not always written down and even one simple rule 
could be interpreted quite differently by different individuals. Thus, Ostrom (1990: 100) 
states that there needs to be some mechanism for resolving what is or is not a rule infraction. 
In the context o f Fijian coastal management, as an official arrangement for conflict 
resolution, the fisheries extension officer w ill become involved as a representative o f the 
government in any dispute between individuals over qoliqoli.
As Ostrom (1990: 101) explains, these mechanisms can be informal. As shown in 
Figure 5.3, Cuvu District has developed a clear decision-making process involving the 
Environment Committee for any resource management concerns among villagers including 
conflicts. In F iji’ s case, the presence o f a chief also functions as a conflict resolution 
mechanism. A Fijian term, vakaturaga, is commonly used to describe ideal behaviour, 
one’s actions and characteristics befitting the presence o f a chief (Ravuvu 1983: 103). 
People are expected to respect and comply with the chief. Although the District o f Wai 
does not have such an organisation working specifically for resource management issues, 
the Environment Committee o f Cuvu District does. However, traditional decision making
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with the yavusa chief at the top serves as a mechanism for discussing and resolving 
conflicts.
Furthermore, the generous attitude of most Fijian villagers plays a role in avoiding 
unnecessary conflicts. Although his book was published two decades ago, Ravuvu (1983: 
109) describes Fijians as generally gentle because anger and hatred are subversive to group 
living and solidarity. In my own research, I also found that lapses were usually overlooked, 
while villages have a number of rules and norms that residents are expected to obey. 
Residents often use expressions to indicate that they cannot change others or cannot force 
others to act as they would like. For example, although drinking kava is a common activity 
in village gatherings and considered an important social obligation, the decision to accept a 
bowl or not is often left up to individuals. Another example can be found in the decision to 
attend church services. Though all village residents are Christian and frequently attend 
church, some occasionally missed Sunday services. Although Ravuvu (1983: 98) states 
that some people go to church to avoid such labels as ‘setani’ (of satan) or ‘tawa lotu’ 
(atheist), I also found many residents accepted the decision of whether to attend or not as a 
personal choice.
Although it is hard to prove, this generous attitude may reduce conflicts regarding 
resource use and work as a proactive conflict resolution mechanism. One example is the 
attitude of villagers’ toward fishing by Indo-Fijians. Indo-Fijian residents in the district do 
not possess customary fishing rights in the qoliqoli and many Fijians perceive their fishing 
as illegal. Flowever, even when they observe fishing activities by Indo-Fijians, Fijians 
normally do not stop them if the fishing is only for home consumption. In case they are 
found in the tabu areas, they are merely given a reprimand:
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They [Indians who come to the tabu] are neighbours around our place; we just give them a 
warning and tell them to make sure [there is] no next time. (Villager 3 o f Cuvu)
As an explanation for this, a resident o f Cuvu said that the villagers know that the fishing is 
only for providing food for the family. Since Fijians also consider family to be important, 
they do not hold any grudges against their neighbours.
5.4 Residents’ overall understanding of the rules
To this point, I have provided a discussion o f the resource use rules and related issues. The 
challenge to sustaining a CPR is to maintain these institutions through collaboration. 
Therefore, the important question to ask is whether the residents who use the coastal 
resources understand these rules and norms. In this section, I w ill discuss how the residents 
o f the two districts understand resource boundaries and appropriation rules.
5.4.1 Residents’ understanding of resource boundaries
The dual ownership system under which the State registers the coastal waters and natural 
resources to be shared by the Fijian people is complex. Lagibalavu (1994) reports that it is 
commonly not well-understood by the people. However, it does seem that villagers in 
Cuvu and Wai are well informed on this issue and clearly understand how property rights 
are assigned. The villagers showed me their qoliqoli boundaries on a map with reference to 
actual landforms and what they pointed out was consistent with the boundaries on the 
official map o f qoliqoli. In my interviews, the villagers discussed the boundaries o f 
qoliqoli and tabu, as the CPR boundaries and property rights they possess:
[The boundary o f our qoliqoli is] up to the end o f the reef. That’s where we protect. (Villager l 
o f Cuvu)
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We, Fijian people, only have usage rights for local people in our tabu, not ownership but usage 
rights. (Villager 3 of Cuvu)
The government has power so anything to do with the water, the government should know, 
business or we make things there like tabu, then the government must know. (Villager 1 of Wai)
As part of the NGO assisted conservation projects, the residents of both districts 
were given the chance to learn the property rights arrangement regarding their fishing 
activities in the qoliqoli. During workshops organised by the NGOs, officers of the 
Fisheries Department discussed on how property rights were assigned. The result was that 
village residents gained knowledge on the legal arrangements of the coastal resources.
While the villagers generally share understanding of the qoliqoli boundaries, the 
official understanding does not necessarily capture the more detailed division of rights in 
the communities in Cuvu District. In her case study of Ucunivanua village in the 
northeastern part of Viti Levu. Vunisea (1994) explains that smaller social units could have 
fishing rights over specific areas within the district level customary fishing rights area. 1 
observed similar nested rights in Cuvu District. Although all Fijians of the district have the 
right to access any part of the district water, individual villages in the district maintain the 
right to restrict the entry of people from other villages into their areas. As a result, villagers 
maintain a norm to go fishing only in adjacent waters:
If you talk about fishing at the village level, each village has their own rights. Tore village’s 
water is up there, that’s theirs. Also, ours is straight in the water just adjacent to our village.
That’s how qoliqoli usage goes in our villages. (Villager 3 of Cuvu)
If people from another village [in the same district] come and want to fish here, then they have 
to go through traditional protocol to get permission. (Villager 13 of Cuvu)
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After the introduction of the government definition of qoliqoli, which is managed at 
the district level, and the publication of official maps, discontent spread among some 
villagers, because it reduced village autonomy and increased pressure on marine resources 
by people from outside the village. This concern is described by the interviewees:
Before, the village had [its] own qoliqoli. For example, this village had [its] own qoliqoli and 
Yadua [village] had [its] own qoliqoli. If someone from other villages wanted to fish in this area, 
then they came and brought grog [yaqona], asked elders [for permission]. But now it is 
changing. Now qoliqoli is for tikina [district], A particular qoliqoli which used to belong to 
tokatoka [extended family] became a qoliqoli of the whole tribe. (Villager 13 of Cuvu)
The concept of marine management is changing. It has been managed by the tikina [district] 
these days, but every village used to have own qoliqoli and if someone wanted to come they 
went through the village. (Villager 15 of Cuvu)
We want to go back to traditional ways of fishing, like you fish in own area. There will be more 
fish. There will be more stability of the fish. Nowadays, for some people, they want to sell fish 
and those people go to the other village’s area, and those people go and dive there. But before, 
people went fishing to only their own area and fished there and ate it. (Villager 17 of Cuvu)
The villagers of Wai District were able to show me their qoliqoli boundaries on a 
map and what they pointed to was also consistent with the boundaries on the official 
qoliqoli map. However, in contrast to Cuvu, nested rights, such as village level ownership, 
were not found in the Wai waters. The Wai residents recognise collective ownership over 
the district waters which coincide with the governments’ defined boundaries:
Our fishing ground is owned by a yavusa [clan] which consists of six villages. It is not owned 
by individual villages, but owned by a yavusa. (Villager 3 of Wai)
Like qoliqoli boundaries, MPA or tabu boundaries are clear among villagers in both 
districts. All the interviewees could show me the boundaries o f their tabu on a map.
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Physically MPA boundaries are the boundaries that separate the villages, and people know 
where the boundaries are. Our MPAs are marked by buoys in the water and it uses basically 
traditional landmarks. Everyone knows it. Buoys are outside o f reef breakers. (Villager 3 o f 
Cuvu)
It [tabu] is up to the edge o f reef. We don’t use physical buoys but everybody knows where the 
tabu is. (Villager 8 o f Wai)
Although residents o f both districts know the physical boundaries o f tabu, their 
sense o f resource ownership is slightly different. As explained above, some o f the residents 
o f Cuvu District showed their discontent over official demarcation o f qoliqoli at the district 
level. Interestingly, at least regarding tabu management, the residents o f Wai suggested 
their preference for collective resource management at the district level. A villager showed 
his willingness to share the resources in his village’s tabu with other villages:
Tabu area is not only for a particular village, it ’s for all o f us, six villages. ... The six villages, 
that is our family. (Villager 1 o f Wai)
In sum, the boundaries o f CPRs, both qoliqoli and tabu, are well defined in both 
districts, although there is a difference between two districts in the recognition o f nested 
rights. Through workshops and training organised by the NGOs, the villagers have had a 
chance to learn what rights are given to them and developed their common understanding 
o f the tabu locations.
5.4.2 Residents’ understanding of appropriation rules
The residents o f Cuvu and Wai districts also have a good understanding o f those rules 
regarding appropriation. A ll villagers know that all fishing is prohibited in their tabu and 
the use o f certain types o f fishing gear is not allowed. It seems that though villagers do not
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have accurate knowledge regarding mesh size restricted by the Fisheries Act, they 
understand that they are not allowed to use fine nets for fishing.
An interesting point to note is that residents consider the rules on fishing equipment 
to be that o f their own community. They explained that they made the rules for their own 
resources, while the national law actually restricts the use o f poisonous plants and fine nets. 
Although this may be based on a misunderstanding among the residents, the fact that they 
believe themselves involved in the decision making process seems to convince them o f the 
importance o f the appropriation rules and give them an incentive for compliance.
5.5 Rule enforcement and compliance 
5.5.1 Monitoring
CPR researchers emphasise the necessity o f monitoring. Gibson et al. (2005) demonstrated 
that rule enforcement by the local group is significantly correlated to CPR conditions. 
According to Section 3 o f the Fisheries Act, the government may appoint honorary fish 
wardens in order to prevent and detect offences, enforcing the provisions o f the Act. The 
honorary fish wardens may require any person engaged in fishing to exhibit his licence, 
apparatus and catch. Furthermore, where there is reasonable suspicion that any offence has 
been committed, they may take the alleged offender to the nearest police station or port and 
confiscate the vessel, apparatus and catch, without summons, warrant or other process 
(Fisheries Act o f Fiji Section 7).
As part o f the process o f tabu establishment, the appointment o f fish wardens was 
facilitated in Cuvu and Wai Districts. The Fishery Department sent its officials to train the
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nominated fish wardens and gave them an ID card. As a facilitator of the CBCRM in Cuvu 
District, PCDF officers consider the involvement of government agencies in their project as 
important:
That [the fish warden training] was to teach knowledge and skills to the fish wardens, like what 
their rights are, if  they use the rights what the consequences are...that’s Fisheries Department, 
that’s their role...W hen we come to these [training] workshops, we invite the [government] 
officers to present. Workshops, like awareness raising, can be done by ourselves, but we also 
invite reps from the Fishery and Environment so that we can have the integrated approach. This 
is necessary, because once we will puli out, the government will be still responsible for the 
project. (PCDF officer)
Every coastal village in both districts now has a few residents to monitor the tabu. 
Although monitoring is not implemented on a regular basis, the objective of the fish warden 
is well understood by the residents and their management is considered effective. The 
residents of Cuvu describe the role of fish wardens thus:
Fish wardens always tell them [rule breakers] not to fish in tabu, and now they come only to 
open area. (Villager 13 o f Cuvu)
Not anymore [rule breakers]. Before the tabu, they [Indians] always came and fished, but not 
now. When we started the tabu, we told Indians not to come. We have fish wardens, checking 
and always looking after the tabu. (Villager 15 o f Cuvu)
However, some monitoring concerns were identified from the interviews. Lack of 
time and money is the major constraint in monitoring activities in Cuvu. Most of the fish 
wardens in Cuvu District have a paid job and it is not easy for them to spend time patrolling. 
Another problem identified in Cuvu is that there is no fund specifically dedicated to 
monitoring. The effectiveness of fish wardens is limited by a lack of necessary equipment 
such as a motorised boat.
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Since fish wardens of Wai monitor their fishing ground while they are fishing, no 
interviewees, who are mainly subsistence fishers, raised the issue of time as a significant 
opportunity cost of monitoring activities. In one of the villages, a person who owns a boat 
was chosen to be a fish warden and is also expected to supply his boat for the common 
interest. He indicated his pride in being selected as fish warden and expressed his 
willingness to work for the community. Since the lack of monitoring equipment was also 
recognised as a problem, the villagers intended to negotiate with the WWF and/or the 
government for provision of a boat.
I have to talk to the Fisheries [Department] for a boat. In Wai, we have own security guys. The 
fisheries from Suva gave us ID card, and the only thing left is a boat. (Villager 1 of Wai)
An article in the Fiji Times (December 20, 2004) reported that, in the case of tabu 
management on Moturiki island, where PCDF has assisted the CBCRM activities, a 
challenge for fish wardens would be in apprehending their own family and relatives in 
cases where they broke the law. Since kinship is the basis for the structure of Fijian 
communities, this poses a serious problem. However, none of my interviewees in Cuvu 
and Wai raised this concern. The fact that the residents understand the rules and the 
objective of the fish warden may have helped reduce concern among fish wardens. In 
addition, villages have adopted graduated sanctions, as described in the next section, and it 
is not always the case that all rule-breakers are immediately apprehended by the fish 
warden. In other words, the presence of graduated sanctions seems to increase the 
effectiveness of monitoring at the community level.
179
5.5.2 Sanctions
In addition to monitoring, sanctions are also considered necessary in CPR management 
(Gibson et al. 2005). Successful CPR cases use graduated sanctions depending on the 
seriousness and context of the offence (Ostrom 1990; Wade 1988). The formal assessment 
procedure for offences against the Fisheries Act involves government agencies. In fish 
warden training organised by the NGOs with the Fisheries Department, the wardens are 
told to report trespassers to police and the Fisheries Department. However, according to 
Ruddle (1995: 10), sanctions are a sensitive issue due to the legal uncertainty regarding 
property rights of qoliqoli. The legal uncertainty discussed by Ruddle exists due to the dual 
ownership of the coastal resource. The actual ownership belongs to the state while Fijian 
people possess access rights to the resources. Thus, the state has law enforcement power 
and should monitor resource use. However, the lack of the state’s capacity to police is 
often a problem. The result is that, local Fijians occasionally try to exclude or punish 
outsiders who fish in their customary or qoliqoli often without any legal basis. According 
to Zann (1983: cited in Ruddle 1995), high chiefs have been taken to court and charged 
with the illegal confiscation of poacher gear. The Customary Fishing Bill being introduced 
in Parliament before the military coup d’etat of December 2006 was to transfer the 
proprietary ownership of qoliqoli from the state to local Fijians. Once it passes, the bill 
will decrease the uncertainty over legal ownership, or so it is hoped.
The interviews revealed that, before proceeding to the formal assessment procedure, 
the villages assess trespassers based on informal graduated sanctions. The sanctions in 
villages of both districts vary from a verbal warning to physical punishment and are applied 
to both internal and external violators. When someone is found in a tabu area, fish wardens
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or other villagers first advise him/her to get out. If the case is more serious, such as 
repeated intrusions by an outsider or the mass taking of fish, the rule breakers’ equipment 
and catches are confiscated and they are sent to a village meeting. While elders make 
decisions on sanctions in the meeting, merely being present when all the villagers are 
together may be sufficient to remind the rule breaker of the importance of compliance:
For breaking the law in the village, we have a village meeting where all the village will be there, 
the person who broke the rule will be there, it is a big meeting that everybody can talk. It’s 
embarrassing. (Villager 11 of Cuvu)
Though the threat of physical punishment continues to exist today, it is rarely applied:
In the old days, under the traditional rules, if you broke the rules in the village, you would be 
whipped in the front of whole village. The chief will sit there, in front of the whole village, 
people stay outside or inside the house, the traditional warriors there with a big stick and whip.
Men, women or even family members of the chief, if  you broke the rule, you would be 
whipped...We still have this [physical punishment], but we don’t really do it now. (Villager 1 of 
Cuvu)
While graduated sanctions are used in the villages, the fear of supernatural 
punishment also plays a role in deterring tabu violations. People continue to respect 
customary beliefs and such threats are actually feared more than sanctions imposed by 
modern laws (Vunisea 1994: 203). As mentioned earlier, the concept of tabu itself comes 
from the idea of sacredness and prohibition (Ravuvu 1983: 91). As a result, violation of 
such rules is thought to invite divine punishment. While I found no respondents in Wai 
admitting to such a fear, one villager in Cuvu told me how superstitious punishment works 
in the village:
He went across [tabu]. He caught octopus, then he got sick. Then he came here to me, because I
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am a churchman and I got a g ift from God: when you pray, something like sickness, God does 
show me why. When he came here and prayed I saw him crossing the tabu area, so I said to him 
‘maybe you went to the tabu area and you touched something that we were not allowed to 
touch.’ Then the boy said ‘yeah, I did.’ He then went and asked the chief for his forgiveness. 
(Villager 12ofCuvu)
5.5.3 Residents’ overall compliance with rules
When the tabu were established, the basic rule the residents agreed upon regarding 
appropriation was not to fish inside the designated area. Under similar regimes o f 
monitoring and sanctions, Cuvu and Wai districts have implemented this conservation 
measure for about five years. As 1 have explained, all the residents have an understanding 
o f this rule. The next question, in order to examine the sustainability o f CBCRM as CPR 
management, concerns whether the residents who use the resources follow the rules. I f  the 
number o f the residents actually following the rules is small, then the institution is unlikely 
to be stable. Despite the fact that rule compliance is an essential factor for enduring 
resource management, neither o f the NGOs had collected data on whether the villagers 
actually follow the local rules. Given the difficulties o f directly measuring rule compliance, 
my individual questionnaire survey asked respondents their perceptions o f rule compliance 
in their particular village.
Figure 5.5 shows villagers’ perceptions o f their compliance with rules in their 
waters. It shows that only 40.4 per cent o f Wai respondents ‘always fo llow ,’ or, ‘most o f 
the time fo llow ,’ the fishing rules. Fifty-six percent o f them answered that either ‘ some 
don’t fo llow ’ or ‘most o f us don’t fo llow ’ the rules. As a reason for the low rate o f 
compliance, one interviewee stated:
We stay in the village at night but we know that some people go to tabu - some Indians and
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some Fijians. (Villager 1 of Wai)
The resource owner is the whole tikina [district], I mean, the Yavusa [clan] chief and Turaga ni 
Mataqali [sub-clan head]. They made tabu for the tikina. But some people never mind. 1 don’t 
think they agree with the tabu. Those people did not join the meetings. (Villager 8 of Wai)
In contrast, Cuvu residents showed better compliance with the tabu rules: 72 per 
cent of the Cuvu respondents answered ‘we all follow’ or ‘most o f the time we follow’ the 
tabu rules. The interviewees emphasised the importance of participation in workshops:
[The workshops are] the only way to be able to get things done here, and to get people 
motivated here. That’s why we had awareness workshops. (Villager 3 of Cuvu)
We learned a lot from them [PCDF], like how to keep our environment clean and how to protect 
our marine resources. That’s why we decided to do the tabu and we follow it. (Villager 11 of 
Cuvu)
However, other interviewees revealed that there were some people who broke the 
appropriation rules. Those rule breakers are both those from outside of the villages and the 
villagers. Some interviewees argue that Indo-Fijians in the district go fishing in tabu:
Only Indians come and break the rules. People in the village, they go to tabu only when they 
have Kalevu's permission. Then they go fishing. (Villager 14 of Cuvu)
Although there were some Indo-Fijians who fished in tabu as the villagers have 
caught some of these Indo-Fijians, it seems that Indo-Fijians are not the only rule breakers 
but Fijian residents of the district do break rules:
Some of the young boys here in this village, they went fishing in tabu. They were attracted to 
tabu because of the abundance of fish. They were too greedy. It is hard to stop them because 
plenty of fish is there. (Villager 10 of Cuvu)
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Interviewees also identified other reasons for rule breaking as lack o f  awareness o f the 
importance o f conservation (V illager 6 o f Cuvu) and decreased respect for other residents 
by younger generation (V illager 2 and 15 o f Cuvu).
Figure 5.6 Perceptions of the level of compliance with tabu rules
Would you say that fishing rules in the village waters are followed by the residents?
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
h We all follow 
m Most of the time we follow 
y Some don’t follow 
y Most of us don’t follow 
y None of us follow
Cuvu: n=57, Wai: n=62
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have discussed how the concept o f institutions is operationalised in 
CBCRM in Fiji. I have presented how villagers in the two districts collaborate in long 
lasting CBCRM by discussing the level o f  villagers’ understanding o f  rules concerning
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resource use and their perceived levels of compliance. To summarise, my findings are as 
follows:
(1) the result of my semi-structured interviews suggest that the residents who use the 
coastal resources in both districts equally understand the following rules 
concerning resource use: boundaries of resources; and appropriation rules; and
(2) the result of individual surveys suggests that perceived residents’ compliance with 
the rules in their own waters is higher in Cuvu District than in Wai District.
These findings suggest that CBCRM in Cuvu District is more enduring than in Wai 
District. My data show a tendency of a perception among residents of Cuvu that they 
collaborate more in their action concerning resource use. Furthermore, while seven of 19 
interviewees in Wai reported cases of rule breaking in their villages, a smaller portion of 
my interview respondents in Cuvu (two out of 17) acknowledged cases of rule breaking by 
village residents. Although I acknowledge the limitations of my data due to the small 
sample size, the consistency with the results of my survey showing that 72 per cent of the 
Cuvu respondents say that they follow rules, supports my argument that sustainability of 
CBCRM in Cuvu District is likely to be higher than Wai District.
In the following two chapters, I will analyse the bonding and bridging social capital 
of the two districts and examine how social capital has contributed to the difference in the 
level of compliance with rules.
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CHAPTER 6
Norms in Fijian Village Life and 
Sharing Information for CBCRM
6.1 Introduction
Bonding social capital in this study is defined as those ‘social ties which cement somewhat 
homogenous groups.’ The theoretical literature posits that bonding social capital helps the 
rationalisation o f rules and norms within a group by facilitating the flow o f information so 
as to encourage the members to conform. Fijian society has placed traditional obligations 
and demands on individuals, especially those living in villages, thus producing some 
dominant characteristics, including a sense of strong bonds that has implications for long- 
lasting CBCRM. This chapter w ill examine what types o f bonding social capital relate to 
CBCRM and how they function. More specifically, it explains how bonding social capital 
influences the operation o f CBCRM institutions discussed in Chapter 5.
This chapter is divided into three parts. First, I discuss different features o f bonding 
social capital in the villages o f Cuvu and Wai. The indicators used to examine this are the 
number of social groups in village, reciprocal relationships regarding coastal resource use 
and a sense o f solidarity. By comparing these features, I examine similarities and 
differences in bonding social capital between the two districts. Second, I analyse the
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functions o f bonding social capital in CBCRM. Along the theoretical functions discussed 
in Chapter 2, I examine the roles o f bonding social capital in CBCRM in the two districts. 
Third, 1 discuss how bonding social capital has changed in recent years in relation to 
changes occurring in the Fijian way o f life.
6.2 Bonding social capital in Cuvu and Wai Districts
This study employs three concepts to examine the level o f bonding social capital (see 
Figure 1.3 in Chapter 1):
(1) Number o f social groups in villages;
(2) Norms o f reciprocity regarding coastal resource use; and
(3) Sense o f solidarity among villagers.
Using these concepts, 1 first analyse the similarities and differences in bonding social 
capital between the two districts.
6.2.1 Number of social groups in villages
Most o f the social groups in Cuvu are church related, such as Sunday School for children, 
the Youth Group (Methodist Fellowship), the Women’s Group and the Men’s Group (Table 
6.1). Membership o f these groups is open to all the residents and there is no special 
requirement, to jo in a group, except gender and age. As a result, most people jo in one o f 
these groups unless he/she belongs to a denomination other than the Methodist church. A ll 
these groups regularly hold meetings, generally once a week.
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Table 6.1 Social groups in Cuvu and Wai Districts
District Social groups Type/Membership CBCRM related?
Cuvu Sunday School Methodist church/children No
Youth Group (Methodist 
Fellowship)
Methodist church/Youth (18-40 years old) No
Women’s Group Methodist church/Mature women No
Men’ s Group Methodist church/Mature men No
Mothers’ Club Primary school/Mothers o f school children No
Elders’ Group Elder men Yes, as decision maker
Rugby team Men No
Meke Group Youth in Rukurukulevu village No
Wai Sunday School Methodist church/children No
Youth Group (Methodist 
Fellowship)
Methodist church/Youth (18-40 years old) No, except in Kubuna 
village.
Women’s Group Methodist church/Mature women No
Men’ s Group Methodist church/Mature men No
Mothers’ Club Primary school/Mothers o f school children No
Elders’ Group Elder men Yes, as decision maker
Apart from the church based social groups, villagers identified some social groups 
in the villages o f Cuvu. Mothers of children in the villages join the Mothers’ Club at a 
primary school to help with school activities. Elder men form an Elders’ Group, but elder 
women stay in the Women’s Group i f  they would like to join a social group. A rugby team 
is organised exclusively for men in Cuvu, while there is no sport group or team for women. 
The villagers say that this reflects better job availability for women in the tourism sector 
near the villages. Although I was unable to collect women’s views on sport groups, one 
male villager told me:
Most o f ladies are working, so ladies don’t have time for sport teams. (Villager l o f Cuvu)
Rukurukulevu village also has a Meke Group consisting o f only young residents that 
occasionally performs Meke, a traditional Fijian dance, for tourists in the nearby resorts.
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In the case of Cuvu, none of these social groups, except the Elders’ Group, are 
involved in CBCRM related activities. Elders’ opinions are highly respected in village life 
and decisions made in elders’ meetings may affect CBCRM related activities. A resident 
explained the involvement of social groups in CBCRM:
We have social groups in the village. They don’t do activities for tabu. But, each member is also 
a member of the village. So, indirectly those groups are involved in tabu. As a member of the 
village, they have responsibility in the tabu management. (Villager 11 of Cuvu)
Like Cuvu, social groups in villages of Wai District are mainly church-based. The 
groups the villagers identified were the Youth Group, the Women’s Group, the Men’s 
Group, the Elders’ Group and the Mothers’ Club at a primary school. Most of these groups 
have a meeting once a week. These groups have no direct relationship with the CBCRM 
project except possible influences by the elders’ grouping decision making.
In addition, although it is not aimed at CBCRM, the activities of the Youth Group 
of Kubuna village are closely related with marine resource use. The Youth Group of 
Kubuna village is comprised of 21 residents who are aged 18 to 40 years old. The group 
keeps a large freezer in the community hall and runs a small business selling fish in the 
village. The freezer was funded by the Ministry of Youth, Employment Opportunities and 
Sports in December 2000, while the Mothers’ Club donated US$58 as an initial operation 
fund. When villagers catch fish, they can sell it to the Youth Group at US$2.03/kg. 
Designated members of the Youth Group keep the fish in their freezer until outside buyers, 
mainly Indo-Fijians who own a small shop near the village, come to purchase. The buyers 
pay US$2.32/kg and the Youth Club receives approximately US$0.30/kg to be used for the 
payment of electricity and telephone for common use in the community hall. The purpose
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o f this business is not to manage the resource but to raise funds for group activities as well 
as for the community. Although the business is run for the common benefit o f the 
community, a resident o f Kubuna village and some residents o f neighbouring Lomawai 
village recently started exactly the same style business in order to gain personal profits. 
The Youth Group continues to explore different business options to raise funds.
6.2.2 Reciprocal relationships
The literature suggests that Fijians generally have strong kinship-based ties and these ties 
have fostered their reciprocal relationships. Fijians seem to commonly recognise the 
presence o f high levels o f reciprocity, as all Fijians I interviewed emphasised how strong 
their kinship ties are and how they help each other in their day-to-day life. In formal and 
informal conversation, many respondents often mentioned the significance o f family and 
his/her responsibility to other family members. Furthermore, Fijians recognise a high 
degree o f reciprocity even between different clans or tribes. A villager described their 
reciprocal relationship over generations thus:
All our ancestors before were like, you come and ask us for help here, then we help out and we 
expect you help us back. Everything is like, you do your matter and we do our matter. You 
make your contribution and 1 make my contribution, like that. I f  you are a chief and come now 
asking us for advice, then you go back and bring back one o f your people and we eat them. 
(Villager 3 o f Cuvu)
In order to examine the reciprocal relationships among villagers in relation to 
marine resource use, the survey asked the participants what they would do when first, they 
borrow fishing gear, and second, when they have extra fish in their catch.
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Obligations for borrowed fishing gear
Table 6.2 shows whether the residents borrow fishing gear from other residents and Table 
6.3 shows what obligations they have for the borrowed fishing gear. In Cuvu District, 24 o f
59 respondents (40.1 per cent) answered that they borrowed fishing equipment. For men,
60 per cent o f the respondents answered that they borrowed fishing gear, while this was 
only 26.5 per cent among women. Although most women go fishing, many o f them do not 
use equipment for fishing and they mainly glean the sea bottom to collect animals such as 
sea urchins and octopus. Thus, the ratio o f women who need to borrow fishing gear is low 
relative to men.
Among those who answered that they borrowed fishing gear, 75 per cent o f them 
would give part o f the fish catch to the owner o f the gear. In my interview, the Cuvu 
villagers explained how reciprocal relationships worked and all o f them emphasised that 
they did not pay money among themselves:
When we come back [from fishing], and i f  we got a lot o f fish, we have to give part o f the catch 
to the net owner, so that they can give [lend] a net to you every time you ask, otherwise very 
bad. ... People never pay in our village. You just give some fish when you come back, because 
we are all like cousins (Villager 1 o f Cuvu)
In Wai District, females borrow fishing gear from others more often than males. 
While 43.3 per cent o f female respondents answered that they borrowed fishing gear, 66.7 
per cent o f the males owned fishing gear and did not borrow equipment from others. Since 
many residents o f Wai depend on fishing for their income and fishing equipment is 
important, more people own gear than the residents o f Cuvu. This particularly applies to
192
males, because they need to use relatively large nets and a boat to catch enough fish to
sell32.
Table 6.2 Use of borrowed fishing gear
Cuvu District
Male Female Total
Use borrowed fishing gear 15 (60.0%) 9 (26.5%) 24 (40.1%)
Don’t use borrowed fishing gear 10 (40.0%) 25 (73.5%) 35 (59.3%)
Wai District
Male Female Total
Use borrowed fishing gear 9 (33.3%) 13 (43.3%) 22 (38.6%)
Don’t use borrowed fishing gear 18 (66.7%) 17 (56.7%) 35 (61.4%)
Table 6.3 Obligation for borrowed fishing gear
Cuvu District
Male Female Total
No obligation 5 (33.3%) 1 (11.1%) 6 (25.0%)
Pay money 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)
Give part o f fish catch 10 (66.7%) 8 (88.9%) 18 (75.0%)
Total 15 9 24
Wai District
Male Female Total
No obligation 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)
Pay money 3 (33.3%) 1 (7.1%) 4 (17.4%)
Give part o f fish catch 6 (66.7%) 13 (92.9%) 19 (82.6%)
Total 9 14 23
32 For example, a fisher in Lomawai village had invested US$464 on a boat ten years prior to the interview 
and US$348 for a net (2m in height and 200m in length) six years prior to the interview.
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In contrast to those in Cuvu District, three o f the nine Wai male respondents who 
borrow equipment from others, stated that they pay money to the owner for its use. As an 
explanation o f the payment, the villagers stated that men sometimes borrowed a motorised 
boat and the money they paid to the owner is to supplement the cost o f fuel, rather than for 
its use. For females, they do not usually pay for borrowed fishing gear, such as nets. 
While the sample size may not be large enough to draw any definite conclusions, 13 o f 14 
female respondents (92.9 per cent) who borrow fishing gear from others reported giving 
part o f the fish catch to the owner. However, although none o f the female respondents o f 
my survey answered that they pay money, 1 learned in my informal interviews with female 
that they usually pay US$0.58 per person per day for fuel when they take a boat ride for 
fishing. Wai women travel longer distances and spend longer time for fishing compared to 
Cuvu women. I f  her family does not own a boat, a female w ill get a ride from male 
villagers who own a motorised boat. The typical boat owner goes fishing on his own from 
Monday to Wednesday for three hours each day, and, on Thursdays and Fridays, he takes 
with him up to six women in the village for fishing. One boat owner stated that the reason 
he charges a small fee for providing a ride in spite o f the prevailing norms o f reciprocity 
without paying in the village is that:
I always help other people in the village. We are all related, like family. But I have to pay for 
fuel and 1 need money to pay it. I bring village women to fishing and they can sell the fish [that 
they caught]. The money they pay for the boat, it ’s just enough for fuel only (Villager 9 o f Wai)
Use of extra fish in their catch
Table 6.4 shows how the villagers distribute the extra fish they catch. The residents o f 
Cuvu do not sell fish they catch, except for a few cases as explained in Chapter 4, such as
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sea cucumbers. Instead, the majority o f the survey respondents (86.4 per cent) give away 
the extra to their relatives, who then share it among their other family members.
Like Cuvu, the residents o f Wai also reciprocate, sharing fish they caught with 
others. For example, when I visited the villages, my host family received complementary 
fish from a cousin and other relatives and served it for me. When there was a ceremony for 
the 100 days after the death o f her brother, her relatives and neighbours provided a feast 
and shared the cost. She would do the same for relatives and neighbours on future special 
occasions. However, in day-to-day life, fishing is an important income source for the Wai 
villagers. After they save the necessary fish for their own family, the majority o f 
respondents (75.5 per cent) either sell their catch to middle persons in the village, such as 
the Youth Group, as explained in the Section 6.2.1, or sell it in the town markets.
Table 6.4 Use of extra fish in catch
Cuvu D is tric t W ai D is tric t
M ale Female Total M ale Female Total
Sell in v illage 1 (4.0% ) 1 (2.9% ) 2 (3.4% ) 17 (63.0% ) 12 (40.0% ) 29 (50.9% )
Barter w ith  
other residents
0 (0.0% ) 0 (0.0% ) 0 (0.0% ) 1 (3.7% ) 0 (0.0% ) 1 (1.8% )
G ive to c h ie f 2  (8 .0% ) 1 (2.9% ) 3 (5.1% ) 1 (3.7% ) 1 (3.3% ) 2 (3.5% )
G ive to 
relatives
22 (88.0% ) 29 (85.3% ) 51 (86.4% ) 5 (18.5% ) 9 (30.0% ) 14 (24.6% )
G ive to other 
residents
0 (0 .0% ) 1 (2.9% ) 1 (1.7% ) 0 (0.0% ) 1 (3.3% ) 1 (1.8% )
Sell in market 0 (0.0% ) 0 (0.0% ) 0 (0.0%) 2 (7.4% ) 7 (23.3% ) 9 (15.8% )
Other 0 (0.0% ) 2 (5.9% ) 2 (3.4% ) 1 (3.7% ) 0 (0.0% ) 1 (1.8% )
Total 25 34 59 27 30 57
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6.2.3 Sense of solidarity among villagers
In order to examine residents’ sense o f  solidarity, the survey asked respondents who they 
thought would act to deal w ith  a situation in which there was a sudden decline in fish catch 
in their waters. Nearly 83 per cent o f  respondents o f both districts answered that they 
would collectively solve the problem, although different levels o f action were suggested 
(Table 6.5). In Cuvu, nearly ha lf (48.3 per cent) o f  the respondents answered that the 
entire district would work together to solve the problem, while about one third (32.8 per 
cent) o f  them thinking the entire village would work together.
Table 6.5 How to solve a resource problem
I f  there were a sudden decline in fish catch in village waters, who do you think would act to deal 
with the situation?
Cuvu Wai
Each household would deal w ith the problem individually 1 (1.7%) 1 (1.7%)
Members o f sub-clan among themselves 4 (6.9%) 0 (3.4%)
The entire village working together 19 (32.8%) 18 (30.5%)
A ll village leaders working together 4 (6.9%) 13 (22%)
The entire district work together 28 (48.3%) 10 (16.9%)
NGO 1 (1.7%) 14 (23.7%)
Government offic ia l 1 (1.7%) 3 (5.1%)
Total 58 59
M y interviews also found that the residents o f Cuvu generally consider solidarity at 
the district level to be important for tabu management, although, as explained in Chapter 5, 
some villages o f Cuvu claim nested property rights at the village level. The fo llow ing 
quotations suggest that the villagers’ attitude that unity leads them to better ideas and 
solution in resource management:
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These things, like tabu, are a community-based project. You can’t do it by yourself, but you 
have to work as a community. ... What we are trying to get now is proper resource management.
If we can get together and have the forum of the chief in the whole district, we will be able to 
solve all the problems at the district level. If you are isolated at the village level, we may have 
individual problems and it’s difficult to solve them. (Villager 3 of Cuvu)
If every village does conservation individually, then there could be problems. But if we have the 
whole district work together, anybody fishes in the area work together, conservation will 
become stronger, because everyone will respect the MAP ideas. (Villager 16 of Cuvu)
In Wai, the ratio of people who answered that they would collectively solve the 
problem was lower. While 30.5 per cent of respondents chose the village level as the level 
where problem solving action actually occurs, 16.9 per cent chose the district. In addition, 
22 per cent answered that all village leaders work together. An interesting finding was that 
23.7 per cent of respondents in Wai answered that the NGO would be able to deal with the 
problem, a far higher percentage of respondents than in Cuvu (1.7 per cent). Although it is 
difficult to draw a definite conclusion from this data, the possible explanation for this is 
that Wai residents shared a common belief that someone else would solve the problems 
they face.
To summarise, both districts possess a similar set of social groups in the villages. 
Most of them are related to the Methodist church and the residents belong to one or more of 
these groups depending on their age and gender. As the residents respect elders’ opinions, 
the Elder Group may affect decisions regarding CBCRM activities, while other groups have 
no clear relationship with the CBCRM.
Fijians generally argue that reciprocal relationships are an important feature of their 
village life and they prefer reciprocating rather than paying money among themselves. The
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residents o f the two districts generally show similar kinds o f reciprocal actions such as 
giving food to relatives and neighbours, assuming that others would do the same in the 
future. Kinship is the foundation for their reciprocity, as extra fish are likely to be given to 
only relatives. However, in the case o f Wai, as the commercial value o f coastal resources is 
important and many residents are engaged in fishing in order to obtain cash income, the 
scale o f fishing activities is larger than that o f Cuvu in terms o f the volume o f catch, time, 
and equipment. Accordingly, service providers in the village, such as boat owners, expect 
to receive a return paid in cash.
Although both districts show some levels o f solidarity for problem solving, the level 
o f solidarity the villagers perceive differs between the two districts. While Cuvu villagers 
consider solidarity at the district level to be important, Wai villagers recognise strong 
solidarity at the village level and some consider it the responsibility o f leaders or NGOs to 
solve resource problems they may face.
6.3 Functions of bonding social capital in CBCRM in Fiji
As discussed in Table 2.5 in Chapter 2, the major theoretical functions o f social capital are: 
(1) to facilitate common understanding and knowledge among resource users because the 
strong ties among the villagers make knowledge diffusion easier; and (2) to make rule 
enforcement easier because reciprocity can be used in social dilemmas involving an 
assessment o f the likelihood that others are conditional co-operators. Drawing on material 
gained from my interviews, 1 present an analysis o f the functions o f bonding social capital 
in CBCRM o f Cuvu and Wai District. I argue that bonding social capital plays the two 
critical roles to make institutions work: promotion o f common understanding and shared
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knowledge; and better rule enforcement. However, 1 also argue that strong ties in the 
villages have some negative impact on CBCRM in the case o f the two districts.
Figure 6.1 Major functions of bonding social capital in CBCRM
Bonding Social Capital
Better rule enforcement
Promotion of common 
understanding and 
shared knowledge
• Accountability of 
monitors to users
• Graduated Sanctions
■ Knowledge diffusion
• Availability of low-cost 
adjudication
6.3.1 Bonding social capital and knowledge sharing
Knowledge diffusion
Bonding social capital in the context o f CBCRM facilitates the diffusion o f knowledge and 
information among the villagers. Due to the strong bonds, information and knowledge are 
smoothly disseminated among villagers. An example o f this was found in well-organised 
village meetings. In every village of Cuvu District, meetings are held fortnightly and all 
adults attend:
199
Everyone, 18 year old or above, must attend the village meetings. A ll men and women. Turaga 
ni Koro [village leader] yells out ‘everyone must come down to the meeting!’ No grog [yaqona\ 
party, but you must come. That’s our law. (Villager 1 o f Cuvu)
According to the survey, 83.3 per cent o f the respondents in Cuvu answered that 
when there is any change in fishing rules they obtain information in village meetings 
(Figure 6.2). I f  necessary, additional meetings are held. Every village has a building large 
enough to accommodate all the villagers and in many cases the traditional style o f 
architecture, bure, is used for the community hall. Although women and youth are 
normally quiet in discussion at the meeting due to custom and hierarchy, all villagers hear 
and know about both the content and the process through which decisions are made.
Figure 6.2 Information source in village
Village meeting
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Even when one is absent, due to the high level of bonding social capital based on the close 
relationships with family and relatives in the village, it is not difficult for him/her to receive 
information. In addition, all the respondents of the interview answered that village leader 
is responsible for information dissemination in the village. For example, when the tabu is 
open for fishing for a short period, the village leader is responsible to 1 et al\ the village 
know:
I announce the village, shouting out in the morning. I walk down the village and tell everyone 
‘now ready to go!’ or ‘the tabu will be open on this Monday only, not on Tuesday!’ (Villager 2 
of Cuvu)
Since villages in the two districts are relatively small, villagers are able to share 
information.
Like Cuvu villagers, the villages of Wai District hold meetings in their community 
hall every other Monday and all mature residents must attend. In the survey, although more 
chose an NGO and the Chief as an information source compared to Cuvu, 59 per cent of the 
respondents of Wai answered that they would know in the village meeting if there were any 
change in the fishing rules.
Wai village leaders suggest that they have strong connections with other leaders and 
sharing information among them is easy. Important information from other villages, such 
as tabu openings, is then passed to village members in the Monday meeting and shared. 
According to one villager:
If we decide to open the tabu, I go to other villages and tell them the tabu will be opened so that, 
from all the six villages, they will come and fish because the tabu area is all of ours. ... So, 
everyone in six villages must know that we open the tabu. (Villager 1 of Wai)
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The following villager emphasised the significance o f information sharing in order to make 
the tabu effective:
It’s better to tell people where tabu is so that no one w ill go in. In each village, Turaga ni Koro 
[ village leader] has to go through the process [o f information sharing] to tell people that they 
can just go fishing in the village water, but they cannot go in the tabu area. (Villager 3 o f Wai)
Provision of low-cost adjudication
Effective internal mechanisms based on strong bonds can work for conflict resolution. 
Although neither o f the two districts has experienced serious internal conflict over resource 
use, it is expected that reciprocal relationships should reduce rivalry in resource harvesting 
activities and mitigate conflicts as they arise. In the case o f the two districts, a sense o f 
reciprocity and solidarity helps the villagers consider the coastal resources common for the 
entire community. The following quotation is from a village leader o f Wai who showed his 
willingness to share the resources in his village’s water with other villages:
We have to work together. ...We want to bring [representatives of] six villages to sit down in 
one village so that they all know about tabu area. Tabu area is not only for Korokula village and 
Lomawai village, but it is for all o f us - six villages. I want to follow our Fijian way, I mean, 
bringing the six villages together, because that’s our way, Fijian way. (Villager 1 o f Wai)
In addition, the idea o f inter-generational sustainability seems to be a reason to 
pursue conservation and, as a result, reduce rivalry in current resource use. While 
immediate improvement in livelihood is a common concern especially in Wai, the majority 
o f interview respondents in the district stated that they considered their children’s future to 
be important and that the purpose o f CBCRM was to ensure benefits for future generations:
... it [resource management] is not just for me but for future generations, for my children, for
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my children's children. I f  I don’t protect [the resource] now, we w ill have a difficulty in our life.
The price o f living is very high. One tinned fish nowadays costs one dollar eighty cents. I f  you 
protect the environment, then you can just go and fish. You don’t have to buy [food]. You can 
save one dollar eighty cents. That's why we protect the environment. (Villager 3 o f Wai)
Many families in this village depend on the environment at sea for their life. They sell fish 
every Saturday so I think that’s why we all must protect our environment so that everyone in 
this village w ill be happy in the future. (Villager 6 o f Wai)
It is interesting to note that all interviewees in Cuvu mentioned consideration for the future 
generations in their village as the major reason for them to agree with tabu establishment. 
The following villager says that benefits for their children are the most important factor:
We believe that the resources in this area are owned by everybody. We have every right to tap 
into those resources to accommodate daily-needs. Also, we prioritise our children. We are 
considering next generations and we have obligations to do thing for their future. (Villager 3 o f 
Cuvu)
6.3.2 Bonding social capital and enforceable institutions
Accountability of monitors and availability of graduated sanctions
Rule enforcement is necessary for long term CPR management (Gibson et al. 2005), and 
bonding social capital is important in the provision o f appropriate monitoring and sanctions. 
In the Districts o f Cuvu and Wai, fish wardens, selected from villagers for the purpose o f 
monitoring, are accountable to other villagers for keeping a watchful eye on resource 
conditions and user behaviour. The villagers personally know the wardens well, as they are 
locally chosen from the community and understand their roles in CBCRM. As Ostrom 
argues (2000: 151), trust based on the strong bonds among fish wardens is a necessary
203
condition for enduring CPR management. The result is that the rest of the village can be 
motivated to cooperate without fear that they are being taken advantage of.
Villagers’ sense of reciprocal obligations also helps the villages keep sanctions 
graduated. The bonds based on villagers’ kinship allow for local sanctions to be nothing 
more than a simple warning because the level of trust and reciprocity among the villagers is 
high and mistakes tend to be forgiven. In economic terms, the cost for rule enforcement 
remains low. As Ostrom (1990) argues, low cost rule enforcement is a necessary condition 
for long-lasting CPR management. Particularly in Cuvu District, this seems so far to apply 
to even outsiders, such as Indo-Fijian residents in the districts. However, in the case of 
serious repeated infringements, external support, and its relationship with bridging social 
capital, may be necessary to exclude the intruders.
The suggestion of past literature that trust among resource users is the key in CPR 
management support the argument that bonding social capital is significant in CBCRM 
because it makes low cost rule enforcement possible. It is indeed important to understand 
ties among villagers that have been fostered over generations as part of their social system 
and how they are relevant to CBCRM activities. However, although there is no difference 
in bonding social capital between the two districts, the level of rule compliance in the 
districts is different. To summarise, the levels of bonding social capital in the two districts 
were not noticeably different and are therefore an unlikely factor in explaining the 
variations in the functioning of institutions presented in Chapter 5. In addition, my field 
data suggest that there is actually a negative aspect of bonding social capital in the context 
of Fijian CBCRM.
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6.3.3 Negative impacts of bonding social capital
While bonding social capital has positive effects on CBCRM, both in facilitating 
information sharing and the enforcement o f rules, existing strong bonds, in certain 
instances could also have a perverse affect on CBCRM. For example, strong internal bonds 
may lead residents to exclude outsiders, preventing the villages from learning new ideas. 
The residents o f Cuvu stated that it took about six months for the entire village to 
understand the meaning o f marine conservation and reach a consensus to have the tabu:
At the beginning, we tried to convey new idea o f marine conservation to people [in the villages] 
through tikina [district] meeting but they could not take it as their advantage. ... They gradually 
understood and found out what was tabu like, reason and the way to protect marine life. What 
they used to do [overfishing] is not good for future. They finally realised that it was not good. 
(Villager 15 o f Cuvu)
This may be due to the low education level o f the villagers, particularly among the 
decision-makers who are relatively old and have no formal schooling. However, the 
following quotation suggests that education is not the only problem. Tradition requiring 
strong internal ties could be an obstacle to introducing new ideas:
Maybe Fijian mentality is a big problem. It pulls a lot o f people back in and they seem to be 
relaxing sitting there most o f the time. That’s Fijian style, village life. ... We are proud o f our 
traditional ways o f life but sometimes hard to go beyond. (Villager 3 o f Cuvu)
A villager o f Wai District also cited similar negative effects o f bonding social capital:
It was just difficult for people in the village to understand what WWF was saying: the idea o f 
tabu. It was very new to them. Fijians have own culture and it is tough in Fijian villages to have 
new things, like new ideas, from outside because the village has own life and own rules in own 
ways. (Villager 19 o f Wai)
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The reciprocal relationship based on the strong bond could also threaten natural 
resources that are limited. Reciprocity, which is often extended to a relationship with 
someone outside the village, is an important principle in Fijian life and Fijians consider it 
an important custom. However, CPR management basically requires the exclusion of 
outsiders who seek benefits from the CPR. A villager stated that it was difficult to balance 
the sharing system and resource management:
People in Fiji are so bound traditionally. I feel bad to say this, but people have so much 
obligation that they have to provide. ... We cannot say “No” to others, as long as we want to be 
happy living together as big family. ... I hope the good nature o f Fijian people won’t be the 
problem, but some people come here and try to get things out o f this good nature. Some people 
take it granted for, but we would rather help people in need. (Villager 3 o f Cuvu)
Moreover, a number of ceremonies and cultural functions in the villages, including 
weddings and funerals, require harvesting marine resources. Every Fijian who I 
interviewed claimed that these ceremonies with the use of natural resources were traditional 
and important for village life. The following villager describes the need for fish for cultural 
events in the villages:
Every year, we clean the graveyard for our ancestors, our grandfathers and great grandfathers.
When we clean the grave yard, we have to eat fish together. So we open tabu, that’s our culture.
Then after that, we close it again. (Villager 2 o f  Wai)
In my interview with the above villager (Villager2 of Wai), he stated that he believed that 
tabu should remain closed for better conservation achievements. However, he argued that 
their custom demands natural resources and it was unavoidable to open the tabu to provide 
marine resources for the ceremonies.
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Villagers of Cuvu District raised the same kind of problem. In Cuvu, as explained 
in Chapter 5, the Paramount Chief makes decisions to open their tabu without consulting 
the Environment Committee. To satisfy the demands for cultural and traditional 
ceremonies, requests for opening tabu have been repeatedly submitted. As a result, during 
the three months I conducted my fieldwork in Cuvu District, Cuvu’s tabu areas were 
opened at least once a month.
From the perspective of durability of natural resource management, the problem is 
not only that ceremonies and functions demand fish in tabu. Rather, tradition gives an 
excuse for individuals in the villages to fish in tabu for short-term personal benefits. When 
the opening of tabu is approved for a particular reason, such as a wedding for a particular 
family, anyone else in the village can go fishing. Due to the norm of reciprocity there can 
be no discrimination of who goes to fish on the opening day. Indeed, on these opening 
days, there is no restriction on the amount, species or size of fish to catch. As a result, the 
entire village goes in tabu and harvests as much as they wish. CBCRM experts in Suva, 
such as academics, criticise the repeated opening of tabu, because it reduces conservation 
effects.
If you want to have a good tabu, you need to make sure that you keep it closed for the period 
you decided. People have to understand that. People should not break the rules they decided. 
Otherwise, they can’t protect the resources for the future. (NGO Staff 8)
However, although it could ruin the sustainability of the institutions when people 
keep opening tabu to harvest resources despite that they have agreed not to, one of the 
Cuvu residents stated that opening the tabu can have a good effect since the villagers are 
able to see the increase of marine resources in tabu. This gives them hands-on learning
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experience o f the effectiveness o f the conservation efforts. He argues that giving the 
villagers the opportunity to go in tabu is part o f the learning process for them:
We started opening-up o f certain areas [o f tabu] only five years after we started marine 
management. [That was] three years after [we established] the tabu areas. After the three years, 
we found, when we open the area, that people would know what are in there. That helps them 
make own decisions on the resources whether we catch all now or sit until another phase. 
(Villager 3 o f Cuvu)
This positive effect o f opening tabu was also identified by a villager o f Wai District. He 
had a first-hand experience in the increase o f fish in tabu when it was opened for fishing:
We had Korokula Day [a fund-rasing event in the village] on the 8th o f September. That was 
last month. We opened the tabu for that day, and we had big fish and qari [crabs]. That was a 
good change we found after we made the tabu. ... We all know that tabu is working well. 
(Villager 1 o f Wai)
6.3.4 Changes in bonding social capital
Weakened bonds
As discussed, Fijians commonly have a sense o f strong bonds among themselves, and their 
actions in the context o f marine resource use indicate the strong sense o f reciprocity in 
village life. However, although the residents o f Cuvu and Wai Districts claim the strong 
ties, it seems that the ties are becoming weaker and the degree o f reciprocity is decreasing. 
An example o f weakened bonds in Cuvu was found in community work required o f the 
villagers. In all villages in Cuvu and Wai, Mondays are considered community work days. 
A ll adult villagers are expected to contribute to activities and events for the village’s 
common interests, such as village cleaning or construction o f public buildings. On one 
Monday during my fieldwork in Cuvu, a village planned to plant pine seedlings provided
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by PCDF on hilly land near the village as part of their environmental activities to reduce 
erosion. According to the village leader, he announced this community work in advance 
and all villagers knew that they were expected to attend. However, only two villagers 
attended the work on the day. While it might be difficult for those who have a paid job to 
attend community work during the daytime, elders and other villagers consider it to be 
individualistic behaviour displaying a lack of respect for others:
For example, people do not listen to even Turaga ni Korn [village leader]. When he called 
community work today, only two attended. People were not like this in our time. People used to 
respect Turaga ni Koro and of course worked for the community, but today only two came. 
(Villager 7 of Cuvu)
A 68 years old interviewee compared this with the time he was young and stated 
that villagers of the district tend not to follow the rules of the village:
When 1 was a child, marine resources were in good condition because we were not allowed to 
use duva [poisonous plant to kill fish]. We followed the village law. Now, people always pound 
duva. They put it into a plastic bag and then they go to the sea. When they don’t see anyone, 
they put it into the water slowly, like pretending they are fishing, but they put duva. ... People 
have changed a lot. Before, people were afraid of elders, and if elders said something, people 
just followed. But now, a lot of people hide and cheat elders. (Villager 15 of Cuvu)
Others said that the villagers are becoming independent from their community and show a 
lack of reciprocal altruism even within their families:
We can feel that people are becoming more individualistic here. In the past years, like the time I 
was little, if someone died in my family, the rest of family supported, but nowadays, no. People 
still support others, but not much. People just do their own thing. They can support you, but not 
like before, 1 mean, the way they support is different from the past. (Villager 16 of Cuvu)
Normally in Fijian villages, we work together. If you have to clean up your farm one day, 
everybody is coming and finish it. But recently, no, we do our own. They do their own. Many
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things are changing. (Villager 12 of Cuvu)
In every village of both districts, a number of interviewees, especially elders, 
criticised people’s individualistic behaviour. Their common concern is that individualistic 
behaviour ruins the quality of life in the village and leads to the loss of Fijian tradition and 
culture. Some villagers cited the increasing urge among villagers for individualistic profit 
making as the main cause behind the degradation of natural resources. In particular, they 
expressed concern over overexploitation and increasingly destructive fishing methods:
1 believe that fish is given to us for eating only by ourselves but not to sell. But now, people just 
catch fish for selling. Maybe that’s why fish’s gone. That’s why things that we used to see are 
not left with us now. (Villager 11 of Cuvu)
It [resource depletion] occurred because of misuse of the resources, such as overfishing. People 
go fishing day and night for making money. (Villager 16 of Cuvu)
However, while younger generations admit that they have negative perceptions towards 
individualistic behaviour, many interviewees did state that a certain amount of 
independence from the community was necessary:
In previous days, if you had a television here, the rest of people didn’t have to. When you own 
it, everybody just comes and watches it. That was how things worked before. But now, we also 
need some time only for family. Just for us. So, sharing is good and bad. (Villager 12 of Cuvu)
The following quotation suggests that earning money is a major reason for the 
changing behaviour of villagers:
People go to catch fish because they have to sell. Sometimes some people catch too much and 
others cannot have enough. We, Fijians, share things in the village, but we also have to take 
care of own children. Nowadays, we need money for school, food, fuel and other stuff and have 
to catch fish more. (Villager 15 of Wai)
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6.3.5 Factors affecting bonding social capital
The content analysis o f the interviews identified three factors that influenced bonding 
social capital. While some identified education, tourism and political change at the national 
level as the reasons for changes in bonds o f the community, all the interviewees 
acknowledged the presence o f a market economy as the major factor contributing to the 
change occurring in bonding social capital. When people are involved in a market 
economy, it is difficult for them to allocate their time and efforts to community work 
because o f other commitments they may have. In particular, relatively younger generations 
raising children o f school age were often direct and pragmatic about what they wanted for 
themselves and their families. I found a common desire among those people, both men and 
women, to increase their standard of living and increase the opportunities for their 
children’s education. The following quotation explains the low attendance in community 
work for the tree planting event mentioned above:
I have a job at the resort and 1 had to work on that Monday. People have different plans 
nowadays and busy. I have children and I have to send them to school. I t ’s just hard to do things 
for the community. (V illager 4 o f Cuvu)
Like Cuvu, the market economy seems to also be an important factor affecting 
bonding social capital in Wai. Villagers, especially the younger generation, commonly 
acknowledged the importance of gaining income particularly for children’s education. 
Apparently, improving the level o f education is a common concern:
I have four children. M y second daughter just finished Form 4 [the second year o f secondary 
school] and she w ill start going to nursing school. I am very happy with this, because education
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is important for my children. After finishing school will find a job and help my family. (Villager 
20 ofWai)
When asked to identify the major obstacles constraining the villagers from 
achieving their goals of improving their standard of living and level of children’s education, 
they were likely to label communal obligations. Distraction by social gatherings was a 
common complaint expressed by the villagers in both districts. The following interviewee 
in Cuvu District is one of the village leaders of the district. Although in my interview he 
acknowledged the significance of collective work to make marine resource management 
possible, he feels working for the community to be too much of a personal burden:
I don’t like my position as Turaga ni Koro [village leader] because I have to spend so much 
time for meetings. Too many meetings and obligations, like long meetings in the village, 
meetings with the government. I myself have business for my family and I’m busy. I want to 
concentrate on my business because it is important for my family. (Villager 6 of Cuvu)
Others say that education affects the way people behave. The following quotation 
from a 64 years old interviewee argues that school education contributes to people’s 
individualistic behaviour:
School nowadays does not teach what our tradition is, like how Fijians should be. We used to 
learn how we should act as part of the village. (Villager 7 of Cuvu)
A younger, 31 years old, interviewee held the same view:
Now we go to school and we learn that being an individual is easier, like we just do what we 
like. (Villager 12 of Cuvu)
The impact of tourism was also pointed out in Cuvu, where the country’s first large- 
scale resort hotel, the Fijian Resort, was built in 1970, although tourism does not have 
much impact on life in Wai as there are no large scale facilities in the district. The life of
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Fijians in Cuvu district is tied closely with that of the Resort. While the residents of Cuvu 
admit the economic contribution of the Fijian Resort, they also realise that it has brought 
some changes in their life and culture and some feel that many of these changes are not for 
the better:
Having tourism is good, first, for national economy as foreign money coming in. For the tikina 
[district], it is good because it brings job opportunities. But we have problems too. People 
working there have lost respect to others, especially for elders. And, because of the influence by 
the tourists, ladies now wear mini-skirt, short-sleeves, sometimes even trousers even in the 
village. Our culture is changing. (Villager 6 of Cuvu)
People in Fiji used not to be familiar with drinking alcohol, but nowadays many people get 
drunk in the village. I mean, drinking is still banned in this village, but they take it to the beach 
and drink. Before, our young girls, they had to wear long sleeves but now they see what tourist 
wear, like short skirt and sleeveless. (Villager 13 of Cuvu)
An elder, who was 66 years old, explained that social changes at the national level had 
affected their village life over the last 35 years:
In old days, there were a lot of forbidden. People respected Fijian laws a lot - traditional laws. 
Nowadays, no one really follows. They don’t have a fear. ... I think I know the reasons. I was 
born in the colonial era. At that time, we were not given freedom. We were bonded by the laws 
of vanua [tribe] and colonial laws. People were afraid of these laws. But younger generations 
were bom during the time of democracy. They are given a lot of rights and freedom. They have 
a lot of freedom. If we are going back to the same kind of law, which we used to have, and [if 
we are] to maintain that, there will be order in the community. (Villager 7 of Cuvu)
Some residents of the districts, particularly in Wai, have lived in farming 
settlements separately from their village. Although many of them still maintain their 
identity as part of their village and occasionally visit their families and relatives in the 
village, they seem to be less committed to communal demands. The following is a
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quotation from an interview with a man who lives in a farming settlement. The interview 
was conducted on the day of the ceremony for the 100 days after his wife’s death. He was 
visiting a village in Wai from his settlement:
We live in our settlement because our family’s ancestor came from that land. We are still part of 
this village but we only come when a function like today is held. (Villager 15 of Wai)
He continued that there were difficulties in living in the village due to the balance between 
communal obligations and his own goal and particularly argued that problems occurred 
with the excessive consumption o fyaqona in the village. For him, organising his sub-clan 
[,mataqali] to achieve their goals is more important than contributing to the whole village:
We don’t have any problem with our food [in the village]. We plant cassava, we have banana 
trees, and we can fish. But we have to earn money for other expenses, like medication, 
education, and other commitments that you have to have. ... I am very much concerned about 
my children and as a leader of mataqali [sub-clan], as a Turaga ni Mataqali [sub-clan head], I 
think of members of my mataqali rather than the whole village. My mataqali works together, 
instead of just sitting and drinking grog [kava or yaqona] in the village. ... Some people [in the 
village] are lazy. They drink too much kava. 1 mean, inside them, they are very supportive [of 
the community], but in reality they are not productive. 1 don’t drink kava, I don’t drink beer nor 
smoke. ... It is not our tradition, like people drinking kava until midnight or two o’clock in the 
morning then sleep the whole day. That’s not our tradition. ... Poverty comes from laziness of 
people. ... I’m really against kava, because the influence spoils the future of our children. ... I 
used to go to other houses to drink kava. It was like I go to this house then another house. But 
now, I don’t drink kava. Then, I have more time with my children. ... Lots of people spend 
more time for drinking kava than spending time with their children. Wives are waiting for them 
but they never come home. That is how problems come. Living in the village is tough because 
we cannot say to ‘No.’ ... I’m still connected to my village but I usually stay on my farm and 
only sometimes come to the village. Then, I can work for my family and I can think of my 
mataqali. (Villager 15 of Wai)
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6.4 Conclusions
My study found that the villagers o f both Cuvu and Wai districts are members o f similar 
types o f social groups and levels o f reciprocal relationships. Thus, despite the suggestion 
o f the existing literature that trust among resource users is the key in CPR management, my 
study argues that the levels o f bonding social capital in the two districts cannot explain 
variation in the operation o f institutions discussed in Chapter 5.
However, it is important to understand that these strong ties are built among 
villagers over time as part o f their social system and that they are relevant to CBCRM 
activities. The villagers o f the two districts recognise that they need strong bonds in the 
village in order to protect their resources. The common view expressed by the villagers, 
especially older generations, is that CBCRM is an activity that must accommodate village 
social and cultural commitments because the collective property rights to use the resources 
are given to the villagers and they believe that the stock o f resources should be managed for 
future generations. In addition, the traditional and customary practices are still central to 
the life o f Fijian people and they believe that keeping these practices saves their identity. 
Nevertheless, the common perception among the villagers o f both districts is that people 
are becoming more individualistic and pursuing their own personal benefits and seeking 
greater privacy. They agree that bonds in their villages have been weakened and many o f 
them recognise that it is inevitable that more people w ill seek to achieve their individual 
goals.
The theme o f conflict between the community and the individual is not new to 
Fijian society, nor is it unique. National development policies have emphasised different
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facets enabling Fijians to support both preservation and change by emphasising different 
elements at different times. In the context of Fijian economic development, Nayacakalou 
stated in 1975 that:
‘...many Fijians have felt themselves caught between two worlds in relation to 
economic projects - between the ‘communal approach’ which they understand to 
be favoured by the Fijian Administration and the ‘individualistic’ approach of the 
independent farmers’ (1975: 6).
This issue was also expressed by the villagers in comparison with Indo-Fijians’ way 
of life. In informal conversations, villagers sometimes noted the independence that Indo- 
Fijian residents in the districts have from communal demands, occasionally with a trace of 
envy. However, a more common view expressed by the villagers in the two districts was 
that because Indo-Fijians do not live in such a tight-knit community, they have more 
freedom to pursue individual benefits, such as keeping savings for themselves and their 
immediate family rather than for extended families. This argument is a stereotype and not 
necessarily accurate. Many Indo-Fijians live in settlements with appointed leaders and 
often participate in gatherings and other social events. However, most Fijians believe that 
these Indo-Fijian communities are not like Fijian villages, where the residents are expected 
to accept communal demands. Furthermore, they tend to consider the way of life of Indo- 
Fijians’ to be more suitable for achieving personal objectives. They equate this with levels 
of living standards and other important interests, such as education.
Requiring a balance between the pursuit of individual benefits and communal 
demands, the implementation of CBCRM in Fiji poses difficult, but not new, challenges to 
the residents of the two districts. Due to the nature of marine resources, particularly under 
customary marine tenure, villagers are required to take collective action in its management
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while it may reduce personal benefits. In short, they are asked to follow fishing rules that 
can reduce the income of the individual fisher or the amount of food available for her and 
her family. Although current CPR theories explain that collective action for communal 
demands will turn to individual benefits, it is often tough for the villagers to strike a 
balance between their own benefits and communal benefits. As the following villager 
stated, it will take time to solve this conflict:
By the end o f  coming ten years, we hope that we are able to give people in the village better life, 
but it is always a competition. We are trying. But sometimes tradition is just on the way, but we 
are trying to find a way to go. ... It takes time to change things. Sometimes you just have to 
respect them [the villagers], you cannot rush them. You have to go slowly. (Villager 3 o f  Cuvu)
Another way to facilitate long-lasting CPR management by balancing group benefits and 
personal benefits in Fiji is to build bridging social capital like some NGOs have done under 
the Fiji Locally-Managed Marine Areas strategies.
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CHAPTER 7
NGO Approaches to Information Sharing 
and Rule Compliance in CBCRM
7.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an analysis o f the role o f bridging social capital in CBCRM. As 
stated earlier, bridging social capital is defined as those ‘social ties which create bonds o f 
connectedness across diverse groups.’ As ‘weak ties,’ it can provide a group with 
information, opportunities and technology that the group does not possess. Information 
flows can be facilitated by bridging social capital because of enhanced transparency and 
reduced transaction costs. Granovetter (1973) argues that less intense relationships with 
others are a source o f strength because they provide access to new information or other 
kinds o f resources that are unavailable to those who are locked into highly dense, self- 
contained networks. Guided by the theoretical literature, the following discussion w ill 
examine bridging social capital to determine its function in CBCRM o f Cuvu and Wai 
districts.
This chapter consists o f three parts. In the first section, different features o f 
bridging social capital related to CBCRM o f the two districts are discussed in detail. 
Following existing studies, the indicators used in this examination are the number o f 
external assistance in development villages received, relationships with NGOs regarding
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CBCRM, and relationships with government officials (Figure 1.3). That section compares 
the two districts, Cuvu and Wai, in terms of their similarities and differences in levels of 
bridging social capital and how it was developed. In the second section, I analyse the role 
that bridging social capital plays in the two districts in relation to CBCRM. In addition to 
the function previously discussed in the theoretical literature, promoting better 
understanding o f resource management through transmission and the exchange of 
knowledge, I find that bridging social capital can affect rule compliance by members o f the 
community. This is followed by the concluding section.
7.2 Bridging social capital in Cuvu and Wai Districts 
7.2.1 Number of external assistance villages received
Neither o f the two districts has received large-scale development projects. They have 
gained support only in building small-scale infrastructure from NGOs in addition to regular 
support from the national government with the provision o f subsidies for the installation of 
flush toilets. In 1996, a Japanese NGO, the Organisation for Industrial, Spiritual and 
Cultural Advancement (OISCA), constructed a 100 cubic metre concrete tank connected to 
an artesian borehole in order to improve the water supply in Lomawai Village and Kubuna 
Village in Wai. Another Japanese non-profit organisation called, the Peace International 
Association, visited Lomawai village on the 6th o f October 2004 for a mangrove plantation 
project. According to a villager who had discussions with the representatives of the 
organisation, the project planned to grow mangrove trees on 250 hectares along the
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coastline of the village waters in five years. On that day, 10 villagers formed a team to 
collect and plant 1,000 propagules and received 1,200 dollars as donation to the village’3.
Wai District also received the attention of academic researchers in their 
development related project. The Department of Tourism and Hospitality of the University 
o f the South Pacific implemented a project entitled ‘GIS as a Planning Support Tool for 
Community Integrated Tourism Development Project’ involving Wai District. The purpose 
o f this project was to develop a database for tourism development and to examine its 
applicability for wider implementation both in Fiji and other developing countries. Its pilot 
study site was Wai because the district was identified as a priority tourism development 
zone by the Fiji Tourism Development Plan of 1998-2005. The primary focus was on the 
proposed Natadola resort development. In order to collect information for the development 
of a database using Geographic Information Systems, a community workshop was held in 
the district school from the 21st to 22nd of January 2004. A total of 60 residents from all 
six villages of the district attended. Rather than supporting the long term development of 
the district, the project seems to have resulted in relatively short term community 
involvement since the primary objective of the workshop was to collect information to 
build a database of the University’s research project in a pilot study.
Assistance to Cuvu District for its development started slightly earlier than that of
Wai District. In 1993, OISCA started their project to assist development in Cuvu, targeting
" Although the villagers of Lomawai seemed not to be fully informed, this mangroves plantation was part of 
a project entitled ‘Low Income Community Mangrove Reforestation Project in Fiji’ as part of the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Joint Implementation (JI) Feasibility Study Programme 
implemented by the Global Environment Centre Foundation with funds from the Ministry of the Environment 
of the Government of Japan. The overall purpose of the programme is to explore promising CDM/JI projects 
to achieve a country’s targets of reductions in Green House Gas emission. According to the project report, 
with the 250 hectares of planted mangroves, the estimated amount of CO' removal during the 30 years period 
for this project is 112,608 tons. It is also expected that the mangroves will enhance ecotourism in the area.
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mainly children and youth in the villages. The initial activity was known as the “ Children's 
Forest Programme” , an activity promoting tree planting at schools. Cuvu District School 
was chosen for this project as one o f 2,825 schools attending the Programme in 25 nations. 
Following this school programme, OISCA also implemented mangrove planting in part o f 
the customary marine area o f the district. The mangrove plantation project targeted waters 
in Yadua Village and Tore Village and a few hundreds o f propagules o f Rhizophora sp. 
were planted by the residents.
Table 7.1 summarises development projects implemented by outside organisations 
in the two districts. I f  we take a raw count o f the number o f projects, Wai had a few more 
than Cuvu. Fiowever, a qualitative analysis suggests that these were small in scale and 
short in duration. Therefore, I conclude that the two districts possess similar levels o f 
bridging social capital in terms o f access to external assistance in village development.
Table 7.1 Projects in Cuvu District and Wai District supported by outside organisations
Title Target group Year
Sponsor/implementing
organisation
Wai Installation o f  tanks for drinking 
water
Lomawai and 
Kubuna village
1996 OISCA
GIS as a Planning Support Tool 
for Community Integrated 
Tourism Development Project
Representatives 
from all villages
2004 
(2 days)
Department o f  Tourism and 
Hospitality, University o f the 
South Pacific
Mangrove Planting Lomawai Village 2004 
( l  day)
Peace International 
Association
Cuvu Children’ s Forest Programme Students o f Cuvu 
D istrict School
1993 OISCA
Mangrove planting Yadua and Tore 
villages
1995 OISCA
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7.2.2 Relationship with NGOs regarding MPA
The CBCRM projects in Cuvu and Wai both started in 1999 with assistance from NGOs, 
namely PCDF and WWF. My interviews with officers o f these two NGOs revealed that 
both NGOs emphasised a bottom-up approach in promoting the conservation o f coastal 
resources. The NGOs take residents’ participation and initiative serious, as stated by two 
officers:
Community themselves are involved in decision making. A ll issues must come up from the 
community. It ’s a community management plan. That’s why we conduct community workshops 
and we bring all stakeholders in the workshops, fisheries, environment, forestry and agriculture.
(PCDF officer)
We didn’t make the tabu. That was the initiative o f the people. We facilitated talks in the 
villages and everybody agreed to it. (WWF officer)
Although both NGOs took participation-oriented approaches, opportunities given to 
the villagers were somewhat different between the two districts. In order to measure the 
degree o f villagers’ participation in MPA planning, my survey asked the respondents how 
many times they attended workshop or training on MPA. Table 7.2 shows that the number 
o f attendance in workshops was different between the districts (P<0.05, t-test). In short, 
Wai villagers had a relatively limited opportunity to attend workshops related to MPA 
management.
Table 7.2 Difference in number of attendance in workshops between districts
Mean
T-value P-value
Cuvu Wai
2.47 l .98 2.516 .013
Codes: 1 Never; 2 Once; 3 Twice or three times; 4 More than four times. 
Cuvu: n=55, Wai: n=60
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It seems that the lower levels of participation in Wai owe at least in part to how the 
WWF planned the workshops. Management related workshops organised by the WWF 
were held in one of the villages of Wai and some residents selected from other villages 
travelled to join the workshops:
Since 1999, March this year [2004] was the first time they [WWF] went to all the villages one
by one. Before, WWF paid the participants the fare to come to this village...... Five people were
chosen from each village. They chose the community reps from each village, Turaga ni Koro 
[village leader], maybe one or two women, and two youth from each village. (Villager 8 of Wai)
The following statement suggests that WWF preset criteria for selecting the 
workshop participants:
First of all, we see what we are going to want to give the people, who in Wai are the right 
people to come, so we write to the Turaga ni Koro [village leader], at this particular workshop, 
the people we would like to have or who is likely to benefit from the workshop, then he gives 
us a lot of information on this. Then we send it off to the provincial council and Turaga ni Koro 
of every village, they are the one who knows best who are the people to come. (WWF officer)
It is interesting to note that the villagers’ perceptions of the NGO presence also 
seem to differ between the two districts. In my survey, 19.4 per cent of the Wai 
respondents answered that the NGO made decisions regarding fishing rules (Figure 5.3). In 
contrast, less people in Cuvu answered that the NGO did so (6.7 per cent). The difference 
of villagers’ perceptions might have been caused by the different participation processes 
each project introduced. The residents of Cuvu had more frequent chances to attend the 
management planning workshops because they were held in five different villages in the 
initial stage of the project. This allowed a larger number of villagers to attend the 
workshops. Moreover, more frequent participation in the planning stage might have 
promoted the villagers’ sense of ownership of the project and familiarity with the NGO. In
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short, how to build bridging social capital o f villages in terms o f relationship with NGOs 
may strengthen the degree o f participation in CBCRM projects. I conclude that the way the 
two NGOs built both formal and informal relations with the villages was different. The 
result was a difference in individual participation in CBCRM -  the residents o f Cuvu were 
more likely to become involved in CBCRM than Wai residents.
7.2.3 Relationship with government officials
According to the Provincial Officer, government officials from the Provincial Office o f the 
Ministry o f Fijian Affairs are expected to visit each o f their assigned 22 districts in the 
province twice a month. During their visits, the officers see i f  there is any problem in 
villagers’ life in general and discuss any specific issue raised. In addition, the provincial 
office is responsible to hold a district meeting once every four months. The Provincial 
Officer identified his major responsibility as:
To administer various activities that the provincial council is engaged in. That includes 
proposals o f development in Fijian villages and districts. We are involved in the process o f 
development. (Provincial Officer)
He continued to explain the significance of CBCRM in his province:
By encouraging better use o f natural resources, their [villagers’ ] survival w ill be ensured in the 
future. (Provincial Officer)
As reported in Chapter 5, villagers understand the jurisdictional authority of the 
government regarding coastal areas, particularly the ownership o f marine resources in the 
Customary Fishing Rights Areas. The following villager also recognises the role o f the 
government in the importance o f what we call bridging social capital in his district:
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We have our own [resource] management structure here in Cuvu. It is based on the Fijian social 
structure -  we have traditional chiefs and people in the village. Then, the Fijian Affairs at the 
provincial government coordinates our connections with outside. (Villager 3 of Cuvu)
For NGO officers, collaboration with government is the key in long-lasting resource 
management implementation. Both NGOs, PCDF and WWF, first made contact with the 
districts through the Provincial Office when they were in the process of project preparation. 
In village workshops, representatives of the government agencies, such as the Provincial 
Office, Fisheries Department, Forestry Department and Environment Department, are 
generally invited because the NGOs consider building a bridge between the villages and 
government agencies is important for sustainability of CBCRM. Explaining the reason for 
involving the government, a PCDF Officer stated:
When we hold workshops in the villages, we invite the officers to present. ... We invite 
representatives from the Fisheries and the Environment Departments so that we can have the 
integrated approach. This is necessary, because once we will pull out from the project, the 
government will be still responsible for the project. (PCDF Officer)
However, it seems that villagers do not always acknowledge government support in 
their CBCRM activities. There were only 1.7 per cent of Cuvu and 5.1 per cent of Wai 
survey respondents who answered that government officials would act to deal with the 
situation if there were a sudden decline in the fish catch in their village waters. No 
interview respondent stated that government was helpful in CBCRM. Most villagers seem 
not to have particularly great expectations for government:
1 don’t think we have had any support from the government in tabu management. ... The 
provincial government officers come, if there is any problem. 1 mean, they should come. But, 
for example, no help, even when big waves came to the beach and make big damage on village.
Our sea walls have been damaged, but nothing has been done [by the government]. (Villager 1
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of Cuvu)
The national government is from the colonial government, but the provincial government is 
with us because it is traditional. It’s Fijian way. But they don’t usually come because they are 
busy. (Villager 15 ofWai)
In fact, due to the lack of funding and expertise at the Provincial Office, the 
government are not able to implement their own projects on resource management, 
although they recognise the importance of resource management. Thus, the Provincial 
Officer has the responsibility for supporting NGO activities in his province:
The environmental projects were embarked on by NGOs or association called FLMMA. They 
try to improve the environment in our coastal area and promote the sustainable use of the 
resources. It is very important for the provincial office to facilitate these projects, because it 
directly involves the participation of our local community. Without their participation, 1 don’t 
think that those projects can go ahead. That is why we came to involve with the coastal projects 
especially in Cuvu and Wai. We believe, with their participation, that they [the villagers] can 
improve their life. ... The NGOs provide training to the villagers, and the provincial office 
facilitates their training. (Provincial officer)
To summarise, the bridging social capital, operationalised as the formal and 
informal relations between the villages of the two districts and the provincial government, 
is weak. Due to a lack of resources, such as manpower and budget, it is apparently difficult 
for the provincial office to visit every district as instructed by the government. During the 
span of my fieldwork in the two districts for 116 days, no provincial officer paid an official 
visit to any of the districts except for one district meeting in Cuvu. In particular, there is no 
budget or staff in the provincial government dedicated to CBCRM, although the Officer is 
aware of its importance. Instead, the provincial government intends to facilitate NGO 
involvement in CBCRM, thus building bridging social capital in the villages.
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7.3 Functions of bridging social capital in CBCRM
In this section, I analyse how bridging social capital functions in CBCRM in Cuvu and Wai 
Districts. As shown in Table 2.4, the theoretical function of bridging social capital is that it 
promotes stakeholders’ understanding of CBCRM and its rules by: bringing new 
knowledge and technology from external groups; building links across neighbouring 
communities and other external actors; and organising consistent rules in multiple layers of 
nested enterprises.
The following analysis details how each o f these theoretical explanations can be 
applied to my cases. In addition to this function that is conventionally argued by 
researchers, my research found that bridging social capital can also facilitate villagers' 
compliance with the rules o f resource use.
7.3.1 Bridging social capital and villagers’ understanding and 
knowledge of CBCRM
Knowledge transmission and exchange
Bridging social capital facilitated access to and the creation o f knowledge o f MPA or tabu 
in the villages. A ll the villagers in the two districts stated that the idea o f establishing an 
MPA in their water as a permanent tabu was brought by the NGOs. Although the NGOs 
gave credit to the villagers themselves for starting the conservation activities in their 
villages, it is apparent that the knowledge and technology were transmitted from outside 
through the NGOs’ activities for the villages. While an officer o f WWF admitted that 
having tabu by enclosing only a small portion o f Customary Fishing Rights Area is not
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effective enough for biodiversity conservation from a perspective of conservationist, 
bridging social capital certainly contributed to the creation of knowledge in the villages in 
order for the villagers to take action in management of natural resources.
In Cuvu District, bridging social capital seems to have had clearer effects. Through 
the workshops organised by PCDF, villagers developed their recognition that conservation 
is important to sustain their life. A villager of Cuvu describes project’s effort to involve the 
villagers:
There were management workshops going in the whole district trying to let the people bring out 
their problems and the [Environmentl Committee looked into those problems. We had 
workshops and training in the villages. People could attend it and learned what they needed to 
do. (Villager 3 of Cuvu)
The NGOs also recognise that knowledge transmission from them to villagers is 
significant for long-lasting resource management. Officers of both NGOs expect the 
villagers themselves to act as a manager in resource management in their own village. 
Following Clark’s argument (Clark 1995: 310) that resource users can be the day-to-day 
manager in implementing resource management, the NGOs consider that assisting villagers 
to organise themselves as monitors of resource uses is an effective strategy. In addition, the 
WWF Officer said that the villagers who are trained in their project are expected to 
disseminate their knowledge and experience to other villages in order to extend proper 
management of natural resources:
After we developed the management plan [with the villagers of Wai], they will be the one doing 
the monitoring, and WWF knows that it hasn’t gotten staff and time to go and replicate 
elsewhere. These are the people we have earmarked to go to other community speaking their 
own language, showing the lessons they have learnt there to other people [in other villages].
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We are training a man in Wai now in his status as somebody close to the chief by birth right.
He is going to be the spokesperson for the Wai District. When we leave the work in the Wai 
District and come away, he will be the person that will work for resource management in Wai.
There are also other people there [whom we train] .... Those are the people, after we leave the 
project, who will pass and use the knowledge we built up and do things so that it [the project] is 
going to be sustainable. We leave the knowledge and everything, like skills, with them, after we 
have done and pull away, and we let them do their own. That is their resources and things we 
have done for them. (WWF Officer)
An officer of another NGO based in Suva also involved in the FLMMA Network 
confirmed this dissemination effect:
After we made success in one district, people in other villages became interested in marine 
conservation and having tabu in their villages. They learned the success from the project leader 
in other village and asked us to work in their village. Sometimes the media, like radio and 
newspaper, helps information passed on, but the important point is local people who 
experienced a good practice in conservation tell other locals in their own words. (NGO Officer 1)
In Cuvu, bridging social capital has motivated the village to make resource 
deployment for the learning that contributes to environmental conservation in the village. 
An example was found in primary school education in the district. In the process of 
working with PCDF in resource management, environmental knowledge given and 
educational techniques demonstrated by the NGO affected education at schools in the area:
In primary schools, they started environmental education. ... Teachers are learning from the 
NGO [PCDF] that came in [the villages]. We have had some awareness workshops with the 
NGO, and what we learned has been passed on teachers. It really got into them, and they pass it 
to kids. (Villager 3 of Cuvu)
While environmental education is not included in the formal curriculum at primary schools 
in Fiji, the primary schools in Cuvu districts have activities regarding the environment, 
including lectures on conservation, the collection of mangrove seeds for plantation, and
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rubbish collection on the beach and other areas o f the villages34. These activities are 
conducted irregularly when the teachers find extra time in the formal curriculum.
High levels o f participation set by the PCDF for Cuvu village also provided its 
villagers with opportunities to attend activities outside o f the village. When the PCDF held 
a public exhibition on their project activities in Suva on the 27th o f October 2004 for its 
25th anniversary, representatives o f the Cuvu District, both elders and youth, were invited 
to attend. In the exhibition, the youth gave a presentation on CBCRM activities o f their 
villages. A villager who accompanied the tour said that the youth performance had 
impressed the elders and made them aware that education is important:
After the day, the old people told me on the way back that it was the best trip they had ever had 
for a long time. 1 said, ‘ Sir how come? We just went to Suva, had lunch, had kava, and did a 
few things then came back.’ They said ‘ We are happy to see our kids’ performance. We are 
proud o f them.’ Then they said ‘What you tell us about conserving the environment really hits 
us. Now, we have to acknowledge the young people, kids, and we should seriously listen to 
what they say. They are the ones who w ill be in our village in the future.’ ... They realised the 
importance o f sustainability in our life. (Villger3 o f Cuvu)
Availability of low-cost adjudication
Internal mechanisms based on bonding social capital at the village level are significant for 
the villagers to make the local rules clear at their level. On the other hand, in case that a 
community has conflicts with an individual or group outside the community, links across
4 1 observed very similar change in primary school o f Ucunivanua Village o f Verata District where the 
Institute o f Applied Science o f the University o f the South Pacific conducted its pilot project using the 
FLM M A method to encourage CBCRM. Teachers voluntarily conduct environmental education activities as 
extra curriculum in the afternoon o f Fridays. The activities include beach clean-up, mangrove planting and 
building small scale sea walls to prevent erosion. As the reason they started, the teachers stated that they have 
learned the effectiveness o f an MPA and the significance o f sustainability in coastal resource use through the 
FLM M A project and became aware o f the necessity o f environmental education activities.
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the community may be necessary to mitigate the conflict because they facilitate 
communication and knowledge exchange between the parties. The cases could include 
adjacent or neighbouring communities or other outsiders.
In Cuvu, external ties have been extended to solve potential conflicts with a 
neighbouring community. Due to the mobility of coastal resources, establishing rules in 
one village without rules in a neighbouring village will produce ineffective institutions that 
may not last for very long. Therefore, building networks among villages can provide them 
with opportunities for inter-communication with one another and sharing knowledge. 
Yadua village of Cuvu has started collaborative work with a neighbouring village, which 
has not been involved in the project. In order to make monitoring easier, Yadua village of 
Cuvu planned to relocate their tabu near the border of the neighbouring village, Volivoli. 
In September 2004, representatives of Yadua village visited Volivoli village, and asked for 
their support in tabu management. The chief of Volivoli village acknowledged Yadua’s 
effort to conserve marine resources and agreed that his village would respect the rules of 
Yadua's tabu. This cooperative link between the villages should support sustainable use of 
the resources35. The shared knowledge about conservation may eventually affect the 
neighbouring villagers in their use of the Customary Fishing Rights Area, qoliqoli, in the 
future.
However, the possibility exists that bridging social capital hardly solves problem of 
non-Fijian outsiders in the current Fiji situation. Although I observed Fijians' generous 
attitude toward Indians living in the same district who harvest coastal resources for family
°  For the purpose of this thesis, bonding social capital is defined as ties among residents within a single 
district. The ties between Yadua and Volivoli is considered bridging social capital, although it involves 
neighbour relationships between people of the same type - indigenous Fijians.
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consumption, 28 o f the interviewees (75.7 per cent) complained that Indians infringe on 
their qoliqoli and threaten their resources. According to Fijian villagers, Indian 
communities had been informed about CBCRM in Fijian villages, such as tabu, and Indians 
are aware of rules that Fijians set. However, there is no data on how Indians perceive the 
presence of tabu in their residential district. Furthermore, given the population ratio of 
Indians to Fijians in the two districts36, it is not a surprise even i f  Indians feel unfairness 
and frustration on local rules that are set by Fijians, and it leads them to exploit coastal 
natural resources in Customary Fishing Rights Areas rather than following the rules. Since 
CBCRM efforts in Fiji have been made exclusively for the benefit o f Indigenous Fijians 
and have not included Indians as a stakeholder group, no ties have been built between the 
two racial groups to solve those conflicts in resource use in Customary Fishing Rights 
Areas and the existing system of customary tenure appears to block the development of 
trust between the groups.
Consistency of rules and management strategies at multiple levels
Rules at one level need to take rules at the other levels into account or the system may 
become incomplete and its sustainability uncertain. I f  bridging social capital transfers 
knowledge from government to citizen, it should help to organise rules and strategies of 
management at the grassroots level consistent with government policy. In other words, 
community rules made as part o f the CBCRM project activities in the two districts should 
be consistent with the existing legislative framework if  bridging social capital transfers 
knowledge of national laws to the villagers. For example, the nominated village personnel
In Cuvu, Fijians make up 48.6 per cent o f the total population while Indians are 49.7 per cent o f that. O f 
the inhabitants o f Wai, Fijians and Indians make up 56.8 per cent and 43 per cent respectively.
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are appointed as fish wardens by the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forests and 
their duties are specified in the Fisheries Act. Through the NGOs’ effort to involve 
government agencies in the project, the Fisheries Department dispatched its officer to the 
villages to train and certify the wardens. NGOs also provided the villagers information on 
the current national law regarding property rights of marine resources. As reported in 
Chapter 5, the villagers understand how the law regulates resource ownership between the 
nation and local resource users. This has helped to increase common understanding in 
CBCRM and to keep the management system consistent and stable.
Bridging social capital also functions to sustain consistent management strategies so 
as to facilitate sustainable use of the resources on a larger scale. Both Cuvu and Wai have 
conducted coastal management activities within the framework of LMMA, although Cuvu 
later left the Network. The LMMA Network has developed a ‘Learning Framework' to 
share knowledge, skills, resources and information among participating projects. The 
participating projects use the framework for monitoring activities and expect to use the data 
and information for understanding factors contributing to the success or failure of project 
activities.
The NGOs that initiated CBCRM projects in Fiji are well recognised by the 
government officials at the provincial level particularly due to their better mobility and 
financial capability:
For tabu, we work with NGOs, FLMMA, like PCDF and WWF. They give some assistance to 
the villages, like floaters, buoys. ...The government now allows us to work together with these 
NGOs, because they have funds, they can give the people whatever they need, 1 mean 
assistance. (Government Officer2)
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Everybody is quite satisfied with the involvement into the environmental project. Most o f the 
people in the coastal area rely on seafood for their livelihood. Whatever NGOs are involved, we 
appreciate it. (Government Ofificerl)
The role o f Fiji LM M A in marine resource management o f the country is also 
recognised at the national level. At the International Meeting o f Small Island Developing 
States in January 2005, the Foreign Affairs and External Trade Minister stated that at least 
30 per cent o f Fiji's oceans and customary marine area qoliqoli would become marine 
protected areas by 2020, with involvement o f FLM M A (The Pacific News Agency Service: 
17 January 2005). According to the LM M A annual report o f 2006 (LM M A  Network 2007: 
3), the number o f MPAs associated with the LM M A network has expanded to 213 with 345 
square kilometres, including provisional sites.
7.3.2 Bridging social capital and rule enforcement
Supportive external monitoring and sanctioning institutions
Following the Fisheries Act that legally allows local resource users to nominate fish 
wardens as a monitor, NGOs facilitated the self-monitoring o f resources in tabu. As 
explained in Chapter 6, due to the strong ties within the community, accountability o f those 
internally selected fish wardens are considered high in the two districts. However, an 
important question is whether internally selected wardens are effective in protecting 
resources from poaching by non-members o f the CBCRM. Existing studies (for example, 
Schmitt et al. 2000) suggest that this is often one o f the major problems in sustaining CPR 
management. I f  rule breakers coming from outside the community are serious, higher levels 
o f bridging social capital with support from an external sanctioning organisation, such as a 
government agency, might reduce or mitigate the conflicts.
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To repeat, 75.7 per cent o f my interviewees complained that Indians from outside of 
their village come in to their Customary Fishing Rights Areas, including tabu, to harvest 
marine resources. However, while such intruders are identified by villagers as a major 
concern in their self-monitoring (Chapter 5), it is difficult for the wardens and other 
villagers of Cuvu to provide effective policing without a motorised boat. Villagers in Cuvu 
may be able to ask the Fijian Resort for its voluntary, but irregular, support in monitoring. 
However, government officials are unable to provide services for day-to-day monitoring 
due to weak fiscal capacity. As a result, bridging social capital currently has no effects on 
monitoring and sanctioning in the CBCRM of Cuvu and Wai districts.
7.3.3 Effects of bridging social capital on rule compliance
Up to this point, my results are compatible with what the theoretical functions o f bridging 
social capital suggested in the literature. What I would like to add in my empirical study to 
the study of the functions o f bridging social capital in CBCRM in Fiji is that it can affect 
people’s compliance with the rules o f resource use. Ostrom (1990) states that the presence 
o f good rules resulting from appropriators’ participation does not ensure that appropriators 
w ill follow the rules. She argues that the monitoring o f rule conformance could be more 
important than participating in decision making. However, in case studies, appropriators' 
attitudes were affected by the opportunity o f participating in the rule making process.
All villages o f both Cuvu and Wai have nominated two fish wardens each and the 
wardens conduct irregular monitoring activities. On the other hand, no regular external 
monitoring is implemented and no external sanctions are effective in both districts. 
Although there is no distinctive difference between the districts regarding monitoring and
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sanctioning, the degree of compliance with local resource use rules is higher in Cuvu than 
Wai, as presented in Chapter 5, 1 argue that this is due to the difference in the degree of 
villagers’ participation in rule-making between the two districts caused by the different 
project procedure and approaches of the two NGOs.
Before the project started, the WWF visited first to see the clan chief, Turaga ni 
Yavusa, in Lomawai village:
In 2000, WWF came to Lomawai village and they stayed in the village, because our big chief is 
from Lomawai [and lives there] so WWF came to Lomawai and talked to him. (Villager 1 of 
Wai)
It is commonly recognised in Fiji that visiting the chief to make a greeting and offer 
a gift o fyaqona is the first step in making contact with the villages. The entire procedure is 
called sevusevu and outsiders require permission to even walk in and around the villages. 
In the case of Wai, sevusevu and the following discussion with the chief lead to a specific 
project activity:
We went [to Wai] to address the communities’ concern of dying mangroves and use of 
mangroves for dyeing37 [sic]. ...When the chief heard about what’s happening in the mangroves 
and how it could affect the sea, he saw the problem his people were facing. And he knew why.
... Fie got a map...he sectioned the whole his qoliqoli to be all tabu area. Then we had a 
discussion. We asked where the people are going to go to fish, how they will sustain their lives 
if fishing is banned in the whole qoliqoli area. ... After so many deliberations and dialogues, he 
said, 'Ok it [tabu] will be this priority area, according to his tradition’. (WWF officer)
In short, the WWF project put an emphasis on the chiefs opinions and the 
opportunity for villagers’ participation in decision making regarding tabu establishment 
was quite limited. Few residents who actually engage in fishing activity were involved in 
' The residents produce dye from mangrove plants and use it for making handicrafts.
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the rule making and thus do not have much sense of participation in the rule making 
process. A fisher perceives the decision regarding the tabu establishment to have been 
made unilaterally by the chief:
When the tabu was put, only chief decided where to put it. Nobody else was involved. (Villager 
9 of Wai)
According to this fisher, the deceased previous chiefs decision on the location of tabu, is 
not sufficient in protecting juvenile fish. Although these fish are found in the river mouth, 
tabu cannot protect them sufficiently because it is set in a different place:
Tabu should be put in a place where fish grow. I have seen a lot of baby fish in the river mouth 
area, but people fish in this area. Now we have tabu in other place but it should be in the river 
mouth. The location should be changed. Other people, I mean fishermen, know this too. If the 
chance is given, I would like to raise this in the village meeting. (Villager 9 of Wai)
The current chief agreed with the fisher’s opinion that participation was not enough:
My brother decided tabu when WWF came. I don’t know how they decided. (ViHager 13 of 
Wai)
Although the residents of Wai I talked to said that they respected the previous chief, I did
observe some discontent about the rule that the ultimate authority lay with the chief and
how his decisions may have affected the residents’ compliance to the tabu rules. Specific
attributes of the particular resource need to be considered in rules in CPR management as
argued by Ostrom (1990) as one of the principles for long-enduring CPR:
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of 
resource units are related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring 
labour, material, and/or money (p. 90).
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Detailed in her later work (Ostrom 1998b), and one of the important points this 
principle suggests, is that the rules must have a linkage with local ecological conditions. 
However, as Villager 9 and 13 of Wai stated, the specific attributes of the marine resources 
in these particular areas, which have been built up in interactions with villagers’ resource 
use patterns, were not taken into account in designing rules-in-use. The ecological 
congruence between institutions and local conditions may not be as strong in Wai District 
due to the project process which failed to incorporate villagers’ local knowledge, 
particularly in rule-making. This discourages the villagers in complying with the rules of 
resource use.
In order to measure respondents’ perceptions of their influence in CBCRM, the 
individual questionnaire survey asked how much influence they think people in the village 
could have in making marine resource management in the village water better. The results 
showed that villagers of Cuvu have a stronger sense of empowerment than villagers of Wai 
(Figure 7.1 and Table 7.3). In short, 71.9 per cent of Cuvu respondents answered that they 
have a lot of influence in marine resource management in their village, while only 44.2 per 
cent of Wai respondents answered so. Males and females showed different trends in their 
answers: overall male residents seem to have a stronger sense of empowerment than female, 
although 62.5 per cent of Cuvu women answered that they have some or a lot of influence 
in marine resource management. Due to the lack of data caused by the limitations in 
research design, particularly the small sample size, it has not proved possible for me to 
reach a definite conclusion. However, the project activities that the PCDF facilitated, 
including greater chances to attend workshops and the establishment of the Cuvu 
Environment Committee, might have affected villagers' attitudes. Nevertheless, the
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traditional dominance o f  males in village politics may be the reason for the stronger sense 
o f empowerment in marine resource management even after the NGOs facilitated the 
opportunities o f participation in tabu management regardless o f gender.
Figure 7.1 Perceptions of empowerment
How much influence do you think people in the village like yourself can have in making marine 
resource management in the village water better?
!%)
100
Cuvu i%i
100
Wai
08 1
; ■;
None Not very much
Cuvu: n=60, Wai: n=62
Not very much Some
a Female 
«Male
Table 7.3 Perceptions of empowerment
Mean
T-value P-value
Cuvu Wai
2.] I 2.63 -2.523 .013
Codes: 1 None; 2 Not very much; 3 Some; 4 A lot. 
Cuvu: n= 60, Wai: n=62
7.4 Conclusions
This chapter analysed the function o f bridging social capital in CBCRM in Cuvu and Wai 
districts. By building bridging social capital between NGOs, villages o f Cuvu and Wai 
gained access to knowledge and information on coastal resource management and MPA or
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tabu that were new to them. Bridging social capital between Fijian communities can work 
to mitigate or avoid conflict between them by facilitating understanding of CBCRM 
objectives and its rules in another village. Furthermore, bridging social capital connects the 
village and different levels and types of organisations particularly government agencies. 
By providing not only knowledge to the villages, but also incorporating government 
agencies into the process of CBCRM, local rules, such as the village fish warden system, 
can be consistent with the existing legislative framework and leading to greater stability in 
the entire management system.
Higher levels of bridging social capita! seem to increase villagers’ compliance with 
the local rules. The two NGOs chose different strategies in their community-based projects 
and the results were different. When relationships were built that took into consideration 
the interests of each community member rather than considering the community as a 
homogeneous unit, rule compliance was higher. The ‘individual approach,’ which allowed 
individual villagers to participate in the process of MPA formulation, was more successful 
in the involvement of community members. This facilitated the sense of ownership among 
the villagers on the management practices. The lack of participation failed to incorporate 
resource users’ knowledge and experience into management planning, resulting in the 
lower ecological congruence between institutions and local conditions. However, in order 
to generalise the effect of NGO approaches to CBCRM, further research is necessary to 
examine how other factors, such as attitudes of the chiefs or the degree of each villager's 
involvement in the market economy, is responsible to villagers’ compliance with local rules.
Previous studies on Fiji argue that traditional practices that contribute to conserving 
coastal resources have been largely maintained (for example, Veitayaki et al. 2001).
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Operations of those practices, such as imposing seasonal bans, temporary no-take areas or 
restricting particular types of fishing methods, are supported by strong bonds that have 
been formed in Fijian communities. Traditional norms of hierarchy restrict people's 
behaviour and require obedience to the community’s rules. As my research shows, these 
rules are often arbitrarily imposed by the chief or other elders. Strong bonds that facilitate 
trust among the people in the community are necessary to maintain long-enduring CBCRM 
institutions. However, the effectiveness of those local practices is increasingly being 
challenged due to pressures of population growth and the related need to harvest more to 
feed household members. Pressures to earn money in an ever expanding cash economy are 
also responsible for increasing rates of change in these traditional communities.
My thesis aims to explain how different types of social capital function in CBCRM 
in Fiji and 1 do not make any assumptions of moral superiority or inferiority about a given 
type of social capital in Fijian society. However, whatever the characteristics of social 
capital in a particular community, rural Fijians are increasingly under pressure to 
participate in a global economy, bringing pressure on local natural resources. I argue that 
these changes in the lives of the Fijian people require higher levels of bridging social 
capital for the purpose of coastal management. This allows people in a small community to 
obtain new ideas, technology and funds that are necessary to improve the status of natural 
resources. In order to improve marine resource management at the village level, the 
challenge is to identify a strategy for building bridging social capital that is consistent with 
the bonding ties that already exist.
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusions
8.1 Introduction
This thesis examined the issue o f coastal resource management in Fiji as CPR management 
where cultural norms and traditional practices in a community have affected on its 
members’ actions in resource use by constituting an institutional framework that requires 
strong bonds and cohesiveness within the community. However, as economic and social 
conditions change, a common perception among Fijians themselves is that they are 
becoming more individualistic and ties with other people in the community are becoming 
weaker.
In recent years, a new style o f coastal resource management has emerged in Fiji 
with demand from both community members and outsiders to improve existing 
management practices for sustainable resource use. The CBCRM projects o f Fiji attempt 
to provide the community with knowledge and skills based on science, while incorporating 
Fijian cultural norms and traditional practices into management. Since different donors and 
NGOs are involved, although all the projects are ‘community-based’ , their implementation 
employs different approaches and strategies from place to place. In short, some projects 
encourage every single villager to participate in the project activities considering that 
individuals have different interest and objectives in their own life but improving shared
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understanding on CBCRM through the participatory process would facilitate the 
construction of stable mutual expectations among villagers so as to increase rule 
compliance. Other projects assume that the whole community shares interests and concerns 
with their chief as a political leader and the project formulation may fail to incorporate 
ideas and needs of individual villagers who use resources for their day-to-day life so as to 
discourage the will to cooperate with one another.
A key focus of my research has been to investigate different types of social capital 
in CBCRM. The operational definition of social capital for this study is ‘a set of values, 
such as the norms of reciprocity, and social relations embedded in the social structure of 
society that enable people to act collectively and to achieve their desired goals.’ The 
theoretical literature on new institutionalism suggests that a certain level of trust among 
resource users is necessary to sustain institutions. This logically leads to the argument that 
social capital plays important roles in long enduring CPR management. In particular, since 
CBCRM in Fiji has involved different types of stakeholders, understanding how the ties 
within the community, as well as between the community and other stakeholders, affect 
management is important. Thus, the research question posed in this thesis was:
What are the different roles of bonding and bridging social capital in CBCRM?
Bonding social capital was defined as ‘social ties which cement somewhat homogenous 
groups, such as in terms of race or kin, and bridging social capital on the other hand refers 
to ‘social ties which create bonds of connectedness across diverse groups. ’
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My thesis examined the roles of these two types o f social capital based on the 
following theoretical argument:
(1) As ‘ strong ties,’ bonding social capital reinforces homogenous groups and facilitates 
common understanding and shared knowledge among members. By helping the 
rationalisation o f rules and norms within the group, it encourages members to comply.
(2) As ‘weak ties,’ bridging social capital provides a group with information, opportunities 
and technology from the external world. It facilitates information flows and transmission 
and helps consistency o f rules at different-levels
In this concluding chapter, I first review the results o f my study on how social 
capital functions in CBCRM. Based on the findings o f this research conducted in two 
districts in Fiji, I present some issues for consideration in the design o f CBCRM in relation 
to social capital. Finally, I end the chapter with a discussion o f some suggestions for future 
research on CBCRM in Fiji and other areas o f the world.
8.2 Summary of findings
8.2.1 Role of bonding social capital in CBCRM
Rural Fijians are strongly tied to one another. The residents o f villages are exclusively 
Fijian and their close kinship is the foundation o f village social life. Cultural practices o f 
gift exchange and reciprocity have historically been used as mechanisms to maintain and 
strengthen kinship ties. When resource management occurs within a context that uses 
cultural imperatives, rivalry in resource harvesting can be reduced due to the reciprocal
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relationships based on strong bonds. Indeed, shared norms can mitigate potential conflicts 
in the village.
The strong bonds among village members help disseminate information and 
knowledge among residents in the village. Gatherings are one of the major social events in 
day-to-day village life and contribute to information sharing. Villagers get together for 
different purposes, such as for church, women’s or men’s club or mother’s club. Regularly 
held village meetings allow all villagers to know what decisions are made and the process 
through which they are reached.
Existing studies (Gibson et al. 2005; Ostrom 1990) argue that low cost rule 
enforcement is necessary for long-term CPR management. As part of the CBCRM project 
activities, fish wardens were nominated as being responsible for the monitoring of marine 
resources, particularly in MPA or tabu. Villagers trust the fish wardens as they are part of 
the community. The strong bonds between them contribute to their high degree of 
accountability to other villagers. Although sanctions for rule breakers vary from a verbal 
warning to physical punishment, in many cases only minimum punishment is given. In 
their sharing and exchange based village life, anger and hatred are naturally controlled. As 
a result, the cost of rule enforcement in CBCRM remains low.
However, the reciprocal relationship as part of the strong bonds could impose 
pressure on natural resources because Fijians do not like to decline someone asking a 
favour, even when it is considered inappropriate. The basic local rule of marine resource 
use in the villages is that no one is allowed to enter into MPA. However, when a request 
follows the cultural procedure, Fijians, or more specifically a chief of the community,
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normally offer a permit to harvest resources in MPA. Under the hierarchical social 
structure, the majority o f villagers hardly objects to the chief and his fam ily’ s decision. 
Although there is widespread recognition that modern Fijians pursue individual objectives 
rather than cultural obligations, people especially living in a rural village are expected to 
obey hierarchical orders and decisions, even i f  they are not consistent with management 
plans agreed to by the entire village.
8.2.2 Role of bridging social capital in CBCRM
The major role o f bridging social capital is to transmit knowledge and information 
regarding coastal resource management to villages from outside. By building bridging 
social capital between NGOs, villages o f Cuvu and Wai gained access to knowledge and 
information on coastal resource management that were new to them. A ll the villagers in 
the two CBCRM cases learned the importance o f coastal resource management and 
advantages o f MPAs as a tool for management through the NGO that was involved in the 
projects. In the case that a village has a conflict with another Fijian community, bridging 
social capital between the villages can work to mitigate or avoid the conflict altogether. 
Furthermore, bridging social capital between the village and different levels and types o f 
organisations helps to keep consistency o f rules in an organised system. In short, the 
CBCRM project explained to the villagers about the law and regulations regarding the 
resource ownership system o f Fiji and facilitated the process o f fish warden appointment in 
each village according to the Fisheries Act. This has helped not only to increase common 
understanding in CBCRM in the village but also to keep the management system consistent 
at the village level and national level.
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Furthermore, in the cases of CBCRM of Fiji, bridging social capital affected 
villagers’ compliance with local resource use rules. When the involvement of the villages 
was planned, the two CBCRM projects took different processes. The project in Cuvu that 
took an ‘individual participation approach’ considered a village as a group of individuals 
who have heterogeneous interests. It encouraged each villager to individually gain 
knowledge and experience of coastal management. This interactive approach facilitated an 
awareness of village members on the significance of coastal management and their sense of 
ownership over the project. On the other hand, the project in Wai that took a ‘group 
approach’ considered a village to be a group where individuals share common interests 
offered participation opportunities in management planning to only selected villagers. The 
assumption of those who planned this project was that the villagers were united following 
traditional decision making arrangements. However, this approach ended up with a lower 
sense of ownership and responsibility among villagers in resource management. As a result, 
villagers had low levels of compliance with local resource use rules mainly because the 
management plan failed to incorporate local ecological conditions possessed by resource 
users. In short, the Wai project failed to incorporate the diversity of personal concerns and 
individual interests.
Links through deliberate interactions can be particularly significant in relationships 
that are new and developing. Parties to the relationship need to secure their mutual 
expectation, build trust and be able to reduce uncertainty. In settings where arrangements 
for decision making have been traditionally authoritarian and top-down, an effort to change 
it to participatory and shared decision making would require multiple types of interactions 
that are directed towards creating trust by overcoming the unfairness, fears and doubts of
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all parties in the relationship. It is indeed time consuming. However, relationships that are 
deliberate patterns o f association among villages, and aimed at collective action, are crucial 
to the successful continuation of CBCRM activities.
While formal institutional arrangements that support customary marine tenure are 
set by an authoritative higher level body, informal rules and norms evolve through informal 
social interactions and social structures that produce social capital. Interactive processes 
through bridging social capital encourage residents o f the community to create ‘credible 
commitments’ in the project. Externally facilitated processes o f association and being part 
o f the association help build trust and common understanding. Credible commitment 
among the residents is enhanced by connecting individuals and fostering collective interests 
that, in turn, lead to mutually reinforcing expectations among them (M iller 1992; North 
1990; Ostrom 1990). These mutually reinforcing expectations encourage individuals to see 
long term, rather than short-term, interests. In short, whether or not interactive processes 
among the villagers are taken account during the project implementation can make the 
difference between building common understanding and mutual trust among interdependent 
individuals and the stagnation of cooperative arrangements in communities.
8.3 Issues for consideration in designing CBCRM in Fiji and 
relevance of the research
8.3.1 Participation
A widespread endeavour exists to incorporate participation in resource management 
projects in various parts o f the world. In particular, managing systems where a resource is 
communally owned and historically managed by local residents with their shared norms
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and rules require a high degree of their participation to achieve long-term management 
objectives. However, as the involvement of local residents becomes a common strategy, 
‘participation* has come to have different meanings and aims for different people in 
practice. It ranges from contributing to reduce implementation costs by letting community 
members voluntarily contribute to a project that is designed, funded and managed by 
external organisations, to a means of achieving political empowerment by re-establishing 
indigenous organisations and institutions (Buckland 1998; Oakley 1991).
As CBCRM becomes entrenched as a vital part of fisheries and environment 
management in coastal areas, management costs are shifted from the management authority 
to the communities and/or external donors. This offers support for the notion that resource 
management action through CBCRM should not only be to reduce management costs but 
also empower the community with an emphasis on its communal ownership of resources. 
In the case of Fiji, costs for the attempt to establish and maintain locally managed MPAs 
are largely shouldered by the villagers as their fishing activities are restricted in the MPAs. 
However, in most cases in the Pacific island nations, including Fiji, these costs can be 
offset by the presence of customary marine tenure, as it guarantees a certain level of 
property rights in addition to other incentives such as improved fish catch. In other words, 
communities involved in CBCRM should be the net benefactors of the management project 
so that there can be reinvestment of resources by the community, including the 
community’s time and effort, into the CBCRM. In other words, it is important to promote 
bonding social capital as a strong tie within the community to be an owner of the project 
sharing common understanding and norms in CBCRM.
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On the other hand. I argue that individual participation in management planning is 
the key to collective action in CPR management. While the significance o f communal 
ownership remains in Pacific island nations, individuals in the community need to be given 
a chance to directly interact with external actors and to address their concerns and opinions. 
External actors must choose the process o f institution development that encourages 
individuals in local communities to participate because it has profound effects on local 
democracy. The process o f community-based resource management should not neglect the 
importance o f individual participation because local democracy supported by participation 
shapes social and environmental sustainability necessary for long-term CPR management.
8.3.2 Roles of non-local organisations
In CBCRM, the emergence o f collective action can be facilitated in a cooperative 
endeavour by external actors. By designing the project process to encourage resource users" 
participation, they can foster mutually recognised norms o f behaviour and mutual 
expectations that can result in productive cooperation. This type o f facilitation is 
particularly important where social structures and customs are in rapid transition from a 
system o f communal subsistence to that o f a more modern system.
It is important to note that the process o f participation may take a long time and 
achieving cooperation among participants is a time consuming effort. Villagers stated that 
it had been difficu lt to accept new ideas brought by NGOs at the beginning o f the CBCRM 
projects. Strong bonds in the villages may impede the acceptance o f unfamiliar ideas and 
concepts from outside for the purpose o f protecting the in-group. As de Soto (2000) 
explains, a lack o f rigid institutions and trust in the relationship between the villages and
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NGOs could be a possible reason why villagers do not feel they have incentives to invest 
their resources in building a relationship.
A great degree of incongruence of interests among the villagers, which requires an 
extended process of negotiation and compromise, could also be a reason for the time 
consuming process of CBCRM. However, in light of the importance of deliberate 
interactions as patterns of association that potentially generate trust and common 
understanding, facilitation can be conceptualised as a set of interactions between villagers 
as local resource users and non-local organisations meant to achieve effective, efficient and 
equitable coastal resource management. Given that intervention by non-local organisations 
can exacerbate existing asymmetries in communities and bypass or undermine existing 
social organisations, the importance of designing appropriate facilitative arrangements is 
magnified.
CBCRM in Fiji can be conceptualised as a cooperative endeavour between local 
resource users who are given communal ownership and non-local organisations, such as 
NGOs and government agencies. In this type of management arrangement, the 
interdependence in providing both common pool goods and public goods can be 
problematic for the provision of coastal resources. The costs involved to satisfy both 
management aspects are inseparable. For instance, on the one hand, villagers need fish and 
other marine products for their livelihood and subsistence, while on the other hand the 
project specific purpose is to ensure the provision of common pool goods to the villages. 
At least some non-local organisations would like to maintain ecosystem services from that 
coastal area, such as biodiversity and coastal protection. Even if the villagers invested their 
resources to organise themselves for a coastal area to produce enough products for villagers
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themselves in a sustainable way, the non-local organisations may find that public good 
benefits from the coastal area are underprovided. However, villagers cannot be induced to 
sacrifice their harvesting for a public good unless the cost o f obtaining such a good is 
somehow reduced. Non-local organisations may play a role as cost mitigators in the 
provision o f ecosystem services or other such public goods produced by a communally 
managed natural environment. Beyond the current important role o f bridging social capital, 
this could be one o f the ways to conceptualise collective action for coastal management 
between villagers and relevant non-local organisations.
8.3.3 Nature of marine resources and scaling up of community- 
based management
The physical attributes o f a resource affects its governance and management arrangements. 
Understanding the roles o f bridging social capital also helps CBCRM solve its potential 
weakness in relation to characteristics o f marine organisms. First, many coastal organisms, 
such as fish and invertebrates, are highly mobile. The currents and buoyancy support the 
different stages o f their life histories, allowing a large number o f plankton and nekton 
species to disperse. Second, habitats on the coasts, such as tidal flats, rocky shores and 
seagrasses, alter seasonally or sometimes even daily. Third, many species o f marine animal 
groups, such as molluscs, echinoderms and crustaceans, morphologically change as they 
grow. As a result, different stages o f their life history require different environmental 
conditions and physical settings. The heterogeneity o f habitats provided by the diversity o f 
coastal ecosystems needs to be considered for effective conservation planning. Moreover, 
larvae o f many marine species can be dispersed away from their parent population, which
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means that their recruitment can occur on a scale of hundreds of metres to tens of
kilometres or even larger scale.
Due to these unique characteristics of marine organisms, the geographic scale of 
conservation is a debatable issue. In short, while the significance of involving local 
resource users is widely recognised and clear boundaries of CPR are argued to be one of the 
most important conditions in long-lasting management, a major criticism of community- 
level MPAs, like tabu, is that they are small in scale and, consequently, may have no affect 
on widespread marine resource problems. Foal and Manele (2004: 376) argue that, when 
a community chooses to close part of their territorial water as an MPA to fishing, the 
geographic scale of the MPA must be similar to, or larger than, the scale of stock- 
recruitment relationships in order to ensure conservation benefits for the community that 
pays the cost for resource conservation. In short, setting up a no-fishing zone does not 
assure the increase of their fish catch when the scale of larvae recruitment is larger than the 
area of their water.
A possible solution to this scale problem is to expand a network among the 
community projects because the community loses incentive to continue the MPA, unless 
other communities agree to implement MPAs in their water. For instance, by building a 
network, small tabu projects can scale-up their impacts so as to contribute to marine 
resource conservation in a larger area. This appears to be more realistic than setting up one 
large MPA that requires consensus among a large number of stakeholders at once.
When expanding the network among the community projects, non-local 
organisations concerned with specific conservation issues can affect local communities.
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These allow for good communications but are also able to coordinate local/non-local 
actions important for larger scale resource management. Building effective bridging ties 
among these stakeholders facilitates better understanding and the sharing o f knowledge o f 
management practices. The common understanding and shared knowledge should lead to 
greater cooperation, including higher degrees o f rule compliance. The involvement o f 
stakeholders at different scales and building cross-scale networks offer some hope for 
addressing the great complexity o f multiple-scale coastal resource management.
8.4 Suggestions for future research
Although I have attempted to examine the relationship between social capital and CBCRM, 
many issues, questions, and avenues for future research remain. In particular, the presence 
o f non-Fijian resource users, the influence o f migrants from villages and the issue o f 
theoretical generalisability are problematic. The following sections briefly discuss these 
issues as possible research topics in the future.
8.4.1 CBCRM and non-Fijian resource users
This thesis examined the roles o f social capital in CBCRM in Fiji focusing on its two 
dimensional nature, expressed by bonding and bridging social capital. Both the cases o f 
CBCRM used involve Fijian villages o f two districts and NGOs as non-local organisations. 
The strength o f this research is that both cases are geographically close and the social 
structures are similar. Thus, the controlled comparison between the two cases allowed me 
to examine the impact o f the differences in project processes implemented by the NGOs on 
villagers’ participation and compliance with local rules.
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Due to the unavoidable limitations addressed in Chapter 1, 1 could obtain data 
concerning only Fijians and their resource management. However, although they are not 
granted customary marine tenure, 1 realise that non-Fijians, especially Indians, are at least 
part o f the existing resource use system comprised o f harvesting, trading, marketing and 
consuming resources. It is reasonable to expect that their actions and behaviour in resource 
use somewhat affects the management o f coastal resources on a larger scale. However, 
data are currently lacking. Understanding the possibilities o f building bridges between 
different groups is one o f the ways to improve larger scale, such as national level, resource 
management o f Fiji.
8.4.2 Migrants from the villages
International migration is a common social phenomenon in Pacific countries, including Fiji. 
Emigration o f Fijian citizens to metropolitan countries, mainly Australia, New Zealand and 
the USA, became common especially after the coup d'etat o f 1987 particularly for the Indo- 
Fijian population. The annual average Indo-Fijian migrants to overseas was approximately 
4.400 during 1987-1999 and it increased to 5,800 migrants a year during 2000-2003 
(Mohanty 2001). While the number o f indigenous Fijians migrating to overseas is far less - 
the annual average was approximately 300 during 1987-1999 and 470 during 2000-2003 
(Mohanty 2001), internal migration or rural-urban migration is common in the country. 
The urban Fijian population has continuously increased from 23.8 per cent in 1966 to 44.5 
per cent in 2007 (Table 8.1).
256
Table 8.1 Indigenous Fijian population 1966 - 2007
C e n s u s  y e a r U r b a n  p o p u la t io n R u r a l  p o p u la t io n T o t a l
19 6 6 4 8 ,2 0 5 ( 2 3 .8 % ) 153,971 ( 7 6 .2 % ) 2 0 2 ,1 7 6
19 7 6 7 9 ,3 1 4 ( 3 0 .5 % ) 180 ,618 ( 6 9 . 5 % ) 2 5 9 ,9 3 2
1986 1 0 7 ,7 8 0 ( 3 2 .7 % ) 2 2 1 ,5 2 5 ( 6 7 . 3 % ) 3 2 9 ,3 0 5
19 9 6 161 ,335 ( 4 1 .0 % ) 2 3 2 ,2 4 0 ( 5 9 . 0 % ) 3 9 3 ,5 7 5
2 0 0 7 2 1 0 ,7 6 2 ( 4 4 .5 % ) 263 ,221 ( 5 5 .5 % ) 4 7 3 ,9 8 3
Source: Bedford (1988); Fiji Government (1996a; 2007b)
Li (2004) argues that it is not unusual for migrants to have high levels o f bonding 
social capital among themselves. In particular, due to the customary land tenure system 
which constrains their identify in relation with a particular piece o f land given to his or her 
clan, Fijians generally keep strong connections to family and relatives left in his/her home 
village even after migration. However, as the migrants go to school or work in their new 
home, they extend their networks beyond their kin-based relationships brought from the 
home village. Here, people start building bridging social capital. For families and relatives 
remained in the home village, migrated members of the family may bring new knowledge 
and technology besides remittances, building a bridge between the village and outside. In 
short, the migrants could play a role in building bridging social capital for rural residents.
This is seen in the context of CBCRM in Fiji, although I did not Find any evidence 
o f migrants’ direct effect in my cases. From my interviews with MPA experts in Suva, I 
found that at least two other MPA sites in Fiji had strong influence from a former village 
resident who migrated to the capital city for education and job. In both cases, the idea of 
MPA and part o f initial cost o f its establishment were provided by or through those former 
residents. It is not clear if  this tie should be categorised as bonding or bridging -  the 
migrants are part o f family who have connection based on kin but they apparently possess 
different links to sources external o f the village. Understanding the nature o f social capital
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that is built by migrated villagers and its effect on CBCRM would contribute to policy 
implications for improving CBCRM operation.
8.4.3 Theoretical generalisability of the study
A key test o f the utility o f any theory is determined by its applicability across similar cases. 
However, due to high costs, time limits and other constraints, I chose to take a case study 
approach to this research, rather than conducting a large-N study. The main strength o f this 
approach is that it offers the opportunity for in-depth descriptions useful for concepts we 
know little about. Although the generalisation o f case study findings are usually limited to 
the case itself or to similar cases, my results may be applicable to other CBCRM projects in 
Fiji designed and implemented under the framework o f LM M A. 1 expect this to be the case 
especially for those Fijian villages that have a social structure similar to the one described 
in this thesis. However, I recognise that this can only be examined through further research 
and so I wish to lim it my conclusions. To examine further the theory o f the importance o f 
bonding and bridging social capitals on CPR management, it is essential that future 
research examine the problem o f measuring social capital. Determining appropriate 
empirical indicators to measure social capital across geographic regions is a major 
constraint for this type o f study.
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Appendix A Sample Interv iew Guide - Village Representatives/Chief Interview
1 .Background information
• Population, number of household, number of yavusa and mataqali
• When and why was the marine protected area (MPA)/tabu area established?
2. Marine resource use
• What are the value of marine product?
• What are the most important marine resources for home consumption? Income/exchange? 
Traditional ceremonies?
• How are the catch sold or distributed? e.g. home use, given away to other residents, sold to a buyer, 
sold directly to consumer. Is there any buyer regularly come to village?
• How stable is the supply of the products?
• What are major fishing techniques used among the village residents?
• Do usually people borrow fishing gear or any other equipment which allow them to access marine 
resources (e.g. boat)?
• What are their obligations when they borrow fishing gear?
• Are there any activities in village water other than fishing? Who is conducting these resource uses?
• In addition to marine resources, what natural resources do the residents have access to? (agricultural 
land, livestock etc)
3. MPA (tabu) management
• (On this map) Please indicate the fishing ground you/your village has access to and WIPA/tabu area 
set in the water. Please explain resource uses in the village water.
• Within the MPA, what rules govern resource use?
• What are government regulations that affect resource use in the MPA?
• What are unwritten rules or customs that affect resource use in the MPA?
• What was the process that people went through to establish the MPA and how were these rules 
developed?
• Who was involved in the development of the MPA? Who initiated?
• What is your role in decision-making regarding the management of MPA?
• How did government agencies work with the village?
• How did NGO/University work with the village?
• How has management changed?
• How has it changed over the years? Any changes in players involved in management?
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• Suppose there is a problem in marine resource use in the village (e.g. sudden decline of fish catch) 
requiring an immediate solution. What would be a process to make decisions?
• How have these rules affected resource use patterns?
• Is there any punishment for rule breakers?
• If yes, how is the punishment determined?
• What villagers usually do if they see somebody breaking the rules?
• How does your village get necessary resources for MPA management?
• What is the most important source of funding?
• What is the most important source of expertise or advice which your village receive?
• How do your village contact with NGO/University/government agencies?
• What for do your village contact with them
• How often do they visit to the village?
• Do you visit them in Suva? If yes, how often?
• How do you describe the relationship between your village and the NGO/University?
• How do the village residents share information regarding resource use?
• How do they know if there is any change in legal rules?
• How do they know if there is any change in unwritten rules?
• Is there anything you would change to improve the MPA/resource management?
• How many fishing licenses have your village approved? How much was the value?
4. Social groups and networks
• What types of organisations or groups do exist in this village? E.g. church, women, youth (use a 
Venn diagram to show the groups and the relationships among them)
• How are these orgnisations/groups involved in MPA management?
• How can people be a member of these organisations/groups?
• Are there any difficulties in being involved with the organisations/groups? Is there any membership 
fee (or donation) to the organisations/groups?
• Is there any other organisation (e.g. NGO, donor, university) that has had or is having any project in 
your village in the past 10 years? (e.g. health, education, infrastructure, conservation)
5. Resource status and management effectiveness
• How do you see the future conditions of the marine environment in the area?
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Appendix C Sample Individual Survey Questionnaire
Bulaü
I am a student from the Australian National University in Canberra. I am visiting your village to gain 
some knowledge in coastal management o f  Fijian villages. My study is being implemented with 
cooperation from XXXXX, and supervised by Dr. Joeli Veitayaki o f  the University of  South Pacific as 
well as Dr. Meg Keen o f  the Australian National University.
I would like to ask you some questions regarding marine resource conservation in your village, as well as 
village life. Your answers will help me write my research report. Before I start asking the questions, I 
would like to explain about my research.
Fiji is a prominent country in coastal resource management. There have been some great initiatives to 
make sustainable resource use possible, especially at a village level. My research attempts to investigate 
how people work together for better marine management. It is very important to know this because it 
helps others to learn lessons from coastal management in Fiji and improve marine management practices 
in other areas o f  the South Pacific. I came to your village for my research because this is a village that is 
with a strong commitment to locally managed marine areas and I can learn a lot from your experience.
The following is important information for you:
■ It should take only 10-15 minutes to answer all the questions.
■ Your responses remain completely confidential and I will not show/tell anyone what your answers 
are. You will not be identified by name in my thesis, or in any report or publication resulting from 
this study.
■ You may skip any questions you feel you do not wish to answer. However, I would appreciate you 
answering all of  the questions because 1 believe that each question is relevant to understanding 
people and coastal management in this village.
■ A summary o f  the research results will be sent to your village.
If you have any questions about my research, please do not hesitate to ask me. Thank you in advance for 
your cooperation.
Vinaka vakalevu.
Yae Sano 
PhD Candidate
Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government 
Australian National University 
Canberra ACT 0200 Australia 
Phone: +61-2-6125-6557
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1. First o f all, I would like to know how you usually get food. What is the most usual way for 
you to obtain food? Please choose one.
Gardening
Buying food in market/village store
Fishing
Livestock
Supply from relatives / neighbours 
Other
□
□
□
□
□
□
Please specify ___________________________
2. Now 1 would like to know how marine resources are used in the tikina water. Please answer 
the follow ing questions.
2-1. Do you go fishing (all activities to get any kind o f marine resource)?
Yes □  No □
I f  yes, please go to 2-2. I f  no, please go to 3.
2-2. For how long have you been fishing?
________  years
When did you start fishing?
Since age o f ___________
2- 3. How often do you go fishing?
Less than once a week □
1-2 days per week □
3- 4 days per week □
5-6 days per week □
Everyday □
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2-4. What fishing gear do you most often use? Please check as many as applicable. 
Net □
Trap □
Hook and line □
Other □  Please specify _____________________
Do not use gear □
2-5. Where do you usually fish?
Kanakana □
Qoliqoli □
Outside of qoliqoli □
2-6. Do you use borrowed fishing gear from other people?
Yes □  No □
If yes, please answer 2-7. If no, please go to 2-8.
2-7. When you borrow, what are your obligations?
No obligation □
Pay money H
Give part of the fish catch □
Other □  Please specify
Don’t know □
2-8. Do you usually go fishing with others?
YesG No □
If yes, with whom?
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2-9. What do you do when you catch too many fish to eat in your family? Please check most 
applicable answer.
Sell in village □
Barter with other residents □
Give to chief □
Give to relatives □
Give to other residents □
Sell in market □
Dispose n
Other □  Please specify
Don’t know □
2-10 Are there other activities than fishing that you do at sea?
Boating □
Bathing □
Swimming □
Tourist guide □
1 do not do any activity other than fishing □  
Don’t know □
3. The following questions are about fishing rules in the tikina water. Your answers will help 
me understand how marine resources are managed in your village.
3-1. Suppose there is a problem in village water (kanakana) and rules for MPA use need to be 
changed. Who makes decisions about changes to the fishing rules in the qoliqoli? Please check 
most applicable answer.
National government □
Local government □
Village residents □
Village chief □
Village elders □
NGO (WWF/PCDF) □
Other □
Please specify ______________________
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3 - 2 .  H o w  w o u l d  y o u  k n o w  i f  a n y  c h a n g e  is m a d e  in  f i s h i n g  r u l e s ?  W h o  w o u l d  t e l l  y o u ?
G o v e r n m e n t  o f f i c i a l s □
V i l l a g e  m e e t i n g □
O t h e r  r e s i d e n t s □
F a m i l y  m e m b e r s □
V i l l a g e  e l d e r s □
N G O  ( W W F / P C D F ) □
O t h e r □
P l e a s e  s p e c i f y
3 - 3 .  W o u l d  y o u  s a y  t h a t  f i s h i n g  r u l e s in  t h e  v i l l a g e  w a t e r  a r e  f o l l o w e d  b y  t h e  r e s i d e n t s ?
W e  a l l  f o l l o w □
M o s t  o f  t h e  t i m e  w e  f o l l o w □
S o m e  d o n ’t  f o l l o w n
M o s t  o f  u s  d o n ’t  f o l l o w □
N o n e  o f  u s  f o l l o w □
D o n ’t k n o w □
3 - 4 .  W h a t  a s p e c t  o f  m a r i n e  r e s o u r c e  m a n a g e m e n t  w o u l d  y o u  l i k e  t o  c h a n g e ?  P l e a s e  c h e c k  a l l
a p p l i c a b l e .
S i z e  o f  f i s h  a l l o w e d  t o  c a t c h □
A m o u n t  o f  f i s h  a l l o w e d  t o  c a t c h □
K i n d  o f  f i s h  a l l o w e d  t o  c a t c h □
L o c a t i o n  o f  M P A / t a b u  a r e a □
S i z e  o f  M P A / ta b u  a r e a □
D u r a t i o n  o f  M P A / t a b u  a r e a n
T y p e  o f  f i s h i n g  g e a r  a l l o w e d □
O t h e r □
P l e a s e  s p e c i f y
N o ,  n o  c h a n g e  i s  n e c e s s a r y □
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3-5. How much influence do you think people in the village like yourself can have in making 
marine resource management in the village water better?
A lot □
Some □
Not very much □
None □
3-6 How many times have you attended meeting/workshop/training regarding MPA management?
Never □
Once □
Twice or three times □
More than four times □
Don’t know □
3-7 If there were a sudden decline in fish catch in village water, who do you think would act to 
deal with the situation?
Each household would deal with the problem individually □
Members of mataqali among themselves □
The entire village working together □
All village leaders working together □
The entire tikina working together □
NGO □
Government official □
Don’t know □
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4. Please tell me about your background and social activities in the village. Your answers will 
help me understand how life in this village is.
4-1. Do you belong to any of the following groups? Please fill a table below for me.
Church
Yes □  Name of church ( )
No □
Men’s group
Yes □  Name of group ( )
No □
How often do you attend meetings/activities?
Less than once a month □
Once to twice a month □
3-4 times a month □
More than 4 times a month □
Women’s group
Yes □  Name of group ( )
No □
How often do you attend meetings/activities?
Less than once a month □
Once to twice a month □
3-4 times a month □
More than 4 times a month □
If you belong to any other group, please specify ( )
4-2. What is your gender?
Male □  Female □
4-3. How old are you?
18-24 years old □
25-34 years old □
35-44 years old □
45-54 years old □
55-64 years old □
65 years old and over □
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4-4. Are you currently employed?
Yes □  No □
If yes, where do you work?
How much did you get paid last month? $ __
4-5. Where do you live?
Name of Mataqali:
Name of Tokatoka :
4-6. What educational level have you completed?
Primary school □
Secondary school □
Vocational school □
University □
Other □
Please specify
Vinaka vakalevu!!!
A summary of survey results will be sent to your village. However, if you would like to receive 
a copy for yourself, please write your name.
Your name: _____________________________________ .
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